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The Evolving Concept of Sustainable Development

3chapter 1 the evolving concept of sustainable development
 1 Introductory Remarks
As a starting point, we may agree with Durán and Morgera, 
when they claim that the definition of sustainable development is primarily a 
construction of international law.1 Yet sustainable development is not something 
artificial, the above statement applies for the definition itself. At the same time 
we must also mention that the different documents and authors provide many 
different interpretations of the same. As one Hungarian ecologist indicates, 
there are many different uses of sustainability or sustainable development, 
while no one claims to hold the holy grail of the perfect definition.2 It would be 
reasonable to start any inquiry regarding sustainable development with some 
scepticism, considering that many prominent figures of international legal 
scholarship regard the concept of sustainable development with due pessimism. 
For example, Fitzmaurice describes sustainable development as an elusive 
category,3 while Lowe observes that sustainable development as a legal category 
is characterized by obscurity and confusion.4 Therefore, we seek to answer the 
question whether sustainable development as a concept set out in international 
treaties obliges the parties to behave in a certain way or much rather serves as 
a mere source of moral legitimation for such treaties, perhaps it is just a clause 
reflecting the spirit of its age without any precisely conceivable content.
It is Judge Weeremantry who mentions the oldest historical examples of 
sustainability5 in his separate opinion attached the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros 
judgment,6 which will be discussed later in detail: 
‘There are some principles of traditional legal systems that can be woven into the 
fabric of modern environmental law. They are especially pertinent to the concept 
of sustainable development which was well recognized in those systems. Moreo-
ver, several of these systems have particular relevance to this case, in that they 
relate to the harnessing of streams and rivers and show a concern that these acts 
of human interference with the course of nature should always be conducted with 
1  DURÁN, Gracia Marin and MORGERA, Elisa: Environmental Integration in the EU’s External Relations, 
Hart Publishing, 2012, p. 34-35.
2  BULLA, Miklós: A fenntartható fejlődés fogalmi világa in Vissza vagy hova – Útkeresés a fenntarthatóság 
felé Magyarországon, Tertia 2002, p. 105.
3  Sustainable development as the precautionary principle is one of the concepts of international environ-
mental law, the real nature of which is mysterious and intangible in spite of its frequent, or perhaps 
overly frequent use. See FITZMAURICE, Malgosia: Contemporary Issues in International Environmental 
Law. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009, p. 67.
4  LOWE, Vaughan: ’Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Practices’. In: BOYLE, Alan E. – FREE-
STONE, David (eds.): International Law and Sustainable Development – Past Achievements and Future 
Challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 23.
5  Justice WEEREMANTRY’s seperate opinion to the 25 September 1997 judgment of ICJ, http://www.
icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/7383.pdf, p. 94-95.
6  Case concerning Gabčikovo-Nagymaros (Hungary v Slovakia) 1997 ICJ3 Reprinted in 1998 ILM 168206.
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due regard to the protection of the environment. In the context of environmental 
wisdom generally, there is much to be derived from ancient civilizations and tradi-
tional legal systems in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, the Americas, the 
Pacific, and Australia – in fact, the whole world. This is a rich source which modern 
environmental law has left largely untapped.’
The concept of reconciling the needs of development with the protection of the 
environment is thus not new. Millennia ago these concerns were noted and their 
twin demands well reconciled in a manner so meaningful as to carry a message 
to Our age.’ In his opinion, sustainable development is defined as the right to 
development limited by the need to preserve the environment. It is worth noting 
that not all authors agree with Judge Weeramantry’s position. Many dispute 
that the right to development is, indeed, a right recognized under international 
law. For instance, Dire Tladi argues in his book7 that the right to sustainable 
development forms part of collective human rights, to which all people are 
entitled in relation to the long-term maintenance of the environment. Tladi 
also recalls that Judge Weeramantry referred to the protection of the environ-
ment as a sine qua non of a number of human rights. Although Tladi acknowl-
edges that some authors – for example Karin Arts8 – accept that the right to 
development forms part of international law, yet he claims that the existence of 
such a right is questionable.9
Bosselmann10 also leads us back to the origins of sustainability, present-
ing the German engineer and forestry specialist, Hans Carl von Carlowitz,11 as 
the inventor of the new definition of ’Nachhaltigkeit’. Based on his studies, in 
1754 Wilhelm Gottfried Moser from Württemberg defined the new system of 
forestry, the first principle of which is the sustainable use of forests.
7  TLADI, Dire: Sustainable Development in International Law: An Analysis of Key Enviro-Economic Instru-
ments. Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2007,
8  ARTS, Karin: Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lome Convention. 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000, p. 40-45.
9  TLADI, ibid. p. 65.
10  BOSSELMANN, Klaus: The Principle of Sustainability (Transforming Law and Governance), Ashgate, 
2008, p. 17-19.
11  His outstanding role is widely recognized: ‘The concept of ‘sustainability,’ or ‘Nachhaltigkeit’ in 
German, can be traced back to Hans Carl von Carlowitz (1645-1714), who managed mining on behalf 
of the Saxon court in Freiberg. Despite the court’s forest regulations, the impact of timber short-
ages on Saxony’s silver mining and metallurgy industries was devastating. In his work Sylvicultura 
Oeconomica oder Anweisung zur wilden Baum-Zucht (Sylvicultura Oeconomica or the Instructions for 
Wild Tree Cultivation), Carlowitz formulated ideas for the ‘sustainable use’ of the forest. His view that 
only so much wood should be cut as could be regrown through planned reforestation projects, became 
an important guiding principle of modern forestry.’ http://www.environmentandsociety.org/tools/
keywords#/id/1819.
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 2  The Evolution of the Principle of Sustainable 
Development
 2.1 From Stockholm to UNCED
The first milestone in the evolution of the principle of sus-
tainable development is 1972, when the Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment was organised under the auspices of the UN.12 As an outcome of 
the conference, the Stockholm Declaration was adopted.13 The special responsi-
bility that human beings bear for the conservation of the natural environment 
is set out in Section 4 of the Declaration. More importantly, in compliance with 
Principle 14 of the Declaration, a balance shall be struck by the means of reason-
able planning between development needs and the imperative of protecting the 
natural environment. The emergence of the concept of sustainable development 
dates back to 1990, when it was included in the publication of the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), in the World Conservation Strategy.
The World Charter for Nature was adopted in 1982 on the 37th session of 
the UN General Assembly, and also included the concept of sustainable devel-
opment.14 The UN General Assembly established the World Commission on 
Environment and Development,15 better known as the Brundtland Commis-
sion, which drafted the report entitled ‘Our Common Future.’16 The Commission 
consisted of altogether 22 members, its chairwoman, Gro Harlem Brundtland 
was the incumbent Prime Minister of Norway. The Commission also included 
a Hungarian member: István Láng. The Brundtland Report elaborated the 
most widely recognized definition of sustainable development.17 In compliance 
with the report, ‘sustainable development is development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs.’ The definition set out in the Brundtland Report stipulates 
the principle of equality among generations as a cornerstone for sustainable 
development, that is, neither of the generations has the right to destroy the liveli-
hood of future generations by exploiting resources immoderately and unfairly. 
This reference in the definition reflects the social sensitivity of the authors of 
the Report, besides also taking into account the needs of the present genera-
tions. Accordingly, sustainable development not only requires states to take into 
consideration the interests of the next generations but also to do their best in 
satisfying the legitimate needs of the less developed areas of the world.
The Brundtland Report set out the principles of sustainable development, as 
constitutive elements of the concept. These are the following:
12  The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm from 5 to 16 June 1972.
13  Stockholm Declaration, UN Conference on Environment, 1972.
14  A/RES/37/7 48th Plenary Meeting 28 October 1982 37/7. World Charter for Nature.
15  The Commission was set up by the Resolution 38/161 of the UN Assembly.
16  A/42/427. Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development.
17  The Brundtland Report was recognised by Resolution 42/187 of the UN Assembly.
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a.) Respect for and protection of habitats
In compliance with this principle, the ethnic groups coexisting in this world 
have to be considerate of each other, that is, development in one country may not 
threaten the satisfaction of the basic needs of the society of another state.
b.) Improving the quality of human life
The objective of sustainable development must not merely serve economic 
growth but should contribute to a higher standard of living for everyone on 
Earth. The development of culture, education and health care belong to the qual-
ity of life just as enhancing the quantity and quality of convenience goods and 
ensuring access to these goods by as many ethnic groups as possible.
c.) Preservation of the viability and the natural diversity of theEarth
On the one hand, preservation of the viability of the Earth includes the pres-
ervation of inanimate things such as climate, air, soil or waters in their natural 
form, on the other hand, it also means the preservation of biological diversity, 
that is, the conservation of the ecosystem of the Earth.
d.) Radical decrease in using non-renewable resources
In the course of exploiting non-renewable resources, caution should be exer-
cised and the legitimate interests of the next generations must also be taken into 
account. The use of non-renewable resources such as oil and natural gas should 
be reduced incrementally and preferably be replaced by other alternative, renew-
able resources.
e.) Respecting the constraints of growth
Humanity must realize that the resources of the Earth are finite; conse-
quently unrestricted growth is impossible. In this respect, the Brundtland 
Report points out the risk inherent in the growth of the Earth’s population and 
urges state leaders to facilitate the treatment of this ever so pressing problem by 
using efficient solutions.
f.) Changing the behaviour of individuals through education and training
No matter the important efforts made by state leaders, these will be unsuc-
cessful in case they are not underpinned by the citizens’ will and commitment 
to preserve the environment. Therefore, the behaviour of mankind must be 
transformed through education and training so that they seek to preserve the 
natural values of our world through their responsible behaviour.
g.) The communities’ role in self-sufficiency
Smaller groups of human communities may efficiently contribute to the 
enforcement of sustainable development, since the organisation of self-sufficient 
groups and their impact on the emergence of other groups play an important 
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part in implementing the concept of sustainable development and disseminat-
ing its practice.
h.) Cooperation at the level of peoples and nations
Natural impacts do not stop at state borders, therefore cooperation between 
the states is indispensable in the interest of the preservation of biological diver-
sity and natural resources. According to the Brundtland Report, states shall 
launch national sustainable development programs complete with action plans 
and the appropriate legal framework, making sure that those using natural 
resources to a greater extent shall shoulder a greater share of the related burden 
and those causing damage shall pay compensation so that all players of social 
life shall equally take responsibility for promoting sustainable development on 
the national level. Finally, sustainable development has to be integrated and 
implemented in all policies of the states.
i.) The need for global cooperation
Not only is it necessary to take common action for the preservation of the 
environment, but it is indispensable that the states bring other states exhibiting 
passive or negative attitudes onto the path of sustainable development, since in 
lack of such a global commitment, processes undermining the natural develop-
ment of the Earth may surface.
The particularly comprehensive concept of sustainable development introduced 
by the Brundtland Report made the term very popular, indeed, instead of a real 
commitment to the preservation of environment and nature it has more often 
than not been used as a political buzzword. The Brundtland concept of sustain-
able development strikes a sensitive balance between the need for development 
and the objective of the preservation of the natural environment. While there is 
a general consensus on the Brundtland concept of sustainable development in 
legal scholarship, there is still somewhat of a controversy regarding the content, 
status and role of sustainable development. For example, certain authors stress 
the relative importance of one value, while others point to the significance of 
other principles. Furthermore, some authors point to novel state obligations 
flowing from the principle of sustainable development, while others construe 
the principle as a possible justification for the restriction of the right to develop-
ment.
It is worth mentioning the studies published by Pearce and Turner, defin-
ing the concept of sustainable development as the maximalisation of the pure 
advantages of economic development with a view to maintaining the quality 
of natural resources and the access of the advantagers provided by them. The 
concept proposed by the authors would ensure that renewable natural resources 
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are used in an equilibrium ensuring their reproduction, whereas in regard to 
non-renewable resources, the efficient utilization of these resources is required.18
Several authors have elaborated on the complexity of the concept of sustain-
able development. Suffice to mention Stephen Maxwell Wheeler and Timothy 
Beatley who defined sustainable development in their essential book entitled 
The Sustainable Urban Development Reader as a process of change in which the 
exploitation of the natural resources, the direction of the investments and tech-
nical development and institutional changes are in harmony with both present 
and future potentials in order to satisfy human needs and aspirations.19
The progress in the interpretation of this overarching legal concept marks 
a novel phase in unfolding the concept of sustainable development, including 
a number of new state obligations. For example, in their book entitled Interna-
tional Law and Sustainable Development: Principles and Practice Nico Schrijver 
and Friedl Weiss mention the obligation of cooperation, the principle of integra-
tion, the responsible use of natural resources, the prohibition of causing damage 
and the obligation to conduct environmental impact assessment as principles 
complying with both the concept of sustainable development and that of ’Envi-
ronmentally Sound Management’ (ESM) underlined in the Basel Convention.2021
The abovementioned examples prove that the definition set out in the 
Brundtland Report of 1987 as the accepted concept of sustainable development 
is more or less generally recognized in international legal doctrine. Conse-
quently, for the purposes of our present study, it is reasonable to use this defini-
tion of the concept.
 2.2 UNCED 1992
The legal framework of sustainable development had not 
been clarified in international law even by the 1990s. This is substantiated by 
Principle 27 of the Declaration adopted in Rio de Janeiro at the UN Conference 
on Environment and Development, according to which the states shall coope-
rate ‘in the further development of international law in the field of sustainable 
development.’22 The Rio Declaration marks considerable progress in regard to 
the elaboration of the concept of sustainable development.
?? Principle 1 is clear in emphasizing that the concept is primarily anthropho-
18  PEARCE, D. W. – TURNEr, R. K.: Economics of natural resources and the environment. London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1990, p. 24.
19  WHEELER, Stephen Maxwell – BEATLEY, Timothy: The Sustainable Urban Development Reader. 
London: Routledge, 2004, p. 57.
20  The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal, 22 March 1989.
21  SCHRIJVER, Nico – WEISS, Friedl: International Law and Sustainable Development: Principles and Prac-
tice. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004, p. 550.
22  Rio Declaration, WSSD, June 3-14, Rio de Janeiro. http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/
Default.asp?documentID=78&articleID=1163.
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centric: ‘Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable devel-
opment. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with 
nature.’
?? Principle 2 – focuses on the sovereign right of states to exploit their own 
resources coupled with their responsibility not to cause damage to the envi-
ronment of other States or areas beyond their jurisdiction.
?? Principle 3 is the primary source for generational equity: ‘The right to 
development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and 
environmental needs of present and future generations.’
?? Principle 4 stipulates that ‘in order to achieve sustainable development, 
environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the develop-
ment process and cannot be considered in isolation from this.’
?? Principle 5 points to a different aspect of sustainable development – eradi-
cating poverty.
?? In compliance with Principle 8, ‘states should reduce and eliminate unsus-
tainable patterns of consumption and production and promote appropriate 
demographic policies.’ Although the Rio Declaration formulated Principle 
8 principally with respect to overpopulated countries, it is worth taking into 
account that this was the first time that health policy pursued by certain 
societies was linked to the concept of sustainable development.
?? Principle 10 is the theoretical background of public participation.
?? Principle 15 covers the precautionary principle.
?? Principle 25 warns us that all the above mentioned elements are interre-
lated: ‘Peace, development and environmental protection are interdependent 
and indivisible.’
?? The above-mentioned Principle 27 of the Rio Declaration refers to the 
international legal role of sustainable development and the commitment of 
states to further strengthen such role. This may be evidence for the existing 
interest of the states to fill the legal concept of sustainable development with 
even more exact legal content.
The Academies of Sciences of the world in 2000 also adopted a statement on 
sustainability,23 which is not more than a concise summary of current trends, 
at the same time it is the most emblematic of the available definitions: ‘Sustain-
ability implies meeting current human needs while preserving the environment 
and natural resources needed by future generations.’
 2.3 Report of the UN Expert Group
Following the UNCED in 1992 the content of sustainable devel-
opment was analyzed in the framework of several forums. One such forum was 
the Commission on Sustainable Development, which identified the ’Principles 
23  IAP Statement on Transition to Sustainability, 21 May 2000.
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of International Law for Sustainable Development’.24 Although this report could 
lead to further regulatory improvements, it is nonetheless one of the most com-
plete, universal, or even holistic of documents, trying to fit as much as possible 
into one single framework.
According to point 12 of the Report, it takes Principle 1 of the Rio Declara-
tion as its point of departure. The other major ideas of the Report are interre-
lationship and integration set forth in point 15. All of the above principles are 
presented in a ’comprehensive and holistic way’ (point 18). As such, it is a clear 
mission of the Report to reveal all possible aspects and linkages, incorporating 
them into the law of sustainable development.
To discuss the individual elements of the Report in detail would be obsolete. 
However, it should be noted that these elements are organized into the following 
set of ‘principles and concepts’:
?? Principle of interrelationship and integration (15-18)
?? Principles and concepts relating to environment and development (19-74)
?? Principles and concepts of international cooperation (75-122)
?? Principles and concepts of participation, decision-making and transparency 
(123 – 139)
?? Principles and concepts of dispute avoidance and resolution (140-160)
In our categorization, the different constituting elements directly or indirectly 
connected with sustainable development may be divided into a special set of 
classes, answering the key dilemma regarding their contribution to improving 
the concept of sustainability. This categorization reflects a selection from the 
elements of the Report with the goal of providing a clear picture of our vision of 
sustainability.
Firstly, there are certain elements of the Report that exhibit a strong, direct 
link to sustainable development; as such, these may be considered as specific 
legal principles and concepts of sustainable development law, and, more 
precisely: of environmental interests. These are:
?? prevention (together with the right to individual or collective self-defense 
and the duty to cooperate) in a wider meaning
?? precautionary principle, as well as the principle covering all the major 
elements of the concept, that is
?? integration, with a specific additional legal element
?? the right to environment, and attached to this
?? the principle of equity, in this case meaning intergenerational equity, and 
together with this two closely related elements:
?? the common concern of humanity and also
24  EXPERT GROUP, 1995: Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Identification of Principles of Interna-
tional Law for Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland, 26-28 September 1995, Prepared by the 
Division for Sustainable Development for the Commission on Sustainable Development Fourth Session 
18 April – 3 May 1996, New York; http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/cn17/1996/background/
ecn171996-bp3.htm).
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?? the common heritage of mankind, both providing a solid basis of a set of 
regulatory and procedural guarantees,
?? public participation with access to information, informed decision-making 
and access to justice;
?? a special instrument, the environmental impact assessment, and,
?? rather indirectly, the notion of prior informed consent.
The second group of principles and concepts may also have an impact via the 
reasonable use of resources, with a stronger focus on material interests:
?? right to development,
?? sovereignty over natural resources and responsibility not to cause damage 
to the environment in areas falling under the jurisdiction of other states or 
lying beyond the national jurisdiction,
?? sustainable use of natural resources, as well as a special notion referring to 
the international equivalent of the same problem, that is the
?? equitable and reasonable use of transboundary natural resources. The next 
concept is the guiding principle for the use of natural resources and the 
protection of the environment, namely
?? the question of common, but differentiated responsibilities, closely 
connected with
?? special treatment of developing countries, particularly small island develop-
ing States. We may also mention the special treatment of countries with 
economies in transition which seems to be gradually losing significance. All 
of the above should lead to the
?? eradication of poverty, a key issue of the Rio process.
Finally, as a third group of principles and concepts, there are some which merely 
exhibit a loose connection with sustainable development. At the same time, they 
may be considered part of a general toolbox of international law:
?? cooperation in a transboundary context, providing for a conceptual frame-
work for the principles mentioned above as well as the elements listed 
below,
?? notification to and consultation with neighbouring and potentially affected 
States, furthermore
?? peaceful settlement of disputes in the field of environment and sustainable 
development. Finally, the traditional obligations of
?? the national implementation of international commitments, and
?? compliance monitoring on the basis of international commitments may also 
be mentioned.
The Report does not put forward a homogeneous concept, it is much rather a 
mix of principles, instruments, special sustainable development aspects and 
general concepts of international cooperation. The individual elements and 
issues vary as regards their weight and relevance and some notions and concepts 
12
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are even repeated in different points of the document. Anyhow, the Report is 
still the most important source for further legal development, a solid and widely 
accepted foundation for clarifying sustainable development law.
There are some elements of the Report that are worth highlighting in order 
to illustrate the progressive character of the document:
Firstly, the Report clearly refers to the necessity of recognizing the right to a 
healthy environment. In point 31 it reads: 
‘The right to a healthy environment provides a focus to guide the integration of 
environment and development. Development is sustainable where it advances or 
realizes the right to a healthy environment.’
The Report is both moderately and reasonably framed when it comes to consid-
ering the interests of future generations. The major problem in this regard is 
best described by Olmsted:25 
‘...our conversation is one-sided. However, we are the speakers and future genera-
tions are the listeners. Just as the past speaks to us with many voices and through 
many idioms, so too do we now speak to the future. Therefore, the wording of the 
Report should be very rational, as it is in point 44 it reads: ‘It also entitles each 
generation to diversity comparable to that enjoyed by previous generations.’ 
Thus, there is a possibility to compare interests and needs, even beyond those of 
the present generations.
The Report examines this responsibility in a broader context under the 
heading ‘Duty to cooperate in the spirit of global partnership’: ‘80. The princi-
ple of cooperation in the spirit of global partnership not only refers to coopera-
tion among States, but should also be extended to non-State entities, ranging 
from business associations through non-governmental organizations to the 
academic world.’ Within the duty of cooperation priority issues are covered such 
as common concern and common but differentiated responsibilities, while the 
notion of common heritage will be covered below.
 2.4 ILA Principles on Sustainable Development
Perhaps it was the Rio Declaration that prompted the Inter-
national Law Association (ILA) to release a declaration on international legal 
principles regarding sustainable development during its conference held in 
New-Delhi in April 2002.26 The International Law Association (ILA) was 
founded in Brussels in 1873. In compliance with its statutes, the objective of 
25  OLMSTED, James L.: Representing Nonconcurrent Generations: The Problem of Now, Journal of Environ-
mental Law & Litigation, Vol. 23, 2008, p. 463.
26  ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development, 
2 April 2002.
13
chapter 1 the evolving concept of sustainable development
the organisation is the study of international law, including its clarification and 
development.27 The documents elaborated by the International Law Association, 
naturally, possess no binding force under international law, at the same time, 
the ILA consists of several thousands of international lawyers, in many cases 
senior lawyers, furthermore, the Declaration issued by the ILA was preceded by 
thorough committee work. In light of the above, the contribution of the ILA is of 
equal significance as the contributions of prominent representatives of inter-
national legal scholarship regarding the principles of sustainable development, 
and the position of the international legal scholarship is considered, in itself, 
in compliance with the special rules of this area of law, a complementary legal 
basis of the international law.
The International Law Association thus began to take a closer look at the 
interpretation of sustainable development law in 2002, adopting the New Delhi 
Declaration, reinforced 10 years later in Sofia.28 This Declaration amounts to an 
attempt of codifying this field of law and may be considered a secondary source 
of international law.29 The Sofia decision did not change the original Declara-
tion, but added an implementation guide instead.30 The Declaration views 
sustainable development as a common concern of humanity, and places human 
rights at the centre of sustainable development. Compared with the previous two 
attempts, this Declaration is more easily accessible and well organized, concen-
trating on its main subject. As it would not be feasible to invent anything new 10 
and 20 years after the UNCED conference, we are all familiar with the princi-
ples by now.
The New Delhi Declaration of the ILA distinguishes seven principles that 
constitute different elements of the concept of sustainable development and 
which, one by one, oblige the states to act accordingly:
a.) The duty of states to ensure the sustainable use of natural resources
The ILA New-Delhi Declaration intends to impose the obligation of sustain-
able use of natural resources on the states within their own territory. Following 
World War II, the right to self-determination, the sovereignty of peoples, as well 
as the UN principles were principally intended to reinforce the rights of peoples 
liberated from colonial rule in order to ensure their free disposal over natural 
resources located on their territory. After the colonial countries became indepen-
dent, the right of states to exploit their own natural resources for the purposes of 
the countries’ welfare, was recognized as an important and progressive step of 
international law.
27  See Article 3 (1) of the International Law Association’s Constitution.
28  Resolution No. 7/2012, Committee on International Law on Sustainable Development, The 75th Confe-
rence of the International Law Association held in Sofia, Bulgaria, 26 to 30 August 2012.
29  HILDERING, Antoinette: International Law, Sustainable Development and Water Management, Eburon, 
2004, p. 34-35.
30  2012 SOFIA Guiding Statements on the Judicial Elaboration of the 2002 New Delhi Declaration of 
Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development, annex to Resolution No. 7/2012.
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However, the use of natural resources is also restricted by existing inter-
national law. It is the duty of states, on the one hand, to use natural resources 
in a rational, sustainable and safe way, so as to contribute to the development 
and welfare of the people living in their territory, on the other hand, states 
must protect the interests of future generations, taking into consideration the 
requirement of the conservation of the natural environment. Principle 2 of the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development stipulates that ‘States have, 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage 
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.’31
This line of development of public international law stems from the princi-
ple sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, known from Roman law and referred to 
in the Trail Smelter case.32 In compliance with this legal principle, the United 
States could rightfully expect Canada to use or utilise its own territory in a way 
that no harm is caused in another country’s natural environment. International 
environmental law has just arrived at the point where in case of some trans-
boundary environmental contaminations, at least in principle, the issue of the 
international legal liability of the state responsible for the harmful emissions 
may be raised. Next, a period may begin, when states are obliged to constrain 
themselves in the interest of observing international environmental legal 
norms. The first principle of the ILA Declaration could play a cardinal role in 
this development, but it seems that we are still very far from the general accept-
ance of this concept.
b.) The principle of equity and the eradication of poverty
The principle of equity is a cornerstone of sustainable development. Solidar-
ity among nations and sustainable development presuppose the enforcement 
of the principle of equity and the eradication of poverty. The more vulnerable 
groups of humanity living in our present time deserve equitable support from 
the more affluent communities, since the right to development is not limited to 
the peoples or countries enjoying a more beneficial situation.
In compliance with Chapter IX of the Charter of the United Nations on Inter-
national Economic and Social Co-operation and based on the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development, it is the obligation of states to cooperate in 
the interest of the eradication of poverty. Following from the principle of equity, 
the duty of the states is to fight against poverty within their own territory; at the 
same time, they must also demonstrate solidarity with the poorest countries of 
the world and assist them in their efforts in dealing with the problems arising 
from poverty. Finally, Chapter 2 of the Plan of Implementation of the Johannes-
31  Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.
32  Reports of International Arbitral Awards (Trail Smelter Case), Vol. III (1938-1941), 1965.
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burg World Summit on Sustainable Development33 concentrates on the eradi-
cation of poverty and declares it an indispensable requirement of sustainable 
development.
c.) The principle of cooperation and the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities
In compliance with principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, States shall cooperate 
in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and 
integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. The Declaration of the ILA extends the scope 
of those obliged to cooperate and points out that international organisations are 
also responsible for participating in the vehicles of international cooperation 
necessary for the achievement of sustainable development.
Considering that states contributed to environmental degradation to a vary-
ing degree, they have common but differentiated responsibilities. According to 
the Declaration, states largely responsible for the deterioration of the environ-
ment are obliged to make increased efforts in line with sustainable development 
in the interest of the preservation of the natural environment of our world. The 
principle of differentiated responsibilities places a greater burden of responsibil-
ity on the developed countries, taking into account the impact that their socie-
ties have on the global environment and considering the extent of their financial 
resources. The expectation arising from the principle is that developed countries 
all over the world are obliged to contribute to the dissemination of environment-
friendly technologies. Common but differentiated responsibilities play a role not 
only in soft law, but also in the relationship among the states, for example, the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change also refers to this concept.34
d.) The principle of the precautionary approach
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration has already set out that ‘where there 
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.’ The precautionary principle has since been duly 
recognized in the law of treaties as well, for example in the Bamako Convention 
of 1991.35 The employment of precautionary measures is prescribed by Article 
4, in case the release of certain substances into the environment may damage 
the nature or the health of human beings.36 There are a number of international 
agreements that include the precautionary principle. For example, the pream-
ble of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity also includes the following 
clause: ‘where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological 
diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
33  Johannesburg Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development.
34  See Article 3 (1) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
35  Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import Into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement 
and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, 30 January 1991.
36  Ibid. Article 4.3 paragraph (f).
16
sustainability, law and public choice
postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat.’ Article 2 paragraph 
a) of the 1992 OSPAR Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
of the North-East Atlantic also obliges the parties to employ the precautionary 
principle, according to which precautionary measures shall be taken if energy or 
substances released into the maritime environment results or is likely to result 
in hazards to human health or the maritime ecosystem.37
In spite of all these concrete provisions in the treaties, the precautionary 
principle can be listed in the category of lex ferenda, that is, it can be considered 
as a principle forming part of a development process, as a result of which it is 
likely to become international customary law.
High risk activities that may have a seriously damaging impact on human 
health, natural resources or the ecosystem are to be prevented, even if there is 
no clear scientific evidence for the fact that the respective interference would 
unconditionally involve the presumed environmental damage. Interferences 
must be preceded by environmental impact assessments that must be trans-
parent and include the possibility of independent scientific evaluation. In case 
there is a risk of long-term and irreversible damage, the burden of proof falls 
upon those planning the implementation of the respective interference.38 The 
evidence should substantiate that the presumed damage to the environment 
shall not take place, otherwise the respective interference may not be made. In 
case the interference does result in damage, those responsible must be held 
accountable, including the liability of the state if relevant.
e.) The principle of public participation and access to information and justice
Ensuring the possibility of public participation is indispensable for the 
enforcement of sustainable development. The most important requirement 
of the right to public participation is safeguarding the freedom of expression 
for the members of society with regard to the investments implemented in a 
given state. In addition to this, citizens have the right to receive information on 
investments within reasonable time and if necessary, they may turn to the court 
against measures prejudicial to sustainable development. Finally, those suffer-
ing damage in the course of such interferences may receive proper compensa-
tion.
The self-organized groups of society play an important role in the overall 
social and national management of environmental contamination. International 
environmental law seeks to promote the enforcement of the norms ensur-
ing that a broad range of social actors learn about the plans on interferences 
involving consequences prejudicial to the respective community (deterioration 
of health, environmental damage) as well as relevant news in relation to the 
development. Strengthening the rights related to public participation enhances 
social eagerness that may be quintessential in environmental matters. The right 
to public participation has been recognized in the treaties of international law 
37  Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic.
38  See Section 4 of the ILA New Delhi Declaration.
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as well, for example the 1989 Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries.39 Paragraph (1) of Article 15 of the Conven-
tion recognizes the right of indigenous and tribal peoples to participate in 
the use, utilization and preservation of the natural resources located in their 
territories. Furthermore, Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration includes that 
‘environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens, at the relevant level. States shall facilitate and encourage public aware-
ness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access 
to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall 
be provided.’ The right to public participation is recognized also in Agenda 21, 
according to which it is the obligation of states to provide a broader range of 
public participation possibilities in regard to the initiatives related to sustainable 
development and to ensure access to information as well as the possibility to 
turn to the court.40
The Aarhus Convention may be considered the most important international 
convention in relation to public participation. The United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe established the Aarhus Convention in order to provide 
access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to 
justice in environmental matters.41 The Convention refers to the principle 
of sustainable development in its preamble: ‘Affirming the need to protect, 
preserve and improve the state of the environment and to ensure sustainable 
and environmentally sound development.’ By way of this reference, the Conven-
tion effectively stipulates public participation, a principle of international envi-
ronmental law, as forming part of the concept of sustainable development.
f.) The principle of good governance
The Declaration underlines that good governance is essential to the progres-
sive development and codification of international law relating to sustainable 
development. The principle of good governance commits states to:
?? adopt democratic and transparent decision-making procedures and ensure 
financial accountability;
?? take effective measures to combat official or other corruption;
?? respect the principle of due process in their procedures and to observe the 
rule of law and human rights; and
?? implement a public procurement approach in line with the WTO Code on 
Public Procurement.
Based on the above, good governance aims at ensuring financial accountabil-
ity, combating corruption and guaranteeing proper procedural safeguards in 
the interest of the rule of law, at the same time, it should also prevent certain 
39  Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention,1989 (Convention No. 169).
40  Agenda 21, paragraphs 8.3 (d), 8.4 (e) and 23.2.
41  The UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), 25 June 1998.
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businesses from trying to turn profit from an unscrupulous destruction of the 
environment.
The Plan of Implementation adopted at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg underlines that good governance within each 
country and at the international level is essential for sustainable development. 
At the domestic level, sound environmental, social and economic policies, 
democratic institutions responsive to the needs of the people, the rule of law, 
anti-corruption measures, gender equality and an enabling environment for 
investment are all required for ensuring sustainable development.42
g.) The principle of integration
The principle of integration is perhaps the most important principle set out 
in the New Delhi Declaration. The principle points to the significance of the 
interplay and correlation of economic, financial, environmental and human 
rights aspects of relevant international legal principles and rules. According to 
the principle of integration, the imperative of the protection of the environment 
must be included in all social considerations and policies determining state 
actions. Environmental protection should not remain at the level of particularity, 
it should much rather radiate in all actions of the state. The international law of 
sustainable development cannot be conceived of as an independent subsystem, 
it is much rather the sum of the respective norms weaving through the entire 
legal system. Legal rules should therefore be interpreted at the national, regional 
as well as the global level in a way that their application and interpretation 
comply with the requirements of sustainable development.
The New Delhi Declaration elaborated by the ILA amounts to the most 
authentic and most detailed concept of sustainable development. So far however, 
there was no binding international legal document which elevated these princi-
ples to the status of recognized legal obligations forming part of the concept of 
sustainable development.
While this Declaration is probably the most concise one, there are still some 
remarks we may make. The ’real’ and general sustainability principles are the 
second, third, fourth and seventh, while the first and third are sustainability 
principles, more focused on international law, while the sixth is a general prin-
ciple of the rule of law. In summary, the principles contained in the Declaration 
are: equity (inter- and intragenerational equity, with references to the concept of 
the right to environment), precaution, public participation (and again human 
rights) and integration. Thus, the essence of the three documents discussed 
above, are almost identical.
As an additional element to the New-Delhi Declaration already mentioned 
above, the ILA in Sofia also issued a Guidance,43 with the aim of bringing prin-
ciples closer to implementation. Here the first and fundamental statement is, 
that sustainable development is without doubt a principle of international law, 
42  See Chapter 1, Section 4 of the Plan of Implementation.
43  Ibid.
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forming a part of jus cogens. The most important message is that sustainable 
development as a principle is not only a principle of international law, but it is 
indeed on of the most elementary principles – ‘2) Treaties and rules of custom-
ary international law should be interpreted in the light of principles of sustain-
able development;’.
The Guidance then goes on to summarize the most important principles of 
sustainable development, again from the rather practical point of view of imple-
mentation – in particular, judicial or quasi-judicial implementation – as follows:
?? common concern, ‘with particular normative precision identifiable with 
respect to shared and common natural resources’;
?? equity (intergenerational and intragenerational), together with the eradi-
cation of poverty, posing great challenges for judicial and quasi-judicial 
bodies, which may be assisted by the principles of equity and fairness;
?? common but differentiated responsibilities are part of international law, but 
have a rather political context;
?? precautionary principle that ‘has significant and increasingly precise legal 
implications’;
?? the three pillars of public participation;
?? the broad concept of good governance;
?? integration and inter-relationship;
?? environmental impact assessment.
These clarifications support our opinion already presented above, according to 
which we should build sustainable development law around the elements of 
equity (generational), precaution, public participation (as procedural guarantees 
of the right to environment) and integration.
 2.5 IUCN Efforts
Compared to the manifold concept presented by the ILA, the 
manuscript of the IUCN Academy of Environmental Law of 2005 entitled The 
Law of Energy for Sustainable Development contains a more simple formulation.44 
According to the manuscript, the concept of sustainable development incorpo-
rates three elements.45 The first of these elements is the idea of intragenerational 
responsibility, according to which all present inhabitants of the Earth are enti-
tled to an equitable share of the natural resources of the world. The concept of 
sustainable development also includes the principle of intergenerational justice, 
requiring us to refrain from overconsuming which would threaten the possibil-
ity of future generations to benefit from the natural resources of the Earth. The 
third element of sustainable development according to the book is the equality of 
44  IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources or World Conservation 
Union).
45  BRADBROOK, Adrian J. et al. (eds.): The Law of Energy for Sustainable Development. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
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species. According to this concept, other species may not be excluded from the 
use of natural resources, since other species living on Earth also have the right 
to life. Natural resources may not be utilized or exploited in a way that would 
damage the ecosystem of the Earth.
It is apparent from the foregoing that international legal scholarship has 
contributed substantially to enriching the concept of sustainable development 
and building it into a comprehensive concept serving as a standard for almost all 
activities of mankind. In the following, on the basis of the practice of interna-
tional treaties, we attempt to identify the public international law obligations 
of the states incorporating the concept of sustainable development into their 
treaties.
The IUCN as a high-ranking international organ has always been deeply 
involved in the development of environmental law, and, among others, designed 
a draft covenant, the first version of which was adopted in 1995, while the fourth 
version is from 2010.46 There is no point in reiterating all the elements featured 
in the Covenant, ranging from equity to precaution, proportionality and the 
eradication of poverty, etc. There is one additional element in the new Article 
9, which is resilience, referring to the adaptive capacity of natural systems and 
human communities in order to survive and restore their systems.
The best way of summing up the development of international law of 
sustainable development is with the words of Bosselmann:47 
‘The continued existence of the principle of sustainability has two important 
consequences. The fist is that sustainable development is given meaning and 
direction. ... The second consequence is that existing treaties, laws and legal prin-
ciples need to be interpreted in the light of the principle of sustainability.’
 2.6 Rio+20
The 1992 Rio principles provide perhaps the most compre-
hensive and acknowledged definition of sustainable development. However, 
this concept is still uncertain and did not receive proper recognition which may 
undermine appropriate implementation.48 Indeed, it is nearly impossible to 
define the precise meaning of sustainable development, since there are many 
competing explanations and all may be questioned.49
46  The fourth version of the draft: Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development, Fourth 
Edition: Updated Text, Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 31 Rev. 3, 2010.
47  BOSSELMANN, Klaus: The Principle of Sustainability (Transforming Law and Governance), Ashgate, 
2008, p. 41.
48  PALASSIS, Stathis M.: Beyond the Global Summits: Reflecting on the Environmental Principles of Sustain-
able Development, Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, Vol. 22:1, 2011, p. 58.
49  LEE, Maria: Sustainable Development in the EU: The Renewed Sustainable Development Strategy 2006, 9 
Environmental Law Review 41 (2007), p. 41.
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Did the Rio+20 process enrich the concept of sustainable development with 
a new element? Did we come closer to the meaning of the principle? The answer 
is definitely in the negative, since the Rio+20 Summit mostly repeated what 
had already been stated before, albeit with one exception: the green economy. If 
one looks at the official outcome of the Conference – The future we want50 -, the 
most characteristic is part II. (’Renewing political commitment’), containing the 
following simple statement: ‘15. We reaffirm all the principles of the Rio Decla-
ration on Environment and Development,...’
Green economy is an additional or seemingly new element, but it does not 
leads us closer to the merits, but rather seeks to invite businesses to work for 
sustainable development. The declarations in connection with green economy 
do not add to the original concept. For example: ‘60. We acknowledge that green 
economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication will 
enhance our ability to manage natural resources sustainably and with lower 
negative environmental impacts, increase resource efficiency and reduce waste.’ 
We do not wish to go into more detail on green economy versus sustainable 
development, suffice to say that green economy is not a novelty, but much rather 
a different expression of the same vague concept. According to some, this lack of 
reforms means the crisis of global management and also a moral crisis, endan-
gering our well-being.51
50  RIO+20, United Nations Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 20-22 June 2012, http://www.uncsd2012.org/thefu-
turewewant.html.
51  ANTYPAS, Alexios: Rio+20: the future we still have to fight for, Environmental Liability Review, Vol. 20 
Issue 3, 2012, p. 92.
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 1 Ethics and Sustainability – A Catholic Vision
Ethical considerations receive an ever greater attention, even 
more so in this specific regulatory area, due to all those challenges we are 
facing. One may read about the significance of intangible assets as ‘love’ in 
the revision of the iconic ‘Limits to Growth’ book.1 Sustainable development 
mandates significant changes in the current trends of development, requiring a 
strict self-control of current generations to meet the needs of future generations, 
a substantial transformation of consumer society in the direction of energy 
saving, consumer consciousness, etc. All of the above is coupled with a long-
term vision of development – suffice to mention the issue of climate change, 
with all the painful decisions current societies should make in order to reach the 
envisaged results 30-50 years from now.
Environmental ethics or the human responsibility towards the natural 
environment and mankind has always been in the centre of ethics. Again, 
we may refer to the separate opinion of Justice Weeramantry, attached to the 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros judgment of the ICJ, who compares the requirements of 
international environmental law with Buddhist ethics – which may somehow 
be taken as an extreme, as compared with our main target, the Catholic morals: 
‘The notion of not causing harm to others and hence sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laedas was a central notion of Buddhism. It translated well into environmental 
attitudes. ‘Alienum’ in this context would be extended by Buddhism to future 
generations as well, and to other component elements of the natural order 
beyond man himself, for the Buddhist concept of duty had an enormously long 
reach.’ Thus, ethics may form a part of the concept of sustainable development 
according to the judge.
Why are ethical considerations so essential? Several authors quote the popu-
lar American environmentalist, Wendell Berry: ‘Our environmental problems... 
are not, at root, political; they are cultural... our country is not being destroyed 
by bad politics; it is being destroyed by a bad way of life.’2 We must also agree 
with the delineation of the importance of ethics, describing three branches of 
legal development and legal systems: first we may take those rules, which are 
made by the society to control its own life – among others the rules of survival 
–, second, we have the manifestations of the will of the legislator, and third, we 
may mention religious rules, which constitute a formal set of ethical require-
ments.3
1  MEADOWS. Donella, MEADOWS, Dennis, RANDERS, Jorgen: Limits to Growth, The 30-Year Update, 
Chelsea Green Publishing, 2004.
2  Reference from the book ’Spirits and Nature’ (ed. by: Rockefeller, Steven C, and John C. Elder, Boston, 
Beacon Press, 1992, p. 30.
3  ARMSTRONG, Adrian: Ethics and Justice for the Environment, Routledge 2012, p. 34.
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A straightforward option of understanding ethical considerations is to turn 
towards religions, motivating the great majority of people in the world4 and 
which are based on traditions, among others environmental or even sustainable 
development traditions. The European Christian Environmental Network in its 
2005 report records5: 
‘The Christian tradition is rich in its description of the human role and responsibil-
ity in relation to creation. We are called creatures, stewards, servants, prophets, 
kings, co-workers. We recognise the damage done by some notions of human 
dominion and domination in the past. We acknowledge God has given all human 
beings, created in the image and likeness of God (Genesis 1:28), a crucial role and 
responsibility as priests of creation and partners of God in it. ... In the process 
of handling natural resources and turning them into human goods and services, 
we are taking of God’s gifts in creation and accepting our responsibility for their 
transformation.’
From among the many possible sources, we selected the Roman Catholic teach-
ing, since on the one hand the authors of the present book are all professors of a 
Catholic University – as a formal reason –, but even more so, because the ideas 
of this religion may be relatively easy to introduce, what with its central author-
ity with a capacity to issue binding documents and guidances and employing 
a systematic approach. One should not forget, that beside the Meadows couple, 
there are many other scientists – such as example is Ervin László, member of 
the Club of Rome – who urge the advancement of a planetary ethics, which 
should be based upon the teachings of all religions.6 Here, we cannot offer a 
lengthy and full picture, but will much rather restrict ourselves to present some 
ideas providing an ethical basics for sustainability. Our perception is that the 
ethical vision and sustainability overlap to a great extent, albeit with a different 
emphasis. As we wish to go through the major elements of the doctrine of the 
Church, we shall primarily use quotes with some short explanations.
If we take a closer look at the Roman Catholic church, it is not an overstate-
ment to say that the more than 120 year old Rerum Novarum,7 considered as 
the beginning of a new social doctrine of the Church, is among others also 
4  The CIA’s World Factbook indicates a global population of 7,021,836,029 (July 2012 est.) with a distribu-
tion of religions as follows: Christian 31.59% (of which Roman Catholics amount to 18.85%, Protestants 
8.15%, Orthodox 4.96%, Anglicans 1.26%), Muslims 23.2%, Hindus 15.0%, Buddhists 7.1%, Sikhs 
0.35%, Jewish 0.22%, Baha’i 0.11%, other religions 10.95%, non-religious 9.66%, atheists 2.01%. (2010 
est.) http://www.pewforum.org/global-religious-landscape-exec.aspx.
5  The 2005 Assembly meeting in Basel – ‘The Churches’ Contribution to a Sustainable Europe’ (8 May 
2005 – A Call of the European Christian Environmental Network Assembly in Basel).
6  LÁSZLÓ, Ervin: Világváltás, Nyitott Könyvműhely, Budapest, 2008, p. 88, in English: WorldShift 2012: 
Making Green Business New Politics & Higher Consciousness Work Together (McArthur & Company, 
2009).
7  Rerum Novarum, Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on Capital and Labor, 15 May 1891.
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the foundation of subsequent environmental teaching – including teachings 
on material development, social problems, ethical misery, human dignity, the 
common interest or the common good. Forty years later, Quadragesimo Anno8 
added new elements to the original teaching, among others subsidiarity (prin-
cipium subsidiaritatis) in the common interest or the common good. Of course, 
at this time neither the concept of environmental protection, nor the idea of 
sustainable development were at stake, but their foundations were already in 
place. This was the case at the time of the announcement of Pacem in Terris,9 the 
legal significance of which lies in its special attention to human rights.
The first clear sign of environmental interests, in parallel with the grow-
ing universal attention directed towards the subject emerged in Pope Paul VI’s 
Gaudium et Spes10: 
‘69. God intended the earth with everything contained in it for the use of all 
human beings and peoples. ... Whatever the forms of property may be, as adapted 
to the legitimate institutions of peoples, according to diverse and changeable 
circumstances, attention must always be paid to this universal destination of 
earthly goods. In using them, therefore, man should regard the external things that 
he legitimately possesses not only as his own but also as common in the sense 
that they should be able to benefit not only him but also others.’
These ideas have common roots with what is today called sustainable devel-
opment and remind us of equity. The responsibility of mankind towards the 
created world, and within this, the environment, becomes more and more appar-
ent as we approach the time of the Stockholm Conference, which also had an 
effect on the Vatican. In Populorum Progressio,11 the limits of material develop-
ment and the issue of human responsibility becomes ever so robust: ‘14. The 
development We speak of here cannot be restricted to economic growth alone. 
To be authentic, it must be well rounded; it must foster the development of each 
man and of the whole man.’ As such, Catholic teaching cannot be separated 
from actual political tendencies.
It was John Paul II, who took the biggest step into the direction of what may 
be called the concept of sustainable development, for the first time in Redemp-
tor Hominis.12 The title we refer to at this point is telling: ’15. What modern man 
is afraid of’, and the message of the title corresponds with the main ideas of 
contemporary times: the 80s. The answer for the question of the title is simple: 
8  Quadragesimo Anno, Encyclical of Pope Pius XI on Reconstruction of the Social Order, 15 May 1931.
9  Pacem in Terris, Encyclical of Pope John XXIII on Establishing Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, Char-
ity, And Liberty, 11 April 1963.
10  Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes, Pope Paul VI, 7 December 
1965.
11  Populorum Progressio Encyclical of Pope Paul VI on the Development of Peoples, 26 March 1967.
12  Encyclical Letter Redemptor Hominis At The Beginning Of His Papal Ministry, 4 March 1979, John 
Paul II.
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‘The man of today seems ever to be under threat from what he produces ... All 
too soon, and often in an unforeseeable way, what this manifold activity of man 
yields is not only subjected to ‘alienation’, in the sense that it is simply taken away 
from the person who produces it, but rather it turns against man himself, at least 
in part, through the indirect consequences of its effects returning on himself. ... 
We seem to be increasingly aware of the fact that the exploitation of the earth, the 
planet on which we are living, demands rational and honest planning. ... Yet it was 
the Creator’s will that man should communicate with nature as an intelligent and 
noble ‘master’ and ‘guardian’, and not as a heedless ‘exploiter’ and ‘destroyer’.’ 
And this new era, according to the Pope ‘demand[s] a proportional development 
of morals and ethics.’ The ambivalent nature of development becomes ever 
so clear to all, requiring a growing awareness from the side of society and of 
mankind at large.
Later, in parallel with the work of the Bruntland Commission, the message 
of the Vatican was likewise articulated, first of all in Sollicitudo rei Socialis,13 
which clearly defined the responsibility towards future generations, together 
with a special emphasis on human rights. 
‘33. ... Today, perhaps more than in the past, the intrinsic contradiction of a devel-
opment limited only to its economic element is seen more clearly. Such develop-
ment easily subjects the human person and his deepest needs to the demands 
of economic planning and selfish profit. ... True development ... implies a lively 
awareness of the need to respect the right of every individual to the full use of the 
benefits offered by science and technology. ... Both peoples and individual must 
enjoy the fundamental equality which is the basis, for example, of the Charter of 
the United Nations Organization: the equality which is the basis of the right of all 
to share in the process of full development. ...
34. ... A true concept of development cannot ignore the use of the elements of 
nature, the renewability of resources and the consequences of haphazard industri-
alization – three considerations which alert our consciences to the moral dimen-
sion of development.’
Soon after the Sollicitudo rei Socialis and before the 1992 Rio summit, John Paul 
II ideas were summarized in a wonderful message, the title of which is also 
worth noting: ‘Peace with God the Creator, Peace with all of Creation’.14
‘7. The most profound and serious indication of the moral implications under-
lying the ecological problem is the lack of respect for life evident in many of 
the patterns of environmental pollution. … Respect for life, and above all for 
13  Sollicitudo rei Socialis, 30 December 1987, John Paul II.
14  Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the Celebration of the World Day Of Peace, 1 January 
1990: Peace with God the Creator, Peace with all of Creation.
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the dignity of the human person, is the ultimate guiding norm for any sound 
economic, industrial or scientific progress....
9. The right to a safe environment is ever more insistently presented today as a 
right that must be included in an updated Charter of Human Rights. ...
13. Modern society will find no solution to the ecological problem unless it takes 
a serious look at its life style....’
The centenary of Rerum Novarum is marked with a new encyclical, Centesimus 
Annus,15 covering all those aspects the roots of which lie in the hundred year old 
document, but which did not receive appropriate attention and were therefore 
clearly articulated at the end of the XXth century.
‘37. Equally worrying is the ecological question which accompanies the problem 
of consumerism and which is closely connected to it. ... At the root of the sense-
less destruction of the natural environment lies an anthropological error, which 
unfortunately is widespread in our day... Man thinks that he can make arbitrary use 
of the earth, subjecting it without restraint to his will, as though it did not have its 
own requisites and a prior God-given purpose, which man can indeed develop but 
must not betray. Instead of carrying out his role as a co-operator with God in the 
work of creation, man sets himself up in place of God and thus ends up provoking 
a rebellion on the part of nature, which is more tyrannized than governed by him. 
... In this regard, humanity today must be conscious of its duties and obligations 
towards future generations.’
Based on this critical vision, focusing on the general neglect of the environment 
and future generations by mankind and society, this Encyclical, similarly to the 
general idea put forward by the Church, reminds us that human beings and 
human development lie at the heart of Creation, and the need to preserve the 
natural environment forms part of this central question:
‘38. In addition to the irrational destruction of the natural environment, we must 
also mention the more serious destruction of the human environment, something 
which is by no means receiving the attention it deserves. Although people are 
rightly worried — though much less than they should be — about preserving the 
natural habitats of the various animal species threatened with extinction, because 
they realize that each of these species makes its particular contribution to the 
balance of nature in general, too little effort is made to safeguard the moral condi-
tions for an authentic ‘human ecology’.
This clear focus is reminiscent of the major inspiration of sustainable develop-
ment, which views the right to development together with the protection of the 
15  John Paul II, « Centesimus Annus » Encyclical Letter on the Hundreth Anniversary of Rerum Novarum, 
1 May 1991.
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environment, the struggle against poverty and the protection of biodiversity 
from a clear anthropocentric perspective.
The highest responsibility is on the governments, as well as the international 
community, calling for an undoubtedly active or proactive attitude:
‘40. It is the task of the State to provide for the defence and preservation of 
common goods such as the natural and human environments, which cannot be 
safeguarded simply by market forces. ... Here we find a new limit on the market: 
there are collective and qualitative needs which cannot be satisfied by market 
mechanisms. There are important human needs which escape its logic. There are 
goods which by their very nature cannot and must not be bought or sold.’
Instead of going too much into the details of several other documents issued by 
Pope John Paul II, it suffices to refer to a concise summary of the environmental 
and also moral problems found in the Venice Declaration,16 reflecting the entire 
construct of sustainability. It is worth mentioning that the Declaration was 
adopted in parallel with the Johannesburg summit.
‘In our own time we are witnessing a growth of an ecological awareness which 
needs to be encouraged, so that it will lead to practical programmes and initia-
tives. An awareness of the relationship between God and humankind brings a 
fuller sense of the importance of the relationship between human beings and the 
natural environment, which is God’s creation and which God entrusted to us to 
guard with wisdom and love (cf. Gen 1:28). ... The problem is not simply economic 
and technological; it is moral and spiritual. A solution at the economic and 
technological level can be found only if we undergo, in the most radical way, an 
inner change of heart, which can lead to a change in lifestyle and of unsustainable 
patterns of consumption and production. ... A new approach and a new culture are 
needed, based on the centrality of the human person within creation and inspired 
by environmentally ethical behaviour...’
Even the concept of common and differentiated responsibility is underlined: 
‘Everyone has a part to play, but for the demands of justice and charity to be 
respected the most affluent societies must carry the greater burden, and from 
them is demanded a sacrifice greater than can be offered by the poor.’
The conceptual line is apparent, and the next pope, Benedict XVI follows on 
this path, among others in his Encyclical Caritas in Veritate,17 focusing on the 
questions of development, covering social problems, the financial crisis, globali-
zation, poverty, respect for life and several other conventional issues, as well as 
the issue of the environmental crisis and its relationship with development. The 
16  Common Declaration of John Paul II and the Ecumenical Patriarch His Holiness Bartholomew I, 10 
June 2002.
17  Encyclical Letter Caritas in Veritate of Benedict XVI on Integral Human Development 
in Charity and Truth, 29 June 2009.
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starting point is the definition of the common good, comparing it with develop-
ment as such. 
‘7. Another important consideration is the common good. ... It is a good that is 
sought not for its own sake, but for the people who belong to the social commu-
nity and who can only really and effectively pursue their good within it.’ If we 
compare development with the common good, then material, financial or techno-
logical development is far removed from being satisfactory (23)
There is a separate chapter (Chapter Four) on environmental protection, again, 
beginning with the balance between rights and duties, entailing also the ques-
tion of solidarity. Furthermore, development has a direct link with human 
rights, also in the context of a balanced vision: 
‘43. ... An overemphasis on rights leads to a disregard for duties. Duties set a 
limit on rights because they point to the anthropological and ethical framework 
of which rights are a part, in this way ensuring that they do not become licence. 
Duties thereby reinforce rights and call for their defence and promotion as a task 
to be undertaken in the service of the common good.’
Development is moreover directly linked with environmental protection, but in a 
much wider context, similarly to the whole idea of sustainable development:
‘48. Today the subject of development is also closely related to the duties arising 
from our relationship to the natural environment. The environment is God’s gift to 
everyone, and in our use of it we have a responsibility towards the poor, towards 
future generations and towards humanity as a whole. When nature, including the 
human being, is viewed as the result of mere chance or evolutionary determinism, 
our sense of responsibility wanes. ....’
Environmental protection – as we understand it – must be considered from 
a human perspective, at the same time, on the basis of the teaching, such a 
perspective must imply responsible care:
‘48. ... Nature expresses a design of love and truth. ... But it should also be stressed 
that it is contrary to authentic development to view nature as something more 
important than the human person. ... Human beings interpret and shape the 
natural environment through culture, which in turn is given direction by the 
responsible use of freedom, in accordance with the dictates of the moral law. 
Consequently, projects for integral human development cannot ignore coming 
generations, but need to be marked by solidarity and inter-generational justice, while 
taking into account a variety of contexts: ecological, juridical, economic, political 
and cultural.’
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Thus, the two sides of generational equity become clear, while the teaching puts 
human responsibility at the centre of our relationship to the environment:
‘50. ... On this earth there is room for everyone: ... At the same time we must 
recognize our grave duty to hand the earth on to future generations in such a 
condition that they too can worthily inhabit it and continue to cultivate it. ... One 
of the greatest challenges facing the economy is to achieve the most efficient 
use — not abuse — of natural resources, based on a realization that the notion of 
‘efficiency’ is not value-free.’
From its very beginning, the Encyclical stresses the necessity to focus on human 
behaviour and morality. The individual states, as well as the international 
community and other players of the sustainability scenario all have a role to play 
in achieving true development, however, throughout history, no institutional 
effort had lead to the aspired result:
‘11 ... In the course of history, it was often maintained that the creation of institu-
tions was sufficient to guarantee the fulfilment of humanity’s right to develop-
ment. Unfortunately, too much confidence was placed in those institutions, as if 
they were able to deliver the desired objective automatically. In reality, institutions 
by themselves are not enough, because integral human development is primarily a 
vocation, and therefore it involves a free assumption of responsibility in solidarity 
on the part of everyone.’
The message to the World Day of Peace in 2010 is also imperative, even the title 
demonstrates its special significance for the environment – ’If You Want to 
Cultivate Peace, Protect Creation’ -, which also proves the continuity of the posi-
tion of the Church (cf. the message of John Paul II from twenty years earlier). 
This message may also be taken as a summary of the entire teaching – it 
requires the revision of our current development model, in order to shift towards 
a more sustainable model.
‘5. ... Prudence would thus dictate a profound, long-term review of our model of 
development, one which would take into consideration the meaning of the econ-
omy and its goals with an eye to correcting its malfunctions and misapplications. 
The ecological health of the planet calls for this ... Humanity needs a profound 
cultural renewal; it needs to rediscover those values which can serve as the solid 
basis for building a brighter future for all. Our present crises – be they economic, 
food-related, environmental or social – are ultimately also moral crises, and all of 
them are interrelated. ...
7. ...The goods of creation belong to humanity as a whole. Yet the current pace 
of environmental exploitation is seriously endangering the supply of certain natu-
ral resources not only for the present generation, but above all for generations yet 
to come. It is not hard to see that environmental degradation is often due to the 
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lack of far-sighted official policies or to the pursuit of myopic economic interests, 
which then, tragically, become a serious threat to creation. To combat this 
phenomenon, economic activity needs to consider the fact that ‘every economic 
decision has a moral consequence’ and thus show increased respect for the envi-
ronment. ... To protect the environment, and to safeguard natural resources and 
the climate, there is a need to act in accordance with clearly-defined rules, also 
from the juridical and economic standpoint, while at the same time taking into 
due account the solidarity we owe to those living in the poorer areas of our world 
and to future generations.’
Finally, there are two recent documents of significance from the Vatican. The 
first one stems from Benedict XVI.18 Albeit only indirectly connected with 
environment, it nevertheless adequately summarizes the primary vision of the 
Church: 
‘5. In many quarters it is now recognized that a new model of development 
is needed, as well as a new approach to the economy. Both integral, sustain-
able development in solidarity and the common interest (mostly referred to as 
common good – author’s note) require a correct scale of goods and values which 
can be structured with God as the ultimate point of reference.’ 
The second is a letter from the present Pope, Francis,19 emphasising in general 
‘as my predecessor Benedict XVI made clear, the present global crisis shows that 
ethics is not something external to the economy, but is an integral and unavoid-
able element of economic thought and action.’
In summary, the starting point of the catholic teaching on our stance 
towards the environment is the definition of the common good, which does not 
only entail material wealth, but requires the respect for all interests of current 
and future generations. The development trend has taken a wrong turn, in brief: 
quantity without quality, and mostly without moral considerations. As a result, 
the development model must be revised, for which the active commitment of 
the states and the international community is indispensable, to – among others 
– protect the right to environment, but also the right to development. In this 
context, everyone and every institution has a special responsibility: a responsibil-
ity towards the environment – towards Creation, with humanity in the centre of 
our approach towards the living Earth. The teachings feature many well-known 
elements, such as subsidiarity, generational equity and cooperation. Thus, there 
is no contradiction between the content of international documents or scholarly 
proposals (as elaborated below) and the teaching of the Church, it is but the 
wording that may be different – the essence remains the same.
18  Message of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI for the Celebration of the 
World Day of Peace, 1 January 2013, ‘Blessed Are The Peacemakers’.
19  Letter of Holy Father Francis to H.E. Mr David Cameron, British Prime Minister 
on the Occasion of the G8 Meeting (17-18 June 2013), From the Vatican, 15 June 2013.
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 1  The Concept of Sustainable Development in International 
Treaties
The concept of sustainable development in international 
treaties underwent significant transformation which is largely due to the 
theoretical establishments of international legal scholarship and their infiltra-
tion into international diplomacy. A characteristic example for the early use of 
the concept of sustainable development is the preamble of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, which stipulates that developing countries need 
access to resources in order to ensure sustainable economic and social develop-
ment.1 By contrast, the next sentence of the preamble stipulates that the parties 
to the Convention are determined to protect the climate system of the Earth for 
present and future generations. The Convention on Climate Change interpreted 
sustainable development principally as the right of the developing countries to 
sustainable economic growth.
A similar approach may be discerned from the Convention on Cooperation 
for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River, concluded in Sofia 
on 29 June 1994.2 The Convention established that in order to ensure sustain-
able development, the contracting parties, taking into account the urgency of 
water pollution abatement measures and of rational, sustainable water use, 
shall harmonize and coordinate measures taken at the domestic and interna-
tional level with regard to the Danube basin, aiming at sustainable development 
and environmental protection of the river Danube.3 Consequently, in the Sofia 
Convention, sustainable development appears as a mode of utilisation in compli-
ance with the environmental criteria of the river Danube.
Similarly, the concept of sustainable development is set out as the synonym 
for environment-friendly economic utilization in Article 24 of the UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
concluded in 1997.4?????????? ??????????????????????????????? ???????????????
from the wording of the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable 
Development of the Mekong River Basin, adopted on 5 April 1995 in Chiang 
Rai.5 Every time the Convention makes mention of the concept of sustainable 
development, it is followed by the expressions of conservation and utilization, 
thus sustainable development appears as the standard of measurement in the 
balance between conservation and utilization.
1  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC. The Convention was adopted in 
New York, on 9 May 1992.
2  Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River (Danube River 
Protection Convention).
3  See Article 2 (3) of the Convention.
4  Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (The UN Water-
courses Convention).
5  Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, Mekong 
River Commission.
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A formulation of sustainable development even more focused on the protec-
tion of the environment may be found in the Cooperative Agreement for the 
Conservation of Sea Turtles of the Caribbean Coast of Costa Rica, Nicaragua 
and Panama.6 In compliance with the Agreement, sustainable development 
means the process of gradual change in the quality of human life, which is put 
at the centre of development and considered the primary objective on the path 
to economic growth and social equality. These goals should be realized through 
the transformation of production methods and consumer practices, by way of 
regional assistance and the maintenance of ecological balance. The process 
should include the respect for regional, national, local ethnical and cultural 
diversity. Main goals are the full social participation of the citizens and their 
peaceful co-existence in harmony with nature, which should also contribute to 
preserving the livelihood of future generations. Compared with earlier interna-
tional treaties, the Convention employs a much more eco-conscious approach to 
the concept of sustainable development, however, it continues to view sustain-
able development mainly as the perfect balance between economic growth and 
environmental protection.
The most comprehensive definition of the concept of sustainable develop-
ment is enshrined in the Convention on Sustainable Management of Lake 
Tanganyika, concluded on 12 June 2003.7 The most important objective of the 
Convention is the conservation of the unique aquatic and other biological diver-
sity of the Lake. Pursuant to Article 5 paragraph 2 of the Convention, ‘[t]he natu-
ral resources of Lake Tanganyika shall be protected, conserved, managed, and 
used for sustainable development to meet the needs of present and future gener-
ations in an equitable manner.’ In order to implement this provision, the precau-
tionary principle, the polluter pays principle, the principle of preventive action, 
the principle of participation and the principle of fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits are set out in the Agreement.8 As reflected by the text of the Agreement, 
the principles of international environmental law developed in regard to sustain-
able development were included in the Agreement on Lake Tanganyika and 
we can but hope that a number of conventions will be concluded in the future, 
applying the concept of sustainable development, taking into account the results 
of international law scholarship.
In connection with the analysis of the concept of sustainable development 
in international treaties, it can be stated that the use of the concept of sustain-
able development in inter-state practice is always supported by the simultane-
ous appearance of the questions of economy and environmental protection. 
However, if the objectives of a convention exclusively concern environmental 
protection, then it is not necessary to use the concept of sustainable develop-
ment. An example for such treaties could be the Agreement on the International 
6  The Cooperative Agreement for the Conservation of Sea Turtles of the Caribbean Coast of Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua and Panama, ‘Tri-Partite Agreement’.
7  The Convention on Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika, Dar es Salaam.
8  Ibid. Article 5 (2), paragraphs A–F.
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Dolphin Conservation Programme, concluded in Washington on 21 May 1998. 
This Agreement is of paramount significance from the perspective of environ-
mental law, yet it does not make mention of the concept of sustainable devel-
opment.9 The reason for this is that, fortunately, dolphins are only exploited to 
a minimal extent (for example in zoos, dolphinariums), as a consequence of 
which, using the expression of sustainable development was not justified.
Within the practice of international greaties we may distinguish the follow-
ing four categories of conventions related to sustainable development:
 1.1 Sustainable Development as a Mere ‘Fig Leaf’
As is evident in many areas of life, certain concepts become 
fashionable and are even employed in contexts where the intention of the parties 
is much rather the opposite. It seems that the concept of sustainable develop-
ment is included also in those international treaties, which are elaborated for 
the purposes of an unrestricted exploitation of the environment where the state 
parties are not inclined to confine their economic activities.
A good example for this type of treaty is the Lisbon Energy Charter Treaty 
of 17 December 1994,10 with the main purpose of establishing a legal frame-
work for long-term cooperation between the contracting partners in the field of 
energy. According to the treaty the parties acknowledge each other’s sovereignty 
over their respective natural resources,11 which primarily seems to substantiate 
their right to unrestricted exploitation of natural resources. Such an aspiration 
stands in clear contrast to the concept of sustainable development. Nevertheless, 
in Article 19 of the treaty the signatories undertook to take into consideration 
in the interest of sustainable development those international treaties to which 
they are party and by way of which they undertook to minimize harmful envi-
ronmental impacts. As such, the treaty does not introduce any novel obligation 
of the state parties with respect to sustainable development, it merely stipulates 
that the Energy Charter shall not annul any obligations of the signatory states 
which they had undertaken in the framework of different environmental protec-
tion treaties.
We must not expect too many eco-friendly measures stemming from the 
International Agreement on Olive Oil and Table Olives adopted in Switzerland 
on 29 April 2005, either.12 The main goal of the agreement is to increase the 
volume of olive oil production, however, in Article 34 of the agreement the 
signatory states stipulate that they shall take environmental and ecological 
aspects into consideration in all phases of olive farming and processing. The 
agreement does not elaborate on the conduct required from the states in their 
9  Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Programme (AIDCP). The agreement came into 
force on 15 February 1999.
10  Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), 1994.
11  Ibid. Article 18.
12  International Agreement on Olive Oil and Table Olives, United Nations.
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efforts for achieving sustainable development, moreover, the concept itself is 
merely referred to in the text of the agreement.
The International Tropical Timber Agreement adopted in Geneva on 27 
January 2006 was compiled in order to guarantee the transparency of the 
international trade in timber.13 Although one of the aims of the agreement is to 
promote reforestation, it is the competence of the signatory states to determine 
the extent and the framework of such efforts. This way, the agreement hardly 
promotes the preservation of tropical rainforests and as such, it must be deemed 
completely contrary to the goals of sustainable development.
 1.2  Sustainable Development as the Main Goal and Moral 
Backbone of the Treaty
The best illustrations of international environmental law are 
international agreements with the main purpose of ensuring the sustainable 
development of certain regions of the world. Such an agreement is the Statute 
of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).14 The most important 
goal of the international organization established in Bonn on 26 January 2009 
is to promote the increasing utilization and proliferation of renewable energy 
resources with special consideration to sustainable development. The contract-
ing parties set the aim of transforming the coal intensive economy in a sustain-
able and safe manner, ensuring the widespread use and diffusion of bioenergy, 
geothermic energy, hydropower and marine energy as well as solar and wind 
power.15 The contracting parties were motivated by their responsibility for the 
environment and their commitment towards future generations, therefore, sus-
tainable development constitutes a solid point of reference and an ethical basis 
for the treaty.
The African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources was adopted under the auspices of the African Union in Maputo on 11 
July 2003.16 This Convention is a further example for those agreements, which 
designate sustainable development as their ethical foundation.
 1.3  Environmental Agreements Acknowledging the Right to 
Economic Development
In a further category of international treaties, the concept of 
sustainable development opens the door to economic activities in the framework 
of an environmental agreement. The contracting parties set the goal of protect-
ing the natural environment, certain animal or plant species, at the same time, 
they cannot remain impassive with respect to the communities living in these 
13  International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA, 2006).
14  Statute of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).
15  Ibid. Article 2 paragraph (b).
16  African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Maputo Convention).
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regions, either. Therefore, the signatory states acknowledge the fact that the 
needs of the communities living in the affected areas are of vital importance 
from the point of view of coexistence. This way, a situation can be prevented 
where communities incapable of satisfying their most basic needs deplete and 
jeopardize the resources of the natural environment.
A vivid example for such a treaty is the Agreement on the Conservation of 
Gorillas and their Habitats adopted in Paris on 26 October 2007.17 Naturally, the 
main purpose of the agreement is to protect gorillas, however, according to the 
action plan provided for under Article 8 it is imperative that the parties contrib-
ute to the sustainable development of the local communities living in the areas 
populated by gorillas.18 Thus, the signatory states cannot be impassive towards 
the indigenous communities living in the natural habitat of the gorillas, for 
in case these communities experience severe economic hardship, they may be 
forced to threaten the last refuge of the gorillas.
A similar approach is followed by the previously mentioned International 
Agreement for the Conservation of Carribean Sea Turtles. In the meaning of 
the agreement, in order to preserve the carribean sea turtle and safeguard its 
habitat from the communities living in the area, it is necessary to provide for the 
needs of such communities as well. The agreement prescribes the education of 
affected communities in order to ensure that the people living in the habitat of 
the carribean sea turtle do not threaten the survival of this special species.
In some instances the international treaties pertaining to this category 
pursue the preservation of entire regions. One such agreement is the Proto-
col Concerning the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based 
Activities in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, adopted in Jeddah on 12 December 
2005.19 This Protocol20 is one of the most important environmental treaties of 
the Middle East region, with the main purpose of compiling a list of endangered 
species, establishing special protection zones in mutual agreement, prevent-
ing the further invasion of non-indigenous species in the Gulf of Aden and 
the Persian Gulf, as well as providing for the management of protected areas. 
The main focus of the Protocol is therefore the protection of the environment, 
nevertheless, the protocol also makes reference to the concept of sustainable 
development, which must be understood as a requirement for safeguarding the 
economic conditions of development. The latter is indispensable for preserving 
the protected areas as well as safeguarding the indigenous animal and plant 
species.
Certain agreements seek to ensure that, with due consideration to sustain-
able development, human economic activity in a certain region – typically the 
17  Agreement on the Conservation of Gorillas and Their Habitats (the Gorilla Agreement).
18  See Section 1 (6) paragraph (h) of the action plan provided for under Article 8 of the Agreement.
19  Protocol Concerning the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities in the Red 
Sea and Gulf of Aden, Jeddah.
20  The Protocol is attached to the 1982 Jeddah Convention. Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea 
and Gulf of Aden Environment (The Jeddah Convention).
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catchment area of a lake or a river basin – does not exceed the degree necessary 
to preserve the environment. The most important example for such a treaty is 
the Agreement between the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania and 
the Government of the Republic of Macedonia for the Protection and Sustain-
able Development of Lake Ohrid and its Watershed, signed in Skopje on 17 
June 2004.21 We may also mention the Agreement on the Cooperation for the 
Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, adopted in Chiang Rai 
on 5 April 1995, as well as the Teheran Framework Convention for the Protec-
tion of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea, signed on 4 November 
2003.22 The common feature of these agreements is that the parties establish 
a Council, a Conference of the Parties or a similar body with the purpose of 
deciding whether the individual measures planned by the parties conform to 
the criteria of sustainable development, since this is the condition for executing 
the proposed investments. Thus, the legal concept of sustainable development 
acquires actual and effective legal force in these treaties. It is easy to see, that in 
case of all three treaties it shall be the state planning the economic investment 
which will be arguing before the Conference of the Parties or other similar 
treaty body for the economic reasonableness of the investment. The other parties 
shall try to achieve the restriction of the volume or the complete prevention of 
the investment, since from the perspective of the contracting states, the utili-
zation of the common natural resource by one party leads to the depreciation 
of the value of their own respective natural resource. As a result, these states 
immediately become the advocates of environmental protection and the conser-
vation of nature, while in case of their own investments, they would argue just 
as passionately with a completely opposite set of criteria.
In sum, we may say that as regards the sharing of common natural resources 
the concept of sustainable development may prove signifant in the ambit of 
international law for reasons of its emerging content. Perhaps even more 
important are the instruments elaborated by the scholars of international law 
in connection with the the concept of sustainable development. States may view 
the economic investments planned by other states as a threat to the natural 
resources located in their own territory and may be prompted to act as fervent 
advocates for environmental interests.
 1.4  Sustainable Development as an Environmental Constraint 
for an Economic Agreement
Contracting parties often seek to guarantee the long-term 
conditions of their economic activities. In such cases the preservation of natural 
21  Agreement between the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania and the Government of the 
Republic of Macedonia for the Protection and Sustainable Development of Lake Ohrid and its Water-
shed.
22  Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea (Tehran 
Convention).
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resources serves the goal of maintaining the natural conditions of economic 
activity for possibly many generations and that human activity does not deplete 
respective natural resources completely. The most typical agreements of this 
category are the ones related to certain fish species or fishing in individual 
sea areas. Such a treaty is the Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian 
Ocean Tuna Commission23 concluded on 25 November 1993, the Protocol on 
Fisheries,24 adopted in Blantyre on 14 August 2001, the Agreement Establishing 
the Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism,25 signed in Belize on 4 February 
2002 and the SIOFA Agreement26 concluded on 7 July 2006, otherwise known 
as the South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement.
Typically, the political goal of such contractual agreements is for states 
pursuing more moderate fishing practices to convince the states operating in the 
same region under a less restrictive fishing policy, to limit the volume of fishing 
for the benefit of future generations. In this pursuit, sustainable development 
provides legal arguments for the states advocating for a more moderate utiliza-
tion of natural resources. Therefore, we may say that that sustainable develop-
ment opens up a window on the construct of economic development leading 
to the direction of environmental protection. However, the Conference of the 
Parties or other similar treaty bodies are typically entrusted with less stringent 
competences, and the agreement on fishing activities in the affected regions 
develops only gradually, if at all.
 1.5 Summary
The concept of sustainable development underwent significant 
transformation in recent decades. In the beginning it was interpreted as the 
manifestation of the peoples’ right to development, which may be rightfully 
restricted by the interests of future generations. As a result, the protection of the 
environment and nature was not stipulated as a value in itself, but much rather 
as a means of protecting the interests of future generations. In the international 
treaties adopted following the nineties – even such significant documents, as the 
Climate Change Convention of the UN – the concept of sustainable development 
meant a version of economic development that is restricted by environmental 
considerations. The UN Climate Change Convetion expressly emphasizes that 
developing states are particularly entitled to the right of sustainable develop-
ment. It can be observed, that in the recent decades the concept of sustainable 
development featured both in agreements on economic cooperation and conven-
tions adopted for the protection of the environment. We may discern an in-
teresting tendency, according to which the concept of sustainable developement 
opens the door to the enforcement of environmental considerations in economic 
23  Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC).
24  Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Fisheries.
25  Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism (CRFM).
26  South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA).
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agreements, while in the case of environmental treaties, the legal institution of 
sustainable development guarantees not only the protection of the environment, 
but also the satisfaction of the basic needs of human communities, the fight 
against poverty and safeguarding the possibilities for development.
With time, the concept of sustainable development acquired a more exten-
sive meaning and the simple legal definition gave way to a wider, overarching 
concept that rendered sustainable development to be a basic concept of interna-
tional environmental law. Although in some instances it may be observed that 
this concept is merely employed as a fashionable term in international agree-
ments, in an increasing number of cases sustainable development becomes the 
moral foundation for the cooperation of the states. The concept of sustainable 
development and its content elaborated by legal scholarship found its way into 
international documents from the years 2000. International agreements sought 
to include definitions corresponding to the sustainable development concept 
elaborated by environmental lawyers, and certain agreements stipulate concepts 
for their respective scope of application that are in complete accordance with the 
sustainable development doctrine formulated in handbooks on international 
environmental law. An example could be the international agreement concluded 
in relation to Lake Tanganyika, where already the definition of sustainable 
development refers to the principle of inter-generational justice and deems the 
principle of precaution, prevention, public participation and the obligation to 
conduct an environmental impact assessment to be constituent elements of this 
concept.
Although the concept of sustainable development is included in numerous 
international agreements, the definition of sustainable development, its content 
and the legal consequences of the same are highly divergent in the individual 
agreements. Thus, we are witness to a development of international law, in 
the course of which the legal content of sustainable development is constantly 
changing as a result of the efforts of international law scholarship, rendering the 
concept more and more clear cut.
Finally, in summary we may say that the concept of sustainable development 
is a truly significant legal tool in international contractual practice that may 
contribute to preserving the fragile ecosystem of our world.
 2  The Practical Efficacy of Agreements Including the 
Concept of Sustainable Development
 2.1 Introduction
In the present volume we are seeking to answer the question 
whether the concept of sustainable development in public international law 
is sufficiently substantiated in order to effectively constrain environmentally 
harmful activities of the states.
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It must be noted, that an important category of international treaties includ-
ing the concept of sustainable development assigns significant legal force to 
the concept of sustainable development. An important characteristic of these 
treaties is that they typically refer to the shared use of a natural resource falling 
under the territorial sovereignty of several states, where the tension between the 
economic activities of certain states and the commitment towards the perserva-
tion of the natural environment must be resolved. In the ambit of the sustain-
able utilization of transboundary natural resources the concept of sustainable 
development is an effective tool for restricting the environmentally harmful 
economic activities proposed by the states. The exploitation of the shared natural 
resource by one state shall namely be viewed by others as a depreciation of their 
own respective natural capital, and as a measure infringing their property, 
which may be countered on the basis of the concept of sustainable develop-
ment. This also holds true in the case of open seas, which may be utilized as res 
communis omnium usus by every state. Similarly to the case of trans-boundary 
legal resources, the main purpose of such agreements is the establishment of 
the conditions of economic utilization and not the protection of the environ-
ment. States seek to moderate the behaviour of the greediest, most reckless 
countries by way of international agreements including the principle of sustain-
able development, at the same time they intend to ensure the perservation of 
the ecosystem of the respective region in order to be able to continue with the 
relevant economic activity, typically fishing, for generations onwards.
 2.2 The Examples of the Mekong River and Lake Tanganyika
In the course of analysis of the concept of sustainable develop-
ment appearing in international agreements, we chose to analyze two conven-
tions with the backdrop of their former social and political environment to 
demonstrate the power of international environmental law, which is the focus of 
the present volume.
During the selection process we aimed at analyzing the background of 
potential agreements, which carry the concept of sustainable development in 
its strongest forms. The best examples we found were agreements where the 
concept applied to a common natural resource with exhaustible reserves. In 
such cases the countries with conflicting interests seek to reconcile their oppos-
ing developmental and environmental claims, and to that end, for the purpose 
of protecting their own environment, the countries are willing to restrict the 
development plans of other states, while their own investments are constrained 
by the environmental concerns of others.
Because of their particular environmental and social significance, the inter-
national agreement on the Mekong River Delta,27 and the treaty regarding the 
27  Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, 5 April 
1995, Chiang Rai, Thailand.
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sustainable use of Lake Tanganyika28 were chosen, however, these treaties are 
notable examples also by reason of their eminent solutions in defining sustain-
ability.
 2.3  Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable 
Development of the Mekong River Basin
 2.3.1  The Mekong River Commission and the Possibility of 
Enforcing the Concept of Sustainable Development
The Mekong River is the catchment area most diverse in fish 
species on Earth.29 One-fourth of non-sea fisheries come from this region.30 A 
significant proportion of the more than 60 million people living in the Delta 
depend on fish for food. For instance, in Cambodia 70% of the consumption 
of annual animal protein comes from fish caught in the area.31 The catchment 
area of the Mekong River is almost 800.000 km2, with more than a hundred 
ethnical groups living in the region. Although the Mekong Basin is shared by 
six countries, only four states participated in the agreement on the cooperation 
for the river’s sustainable management in Chiang Rai on the 5th of April, 1995: 
Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand. Burma, which occupies only an insig-
nificant part of the basin, and China controlling the entire upstream part of the 
river did not join the agreement. The Mekong River Commission32 was estab-
lished on the basis of this agreement to help the cooperating countries through 
harmonization and background research.
28  The Convention on Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika, 12 June 2003, Dar es Salaam.
29  The Mekong Delta is home to a thousand fish species, three times more than the number of fish species 
endemic in the Amazonas.
30  The Mekong fishery is the largest freshwater fishery of the world. See International Centre for Environ-
mental Management: MRC Strategic Environmental Assessment of Hydropower on the Mekong Mainstream. 
Mekong River Commission: Hanoi, Viet Nam, 2010, p. 95.
31  OSBORNE, Milton: ’The Mekong: River Under Threat’. Lowy Institute Paper 27, Lowy Institute for Inter-
national Policy, 2009, p. iv.
32  The mission of the Mekong River Commission is ‘to promote and co-ordinate sustainable management 
and development of water and related resources for the countries’ mutual benefit and the people’s well-
being by implementing strategic programmes and activities and providing scientific information and 
policy advice.’
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Figure 1: Map of dams in Mekong Basin; Source: World Wildlife Fund: The Mekong 
River at Risk, WWF Brief, 2012 July
The densely populated Mekong Delta has one of the world’s fastest growing 
population and economy, where proliferating industrial production and the 
growing population need electricity to an ever increasing degree.33 The upper 
flow of the river has excellent hydrological potential, therefore, China has started 
the intensive energy utilization of the area falling under its sovereignty. The 
government decided to utilize the river’s energy potential in the 1980s with a 
complex of eight power plants called the Lancang Cascade.34 The total power and 
water-utilization capacity of the Mekong-Cascade will match China’s – and the 
world’s – biggest dam, that of the Three Gorges facility. This amounts to more 
than 21.000 megawatt capacity using 475 billion m3 of water.35 Six of the origi-
nally planned eight dams are either finished or under construction.36 With the 
fulfilment of the complex hydroelectric power plant plant system the Mekong’s 
periodic fluxes and refluxes will be largely adjusted, and its runoff regulated. On 
the other hand, the periods burdened with the natural occurrence of floods and 
33  GRUMBINE, R. Edward – DORE, John – XU, Jianchu: ’Mekong hydropower: drivers of change and govern-
ance challenges’. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment (2012) 10, p. 91.
34  See in detail MAGEE, D.: ’The dragon upstream: China’s role in Lancang-Mekong development’. In: 
OJENDAL, J. – HANSSON, S. – HELLBERG, S. (eds.): Politics and development in a transboundary water-
shed: the case of the Lower Mekong Basin. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag, 2012.
35  United Nations Development Programme: Global International Waters Assessment: Mekong River – GIWA 
Regional assessment 55. Kalmar, Sweden: University of Kalmar, 2006, pp. 16., 24.
36  The eight hydroelectric power stations of the Lancang Cascade comprise Gongguoqiao, Xiaowan, 
Manwan, Dazhaoshan, Nuozhadu, Jinghong, Ganlanba and Mengsong.
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droughts shaped the centuries-old agricultural and cultivation practice, which is 
changing because of the construction of the Chinese dam system.37 The annual 
floods of the Mekong River are essential for biodiversity, traditional lifestyle and 
agricultural production.38
Figure 2: Map of dams in the Lancang River Basin; Source: International Rivers, 2011
Situated on the lower part of the river, Laos became the most committed advo-
cate of dam constructions, and elevated this policy to the level of the govern-
ment. There are already 16 active hydroelectric power plants producing electric-
ity on the tributaries of the Mekong, and the Laotian authorities want to triple 
these numbers making their homeland the Kuwait of Southeast Asia.39 The 
most controversial construction work planned is the Don Sahong plant, which 
was introduced to the Mekong River Commission by the Laotian government 
on the 30th of September in 2013.40 The dam’s capacity is relatively low, some 
260 megawatts, but its construction results in many collateral advantages. It is 
37  OSBORNE op. cit. iv-v.
38  KAMEYAMA, Satoshi et al.: ’Hydrological and sediment transport simulation to assess the impact of dam 
construction of the Mekong River main channel’. American Journal of Environmental Science 9 (2013) 3, p. 
248.
39  Besides the sixteen working hydroelectric power plants, there are more than twenty dams in the plan-
ning stage in Laos, and approximately thirty dams are undergoing feasibility studies at the moment.
40  On 30 September 2013, the Government of Lao PDR submitted its notification to the Mekong River 
Commission Secretariat of its decision to proceed with the development of the Don Sahong Hydropower 
Project. According to the Laotian Government, the construction of the project is set to commence in 
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for instance able to provide large-volume energy supply in the area of the Khone 
waterfalls, making it possible to develop a touristic site in the region. Risks and 
dangers however outweigh the advantages of the realization of the project to 
a great extent. The dam is located in the worst possible place considering the 
course of migratory fish, which can only swim upstream on this branch of the 
divided Mekong’s several arms. Although engineers plan to build fishpasses,41 
these did not prove to be an efficient solution in any part of the world. 70% of 
the Mekong River’s fish species are migratory, and in case they cannot pass the 
facility-system, this will result in serious economic and sustenance problems 
for the people living in the upper dam region along the Laotian and Cambo-
dian tributary-systems.42 A group of environmentalists protested against the 
implementation of the investment at the Mekong River Commission,43 which, 
although not publicly, firmly warned Laos.44 Hun Sen, president of Cambodia 
also expressed his concerns regarding the constructions.45 It can be confirmed, 
however, that there is a remarkable economic interest in bringing the plans of 
the dam into effect, which is also supported by the cynical argument that the 
problems of fish migration could be compensated by the propagation of the 
species in artificial lakes above the hydropower plant.
Another controversial example of the Laotian dam construction plans is 
the proposal for the Xayaburi dam, the first of the dams planned on the Lower 
Mekong River, which would caulk the river with a more than 50 meters high 
and 800 meters long wall, thereby creating a 60 km long reservoir. Regarding 
the building of the hydroelectric power plant there are only a limited number of 
environmental impact assessments of poor quality available, and the potential 
consequences were studied only for a certain section of the basin, extending to 
merely 10 km from the dam. A trans-boundary impact assessment has never 
November 2013 and will be finished by February 2018. The run-of-the-river dam will produce 260 
megawatts of electricity with year-round operation.
41  Possible ways to mitigate the blocking of fish migration include fish ladders, fish lifts and alternative 
fish-passages. See BARAN, Eric – STARR, Peter – KURA, Yumiko: ’Influence of built structures on Tonle 
Sap fisheries: synthesis report’. Cambodia National Mekong Committee and the WorldFish Center 2007, 
18-31; http://www.worldfishcenter.org/resource_centre/Baran_et_al_2007_Influence_of%20built_
structures.pdf.
42  DUGAN, Patrick: ’Mainstream dams as barricades to fish migration: international learning and implications 
for the Mekong’. Catch and Culture 14 (2008) 3: 9-15. Mekong River Commission, Vientiane.
43  Australian Mekong Resource Centre, University of Sydney, Open Letter from scientists concerned for 
the sustainable development of the Mekong River, to the governmental and international agencies 
responsible for managing and developing the Mekong River, 25 May 2007. Signed by 34 international 
scientists.
44  OSBORNE op. cit. 33.
45  See Hun Sen’s speech at the Second International Symposium on the management of large rivers for 
fisheries, sustaining livelihoods and biodiversity in the new millennium. Phon Penh, 11 February 2003. 
http://www.mrcmekong. org/news_events.
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been carried out for the project.46 Basin states have but hope in the promise of 
the Laotian president, who holds that during the construction work they also 
want to take into account the fair interests of other countries.47 This, however, 
did not reassure the Vietnamese government, who asked for the postponement 
of the project by ten years. As a consequence thereof, during a side meeting at 
an ASEAN Summit on 7 May 2011, the Laotian Prime Minister reassured the 
Vietnamese Prime Minister that Laos would temporarily suspend the project of 
the Xayaburi Dam. Nevertheless, Laos and the Thai developer, Ch. Karnchang 
began the preparatory works in late 2010, even before the governments of the 
MRC met to discuss the project, then on 7 November 2012, the Laotian govern-
ment held the groundbreaking ceremony for the Xayaburi Dam, also attended 
by Vietnamese and Cambodian government officials. At that time, both govern-
ments had withdrawn their opposition to the project.48 However, with respect 
to the failure of the Laotian government to carry out a comprehensive environ-
mental impact assessment for the Xayaburi Dam project, at the annual MRC 
Council meeting of 17 January 2013, the Vietnamese and Cambodian delega-
tions expressed ongoing concerns regarding the Xayaburi Dam together with 
the Mekong River Commission’s donor governments. The Xayaburi Dam has 
generated unprecedented public opposition, and numerous NGO forums – inter 
alia the Rivers Coalition in Cambodia, the Save the Mekong Coalition, the Thai 
People’s Network for the Mekong, and the ASEAN People Representative – made 
attempts to urge the ASEAN, the donors of the Mekong River Commission and 
the entire international community, to take action to protect the Mekong River 
by calling for the cancellation of the construction of the Xayaburi Dam.49
46  The Thai company TEAM Consulting Engineering and Management Co. Ltd completed a report entitled 
’Environmental Impact Assessment for Xayaburi Hydroelecrtric Power Project’ on 10 August 2010 for the 
Thai dam-developer Ch. Karnchang Public Company Limited. For a comprehensive analysis of the 
report see TRANDEM, Ame: ’Fatally Flawed Xayaburi EIA Fails to Uphold International Standards: A 
Preliminary Review of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Report for the Xayaburi Hydropower 
Dam on the Mekong River Mainstream in Northern Lao PDR’. International Rivers, 14 March 2011. http://
www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/preliminary_review_of_xayaburi_eia_14.03.11_final.
pdf.
47  HERBERTSON, Kirk: ’Xayaburi Dam: How Laos Violated the 1995 Mekong Agreement’. International 
Rivers, January 2013, pp. 19-23. http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/intl_rivers_anal-
ysis_of_mekong_agreement_january_2013.pdf.
48  Ibid.
49  See e.g. the Statement of the Rivers Coalition in Cambodia, the Save the Mekong Coalition, and the 
ASEAN People Representative to the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Kingdom of Thailand dated 14 Novem-
ber 2012 (http://www.ngoforum.org.kh/docs/statements/HCRP_StatementonXayaburito4_en.pdf), or 
the letter of the Save the Mekong Coalition of 11 March 2013 to the Prime Ministers of the MRC’ govern-
ments (http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/20130311-letter-to-prime-ministers.pdf).
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 2.3.2  Assessment of the Potential of the Concept of Sustainable 
Development in the Mekong Negotiations
The Mekong River Delta is especially vulnerable to incautious 
human interventions, as it is already severely exposed to the environmental 
effects of global warming. The most important prediction is that by 2050 water 
levels will increase by 33 cm at the delta,50 allowing for seawater to flow in, sig-














Thailand 205.48 186.07 58.05 31.20%
Vietnam 3424.66 2168.95 390.4 18%
Burma 3900 3700 74.5 2%
Table 1: Hydropower development in the Mekong river. Source: Guo Jun – Jia Jin-
sheng: Prospects of the Hydropower Development and Construction in the Southeast 
Countries, 2006.52
Environmental risks concerning the Mekong Delta have become increasingly 
clear to the civil and scientific circles, and at least some of the resulting conse-
quences have penetrated the political discussion. However, we do not know 
whether there are serious, substantive disputes in the framework of the Mekong 
Commission on the dramatic effects that the planned projects will have on the 
catchment area of the Mekong as a whole. The predictable adverse effects would 
require adequate precaution, which are still not in place.
Although countries joining the Mekong agreement clearly committed 
themselves to exclude harmful environmental impacts from their projects that 
may affect each other, the Mekong Commission did not prove to be an effective 
forum for reaching an agreement on the different claims of the countries.53 The 
50  United Nations Development Programme: Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting climate 
change: human solidarity in a divided world. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 100.
51  Asian Development Bank: The economics of climate change in Southeast Asia: a regional review. Manila: 
ADB, 2009, p. 49.
52  See JUN, Guo – JINSHENG, Jia: ’Prospects of the Hydropower Development and Construction in the South-
east Countries’. Water Power 32 (2006) 5.
53  The representatives of Burma and China do not participate in the MRC, which contributes to a great 
extent to the inefficiency and the lack of proactivity in the operation of the Commission. See Hirsch, 
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fact that from all riparian states, the largest and most important country did not 
become party to the agreement, and that other signatory states demonstrated 
divergent interests, geographical and economic conditions played a crucial 
role in the failure of the agreement.54 China, which is not represented in the 
Mekong River Commission, does not feel obliged to consult with the poorer 
and less influential Mekong riparian countries. Neighbouring countries carry-
ing many historical wounds and maintaining fragile relationships with one 
another only gently touch upon the problems surrounding the Mekong River, 
and do not consider the mechanism of the agreement strong enough to prevent 
investments resulting in serious detrimental effects on the environment in an 
adjacent country.
It is difficult to determine the degree of sufficient grounds for a country with 
environmental concerns to restrain the right to development of another state. It 
would be important to prescribe that any state, wishing to realize a project with 
serious environmental effects be bound to conduct an environmental impact 
assessment, which is an indispensable requirement of the concept of sustainable 
development. It should also be prescribed that in case of uncertainties regarding 
the probable environmental effects, possible risks should result in the cancella-
tion of the project based on the precautionary principle.
 2.4  Practical Enforcement of the Convention on the 
Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika
 2.4.1 The Background of the Convention
As we have concluded earlier the Convention on Lake Tang-
anyika is considered to be one of the most developed conventions, putting the 
concept of sustainable development at the centre of the agreement. The Conven-
tion indicates as an obligatory element of sustainable development the principle 
of preventive action, the principle of participation and also the precautionary 
principle besides environmental impact assessment.55
Philip, JENSEN, MØRCK, Kurt et al.: National Interests and Transboundary Water Governance in the 
Mekong. Australian Mekong Resource Centre in collaboration with Danish International Development 
Assistance, 2006, p. 69.
54  HA, Mai-Lan: ’The Role of Regional Institutions in Sustainable Development: A Review of the Mekong River 
Commission’s First 15 Years’. Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development 5 (2011) 1, p. 130.
55  See Article 5 paragraph (2) of the Convention on Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika.
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Figure 3: Map of Lake Tanganyika Basin; Source: E. A. Sweke: Fish Diversity and 
Abundance of Lake Tanganyika, 201356
The average depth of Lake Tanganyika, which is one of the deepest lakes of 
the world, is more than 500 metres, with its deepest point at 1,500 metres. It 
lies on the territory of four states: Burundi, Congo, Tanzania and Zaire with 
a width of 50 km and a length of 650 km. The area of the lake is 32 600 m2.57 
Lake Tanganyika contains almost one fifth of the world’s freshwater resources,58 
therefore, it is a freshwater source of priceless value, however it is situated in an 
extremely poor and densely populated area of the world. The biodiversity of the 
lake is very rich, making it a significant area of the world both locally and glob-
ally as well. It harbours more than 2000 species of plants and animals, of which 
approximately 600 are endemic to the Lake Tanganyika basin, and do not occur 
anywhere else.59 For instance, the lake is the habitat of the most morphologically 
and ecologically complex flock of cichlid fish, one of the most diverse of fish 
families in freshwaters worldwide.60
56  SWEKE, Emmanuel A. – ASSAM, Julius M. – MATSUISHI, Takashi – CHANDE, Abdillahi I.: ’Fish 
Diversity and Abundance of Lake Tanganyika: Comparison between Protected Area (Mahale Mountains 
National Park) and Unprotected Areas’. International Journal of Biodiversity (2013) 2: 1-10.
57  LINDQVIST, O.V. – MÖLSÄ, H. – SOLONEN, K. – SARVALA, J. (eds.): From Limnology to Fisheries: Lake 
Tanganyika and Other Large Lakes. Series: Developments in Hydrobiology, Vol. 141. Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1999, 213.
58  COULTER, G.W.: ’Lake Tanganyika’. In: MARTENS, K. – GODDEERIS, B. – COULTER, G. (eds.): 
’Speciation in Ancient Lakes’. Archiv für. Hydrobiologie (1994) 44: 13-18.
59  United Nations Development Programme: Global International Waters Assessment: East African Rift 
Valley Lakes – GIWA Regional assessment 47. Kalmar, Sweeden: University of Kalmar, 2006, 22.
60  TAKAHASHI, R. – WATANABE, K. – NISHIDA, M. – HORI, M.: ’Evolution of feeding specialization in 
Tanganyikan scale-eating cichlids: a molecular phylogenetic approach’. BMC Evolutionary Biology 7 (2007) 
195.
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The political atmosphere of Lake Tanganyika has been shaken by serious 
crises. Many hundred thousand people fled from Congo and Burundi to the 
territory of Tanzania. Although the vast majority of the local population is Bantu 
and their mother tongue is Swahili, the four states situated here are divided 
by two political cultures and two languages. The Francophone Congo and 
Burundi constitute one side, while Tanzania and Zambia follow Anglo-Saxon 
cultural and political traditions.61 What made it possible for these states to adopt 
a sustainability convention containing such modern and multi-faceted rules? 
Among the initiators of the Convention are the FAO and the Global Environ-
mental Facility. The research project called ’Lake Tanganyika Research Project’ 
(LTR)62 was sponsored under FAO, which was responsible for elaborating the 
’Framework Fisheries Management Plan’ (FFMP), by means of which it sought 
to place sustainable fishery on the Lake Tanganyika within definite bounds.63 
Under the auspices of the Global Environmental Facility, another new project 
was launched, the so-called ’Tanganyika Biodiversity Project’ (LTBP),64 as a 
result of which a strategic action program was elaborated65 as well as an agree-
ment plan between the member states, with legally binding power. Both the 
strategic action plan and the convention were elaborated by senior colleagues 
of the project who also involved international environmental law experts into 
the work and it was only the finished documents that were put forward to the 
representatives of the member states. In the interest of continuity, the so-called 
Interim Management Authority was set up, financed by the donations of the 
Global Environmental Facility.66 The text of the agreement was prepared by 
2000 and the document was signed by the member states following some 
amendments in 2003. Nevertheless, the convention has still not been yet ratified 
by all four countries, notwithstanding the fact that a full decade had passed.
In practice, however, the work related to the Convention already started, 
and the Conference of the Ministers, which is the most important body of the 
convention, examined the possibility of collecting additional resources in recent 
years. As a result, the Lake Tanganyika Convention Implementation Fund 
(LTCIF) was established, which collects subsidies from the participant member 
61  WEST, Kelly: Lake Tanganyika: Results and Experiences of the UNDP/GEF Conservation Initiative 
(RAF/92/G32) in Burundi, D.R. Congo, Tanzania, and Zambia, 28 February 2001, 17.
62  1992-1998 FAO/FINNIDA: Lake Tanganyika Research Project (LTR). Production and Potential for 
Optimal Management of Pelagic Fisheries.
63  LOWE-MCCONNELL, Rosemary: ’Recent Research in the African Great Lakes: Fisheries, Biodiversity and 
Cichlid Evolution’. Freshwater Forum 20 (2003) 4-64, p. 12.
64  1995-2000 UNDP/GEF: Lake Tanganyika Biodiversity Project (LTBP). Pollution Control and other Mea-
sures to Protect Biodiversity.
65  The Strategic Action Programme for the Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika (July 2000), 
http://www.ltbp.org/FTP/SAPFINE.pdf.
66  UNDP/GEF: Project Document: Part One UNOPS Components: Partnership Interventions for the 
Implementation of the Strategic Action Programme for Lake Tanganyika. Governments of Burundi, 
DRC, Tanzania and Zambia, 2 April 2008, p. 5.
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states, while the a Lake Tanganyika Endowment Fund (LTEF) was also set up 
for collecting money from third state and NGO sponsors. In addition, the Lake 
Tanganyika Friends Trust Fund was also established for welcoming financial 
aid from private persons, further strengthening the implementation of common 
goals by additional financial aid. Although, the Lake Tanganyika Friends Trust 
Fund was launched in 2008 with the mandate to safeguard the lake and its 
natural resources, the strategic action plan was not implemented for long. Even-
tually, the members of the Lake Tanganyika Authority Conference of Ministers 
signed the updated Strategic Action Programme67 and committed themselves 
to the implementation and future evolution of the Programme during the Fifth 
Ordinary Meeting held on 29 February 2012.
 2.4.2  Problems of Enforcing Sustainable Development in the 
Tanganyika Area
In the past decades, international organisations focusing on 
Lake Tanganyika and the organisations within the countries have obviously not 
only been preoccupied with the duties of drafting the convention and establish-
ing its institutions, but have also revealed the fundamental causes that account 
for the major environmental and developmental problems in connection with 
the Lake Tanganyika region. The most severe problems are related to overfish-
ing, principally affecting clupeid stocks68 and ornamental fish, a further source 
of concern is the pollution of urban and industrial origin, seeping into the water 
of Lake Tanganyika.69 Shipping oil products is frequent on Lake Tanganyika, 
which has the potential for grave accidents.70 In addition, Lake Tanganyika is 
surrounded by sloping fields virtually from all sides, allowing for contaminants 
from agricultural production to flow into the lake. The increase in the popula-
tion and consequently the necessary increase in agricultural lands account for 
deforestation, the deterioration of forests, which also has a significant impact on 
the wildlife of Lake Tanganyika.71
The volume of the problems revealed by the scientific organisations and 
the participant countries is so significant and the financial opportunities of 
the participant countries of the Lake Tanganyika Convention are so limited 
67  LTA Secretariat: Strategic Action Programme for the Protection of Biodiversity and Sustainable Management 
of Natural Resources in Lake Tanganyika and its Basin. Bujumbura, Burundi: Lake Tanganyika Authority, 
2012.
68  MUNYANDORERO, Joseph: ’The Lake Tanganyika clupeid and latid fishery system: Indicators and prob-
lems inherent in assessments and management’. African Study Monographs 23 (2002) 3: 117-145, p. 121.
69  Pollution Control and Other Measures to Protect Biodiversity in Lake Tanganyika: Lake Tanganyika 
– The Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis (TDA), 26-27, p. 43. http://iwlearn.net/iw-projects/1017/
reports/transboundary-diagnostic-analysis-en.pdf/view.
70  Ibid. 28-29.
71  See COHEN, A. S. – BILLS, R. – COCQUYT, C. Z. – CALJON, A. G.: ’The impact of sediment pollution on 
biodiversity in Lake Tanganyika’. Conservation Biology 7 (1993) 3: 667-677.
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that these countries will not be able to achieve radical change without external 
resources even with the best of intentions. However, it seems that the potential 
donor countries and organisations would like to leave the agreement related to 
Lake Tanganyika on its own after the initial subsidies and they trust that the 
participant countries will be able to manage the arising difficulties anyway. This 
hope, however, seems illusory. Although the participant countries should be 
applauded for concluding the agreement, the causes for the contamination of 
Lake Tanganyika stem from such severe social and economic difficulties, that 
cannot be solved by the participant states on the short-run, and this situation 
determines the fate of Lake Tanganyika.
 2.5 Summary
As a result of our assessment of the international treaties 
including sustainable development we may conclude that there are conventions, 
in case of which the concept of sustainable development appears merely as the 
requirement of contemporary times and drafters of the treaty only inserted the 
provisions on sustainable development into the conventions in order to make a 
favourable impression before international public opinion.72 In case of certain 
agreements, however, we may assume – in particular in case of agreements on 
the sustainable use of shared resources – that sustainable development provides 
real binding power to the convention. Our hypothesis could be that sustainable 
development creates legal possibilities for the states with opposing interests, 
which – depending on the given situation – assume the role of protecting the 
environmental values or the role of intending to exploit those values in the 
interest of the country’s development with respect to the same natural resources. 
This would create a sort of a balance situation with respect to any given natural 
resource.
The examples examined in practice revealed the circumstances of two 
conventions that are considered as mature examples, taking into account their 
provisions. The agreements under scrutiny were related to the Mecong River 
Delta and Lake Tanganyika. In the course of the examination of the two cases, 
we came to the conclusion that little result may be expected from the implemen-
tation of these environmental agreements purported to be relatively developed.73 
Perhaps the lack of a clear and evidently defined legal standard of measure is the 
major problem, which could authorize the country intending to protect its envi-
ronment, to take action of due impact in compliance with international law.74 As 
72  Examples mentioned for such treaties include: Energy Charter Treaty (ECT, 1994), International Agree-
ment on Olive Oil and Table Olives (2005), International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA, 2006).
73  MAGSIG, Bjørn-Oliver: ’Overcoming State-Centrism in International Water Law: ’Regional Common 
Concern’ as the Normative Foundation of Water Security’. Goettingen Journal of International Law 3 (2011) 
1, p. 340.
74  KE, Jian – GAO, Qi: ’Only One Mekong: Developing Transboundary EIA Procedures of Mekong River 
Basin’. Pace Environmental Law Review, 30 (2013) 3, p. 959.
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Philip Hirsch and Kurt Jensen observe, the Mekong Agreement ‘lacks the legal 
’teeth’ to enforce its provisions and is therefore unable to bring about the realisa-
tion of its aspirations.’75
In the following we examine whether the judgments of the International 
Court of Justice in the Hague (the ‘ICJ’) fostered the crystallisation of sustain-
able development principles in the field of public international law.
 2.6  Issues of Sustainable Development before the 
International Court of Justice in the Hague
Although some aspects of sustainable development have 
emerged in important cases before other international courts, such as the Iron 
Rhine case,76 it is probably the ICJ that has the greatest impact on the develop-
ment of global international environmental law. Thus, in the following we 
analyse the most significant judgments of the ICJ with respect to environment 
protection.
 2.6.1 The Case Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project
The ICJ included the concept of sustainable development in 
the Advisory Opinion on Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons in 1996, declaring 
that the principle is part of the body of international law relating to the environ-
ment.77 Nevertheless, the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros dispute was the first case to come 
before the ICJ addressing questions of international environmental law. The ICJ 
issued its judgment on 25 September 1997 in the Case Concerning the Gabčikovo- 
Nagymaros project.78 The case related to the agreement concluded between the 
Hungarian People’s Republic and the Czechoslovak People’s Republic on 16 
September 1977,79 aiming for the construction of a hydraulic power plant system 
consisting of two locks on the Hungarian-Czechoslovak section of the Danube.
75  See HIRSCH, Philip – MØRCK JENSEN, Kurt et al.: National Interests and Transboundary Water Govern-
ance in the Mekong op. cit. 27.
76  Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine (‘Ijzeren Rijn’) Railway between The Kingdom of Belgium and 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands, Award of 24 May 2005, UNRIAA XXVII 35. See in detail Baetens, 
Freya: ’The Iron Rhine Case: On the Right Track to Sustainable Development?’ In: M. C. Cordonier 
Segger (ed.): Sustainable Development Principles in the Decisions of International Courts and Tribunals 
1992-2012. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=. 
 2246844.
77  Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in an Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 67 
(July 8), paragraph 29.
78  Case concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep. 7.
79  Treaty between the Hungarian People’s Republic and the Czechoslovak People’s Republic concerning 
the construction and operation of the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros System of Locks, 16 September 1977.
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Figure 4: Map of the Original Project of the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros System of Locks; 
Source: International Court of Justice, 199780
The facility was designed to operate in peak power mode, namely a part of the 
Danube’s water quantity would have been regularly held back in the reservoir 
located in the upper part of Czechoslovak territory above the power plant, and 
this quantity would have been released through the turbines in a greater volume 
at various stages during the daily peak energy consumption. In order to compen-
sate the negative environmental impacts of this water fluctuation, the construc-
tion of a second power plant was required on Hungarian territory at Nagymaros; 
this facility would have produced significantly less energy but could have coun-
terbalanced the water level fluctuations resulting from peak energy production. 
According to the plans of the facility, it was envisaged that a significant part of 
the Danube’s water runoff will be diverted to a side-channel to be constructed 
on Czechoslovak territory. The side-channel would have provided the water 
quantity required for rotating the turbines in the Czechoslovak facility, and the 
water would have returned to the main watercourse of the Danube through the 
side-channel.
Environmental risks related to the investment already became apparent 
during the planning phase of the construction. One of the greatest risks was 
the sedimentation of heavy metals from the reservoir located above the Czecho-
slovak power plant into the underground aquifer which represents a substantial 
portion of the water supply of Slovakia and also for Hungary. Furthermore, with 
the establishment of the locks at Nagymaros on the Hungarian side, the water 
quantity in the bank filtration wells in the section of the Danube below the 
locks would dropped to a level which could have endangered the water supply of 
Budapest.
80  See the judgment in the Case concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, p. 32.
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Notwithstanding the fact that as a state belonging to the socialist block, 
significant pressure was placed on Hungary to construct the facility – serving 
also military and strategic purposes –, as a consequence of the mass protests 
immediately prior to the regime change the Hungarian government first 
decided to suspend the construction of the facility. Later on, when the Czecho-
slovak government continued the works on the facility situated on the Czecho-
slovak side, the Hungarian Republic decided to unilaterally terminate the 
agreement in order to cease the legal basis of Slovakia to continue construction. 
The purpose of the Hungarian government was to cease the legal basis entitling 
Slovakia to deflect a major part of the water quantity to the side-channel, conse-
quently to prevent the deflection of the Danube by terminating the agreement. 
However, the measures of the Hungarian government proved unsuccessful as 
Czechoslovakia deflected 83% of the Danube’s water quantity from the original 
watercourse of the Danube to the side-channel on 23 October 1992. Moreover, 
Czechoslovakia unilaterally implemented a technical solution which resulted 
in a modified and amended execution of the energy production plans on the 
Czechoslovak side compared to the originally agreed designs.
After losing its sovereignty over the Danube, Hungary submitted a claim to 
the ICJ which was rejected at first instance, since Slovakia did not assume the 
position of respondent. Later, thanks to the efforts of the European Union the 
parties reached a compromise related to the joint submission of the dispute to 
the ICJ. The purpose of Hungary was to redeem its sovereignty over the Danube 
as a natural resource. By contrast, the purpose of Slovakia was to legitimise the 
execution of the investment diverging from the original plans by way of the 
judgment of the ICJ as a legitimate implementation of the agreement signed in 
1977. Slovakia also intended to convince the ICJ to order Hungary to complete 
the construction of the facilities.
As Section 125 of the ICJ judgment describes, in their complaint the repre-
sentatives of Hungary referred to the principles of sustainable development. 
This principle was raised as a standard within the framework of which the 
parties must perform a joint environmental impact assessment with respect 
to the facility.81 Nevertheless, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant applied 
the concept of sustainable development as a central point of their arguments. 
This notion may seem surprising at first, since the case concerned a situation 
where the application of the principle of sustainable development would have 
been suitable. Indeed, according to the facts, there was a state, namely Slova-
kia, which considered that it is entitled to serve the purpose of development by 
the execution of the investment, on the other hand, there was another state, 
namely Hungary, which held that the facility gives rise to significant risks of 
environmental damage in its territory, therefore this state intended to prevent 
the construction of the facility. Nevertheless, a special circumstance of the 
case must also be taken into account: originally Czechoslovakia and Hungary 
expected to construct the facility as a joint investment in respect of which 
81  Par. 125 of the judgment in the Case concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project.
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serious environmental issues were raised by the Hungarian side. Therefore, 
in the Hungarian-Slovak dispute the fulfilment of contractual obligations, 
the enforcement of pacta sunt servanda principle was an important influenc-
ing factor for the ICJ, moreover the principle appeared to be the determining 
aspect for organizing the conceptual elements of the judgment into a coherent 
system. Therefore, the Hungarian party abandoning the joint investment was 
not in a fortunate position before the ICJ. The Court affirmed the ‘integrity of 
the rule pacta sunt servanda’ and implicitly rejected Hungary’s contention that 
‘the previously existing obligation not to cause substantive damage to the terri-
tory of another state had…evolved into an erga omnes obligation of prevention of 
damage pursuant to the precautionary principle’.82 In doing so, the Court denied 
that environmental law principles could trump treaty law. Therefore, should the 
Court prescribe a certain conduct for the parties realizing a joint investment on 
the basis of sustainable development, we could deduce that all the more could be 
expected from the parties in similar cases where there are no contractual obliga-
tions binding the same parties.
Naturally, the arguments of the parties were based on international contrac-
tual law and on state liability law. With respect to the latter, Hungary referred to 
the international legal norms of emergency in the hope of proving the existence 
of grave and imminent peril threatening the environment, an argument, that 
may justify derogation from the contractual obligations.83 During the discussion 
of this particular issue the ICJ emphasised that while it can accept the argu-
ment and is aware of the fact that environmental protection is an important 
state interest, the ICJ considered that Hungary could not prove the imminent 
peril of the environment and therefore it cannot refer to the rules of liability in 
respect of emergency.84 Finally, the ICJ decided that Hungary unlawfully tried to 
suspend and later terminate the agreement concluded in 1977, at the same time, 
circumstances have overridden the performance obligations which the parties 
had failed to execute by the time of the diversion of the Danube in 1992. There-
fore, the parties should attempt to restore the joint operation of the established 
facility system and thereby fulfil the original purposes of the agreement to the 
fullest.85
The ICJ expressly clarified in its judgment that both current and future 
generations are seriously endangered in case mankind ignores the environmen-
tal impacts of mechanisation, technical and industrial development. Therefore, 
the ICJ found it important to ensure the proper balance between economic 
82  Ibid. paragraph 97.
83  Memorandum of the Republic of Hungary, 2 May 1994, paragraphs 6.56.-6.69.
84  ‘[The Court] has concluded that, with respect to both Nagymaros and Gabčikovo,‘the perils invoked 
by Hungary, without prejudging their possible gravity, were not sufficiently established in 1989, 
nor were they‘imminent’; and […] Hungary had available to it at that time means of responding to 
these perceived perils other than the suspension and abandonment of works with which it had been 
entrusted’(paragraph 57. of the judgment).
85  Ibid. paragraph 155.
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development and environmental protection under the concept of sustainable 
development. According to L. Bostain, the court referred specifically and appro-
priately to this concept,86 the content of which can be best defined as ‘develop-
ment that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.’87 The ICJ in Section 140 of its judg-
ment explains the obligation imposed by the concept of sustainable development 
on the parties. According to the standpoint of the ICJ the parties shall conduct 
an environmental impact assessment with respect to the environmental effects 
of the operation of the Gabčikovo power plant and an adequate solution must be 
found regarding the water quantity to be discharged into the Old Danube and 
its side-branches.88 As it is set forth in the previous subchapters, in paragraph 
140 of the judgment, the International Court of Justice described the concept 
of sustainable development as having customary law status. Legal literature 
paid scarce attention to this section of the ICJ judgment which imposes definite 
performance obligations on the parties pursuant to the concept of sustainable 
development. The ICJ refers expressly in the section to Hungary’s most impor-
tant claim, namely returning adequate water quantity to the Danube’s original 
watercourse, having regard to the fact that most probably this is the most suit-
able instrument available for the parties in order to protect the environment. 
Section 140 reveals that the ICJ requires the consideration of current standards 
in the course of evaluating environmental risks. By mentioning the terms of 
vigilance and prevention the ICJ indirectly refers to the concepts of precaution 
and prevention.89 However, this reference is only of indirect nature and can be 
only be interpreted into the text with great creativity. Some critics of the judg-
ment expressly emphasise that although Hungary expressis verbis referred to 
the principle of prevention, the statement of the ICJ stressing that precaution 
and prevention are essential in the field of environmental protection does by 
no means lead to the conclusion that the judgment canonised the principle 
of prevention. According to Allan Boyle it is not clear from the judgment why 
the ICJ did not refer to the principle of prevention.90 He assumes that the ICJ 
considered that the principle of prevention does not exhibit sufficient legal 
substance. According to Ida L. Bostain, the principle of prevention is a rather 
novel concept, therefore it is not in the least surprising that the ICJ did not refer 
to this principle.91 However, this fact is rather disappointing as the principle of 
prevention could have been suitable for replacing the requirement of immediacy. 
86  BOSTIAN, Ida L.: ‘Flushing the Danube: The World Court’s Decision Concerning the Gabčikovo Dam’. 
Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 9 (1998) 401.
87  World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future 46 (1987) 4.
88  Par. 140 of the judgment in the Case concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project.
89  Ibid.
90  BOYLE, A. E.: ‘The Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Case: New Law in Old Bottles’. Yearbook of International Envi-
ronmental Law 8 (1997), p. 17.
91  BOSTIAN op. cit. 425.
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However, in the absence of such replacement the ICJ rejected Hungary’s argu-
ments with respect to emergency.
Paulo Canelas de Castro, who finds the judgment concerning the Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros project to be full of errors and loopholes, points even more markedly 
to the paradoxical contradictions of the judgment. Pursuant to Castro’s opinion 
the principle of prevention appears in the judgment in a too narrow and a too 
broad sense at the same time.92 On the one hand Hungary could not convince 
the ICJ that real ecological risks existed at the time, thus Hungary’s arguments 
were rejected in the absence of full scientific certainty. The ICJ expressed in its 
judgment that those perils which were referred by Hungary were unfounded.93 
According to Castro, while the ICJ failed to apply the principle of prevention but 
at the same time required full certainty, enforcing prudence and precaution are 
pivotal and indispensable in the preparatory phase of the project.94 Moreover, in 
his study Castro elaborates that the restrictive concept of the ICJ arose when it 
separated preparatory actions, such as the acts related to the construction and 
execution of the lock, from other acts of the parties and only the latter acts were 
deemed unlawful. On the other hand, these acts were interpreted too broadly in 
light of the principle of environmental impact assessment. Had the ICJ taken 
into account the principle of prevention, then the court could only have arrived 
at the conclusion that not only the existing violations breach international law 
but also those preparatory acts which may potentially lead to environmental 
harm. The ICJ imposed continuous environmental impact assessment obliga-
tions on the parties, ignoring that such obligations already existed during the 
preparation of the plans and the evaluation of the environmental effects in rela-
tion to the investment had not yet been completed.95
Returning to the logic of the ICJ, the most important obligation stemming 
from the sustainable development concept is the performance of the environ-
mental impact assessment.96 In relation to the performance of the environ-
mental impact assessment, the ICJ mentions that the actual environmental 
standards shall always be taken into account and the purpose of the assessment 
is to ensure that the parties demonstrate precaution and preventive actions in 
order to avoid potential environmental damage. It can be said that the ICJ linked 
the concept of sustainable development with legally binding elements with the 
result that the concept of sustainable development gave rise to concrete obliga-
tions of conduct.
At this point in the final assessment of the case it is worth noting further 
particularities of the case stressed by other authors, namely, that the entire 
92  CANELAS DE CASTRO, Paulo: ’The judgment in the Case Concerning the Gabčikovo–Nagymaros Project: 
Positive Signs for the Evolution of International Water Law’. Yearbook of International Environmental Law 
8 (1997), pp. 29-30.
93  Par. 57 of the judgment in the Case concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project.
94  CANELAS DE CASTRO, p. 28-29.
95  Ibid.
96  Paragraph 112 of the judgment in the Case concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project.
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judgment would have turned out differently, had the court taken into account 
the aspects of prevention and precaution in the course of exploring the histori-
cal events and not just with respect to future obligations.97 As the ICJ declared 
regarding the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros project both Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
breached the law and the question of winning or losing the case fundamen-
tally turned on who committed the first violation. This is a natural approach 
as in international law the application of reprisals is highly accepted, thus the 
response to the first infringement is considered a lawful counteraction, even 
if such an act would in itself be unlawful in the absence of the first breach. If 
we accept that pursuant to the principle of prevention, an investment which 
contains a serious environmental risk could be suspended until the joint 
environmental impact assessment is conducted, in particular in case a proper 
impact assessment has not yet been conducted, then the first action of Hungary 
deemed unlawful, that is, suspending the construction of the Nagymaros dam, 
could not have been considered an unlawful action. Consequently, the conduct 
of Czechoslovakia deviating from the plans pursuant to the original agreement 
would have fallen into the category of breach of law, particularly the unilat-
eral construction and putting into operation of the facility after the unilateral 
diversion of the Danube. In response to this, the termination of the agreement 
could have been a lawful measure establishing an entirely novel situation in the 
dispute between the parties.
This is why several authors commenting on the judgment expressed disap-
pointment. For instance according to Stephen Stake and Gabriel E. Eckstein, by 
its judgment the ICJ did not meet the expectations required by the principle of 
sustainable development.98 Although the ICJ acknowledged that environmental 
protection is a fundamental interest, it not only failed to provide priority to this 
environmental interest but omitted to ensure the balance between this funda-
mental interest and the benefits of economic development allegedly associated 
with the enormous investment. To be precise, the ICJ maintained in full force 
and effect an agreement scheme which is clearly untenable pursuant to the 
authors, and the ICJ only referred to the principle of sustainable development 
subsidiarily in order to ‘save something from the sinking ship’.99
It is worth mentioning the position put forward by Owen McIntyre, one of 
the authors engaging in the research of sustainable development, according to 
whom the principle of equitable use is actually the manifestation of the principle 
97  See e.g. BOSTIAN, Ida L.: op.cit. 401.; BOYLE, A. E.: op.cit. 13-20.; CANELAS DE CASTRO, op.cit. 
pp. 21- 31.; KOE, Adrianna: ’Damming the Danube: The International Court of Justice and the Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia)’. Sydney Law Review 20 (1998) 4: 612-629.; STEC, Stephen – 
ECKSTEIN, Gabriel E.: ’Of Solemn Oaths and Obligations: The Environmental Impact of the ICJ’s Decision 
in the Case Concerning Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project’. Yearbook of International Environmental Law 8 
(1997): 41-50.
98  STEC– ECKSTEIN: op. cit. 45.
99  Ibid 47.
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of sustainable development with respect to international watercourses.100 Pursu-
ant to the author, negative environmental impacts shall by no means be consid-
ered as equitable use of international watercourses.101
It is important to discuss the separate opinion of Vice President Weera-
mantry as well, since this opinion analysed the concept of sustainable develop-
ment in detail and revealed the aspects of the principle of sustainable devel-
opment in a broad context. According to the standpoint of Weeramantry, the 
fundamental principle of sustainable development is more than a mere concept 
as sustainable development is a principle of normative value, playing a major 
role in deciding the case.102 Canelas de Castro speculates that ‘Judge Weera-
mantry, who is after all part of the majority, echoed, perhaps even unveiled, the 
Court’s thinking when he spoke of sustainable development as a principle with 
normative value’.103 Pursuant to Weeramantry, both the right to environmental 
protection and the right to development form part of international law, although 
these rights may collide and it is for the principle of sustainable development to 
resolve the conflict.104 It should be noted that Weeramantry raises the principle 
of continuing environmental impact assessment105 and the principle of contem-
poraneity in the application of environmental norms106 – notions which the ICJ 
judgment simply connected to concept of sustainable development – separately 
from sustainable development.
The arguments of judge Weeramantry failed to convince other authors 
commenting on the judgment. As a matter of fact, according to the opinion of 
Adrianna Koe, in his theoretical explication Weeramantry ignored facts and 
realities.107 Indeed, which (if any) environmental concerns may be sacrificed in 
favour of development of the Danube to facilitate power generation? Can the 
diversion of a river be justified by the criterion of development? According to 
Adrianna Koe, Weeramantry adopted a utilitarian approach, namely the notion 
of utmost prosperity and joy. But how do we measure human joy? On the one 
hand, Koe accepts the theoretical arguments of Weeramantry ensuring the 
foundation for the concept of sustainable development, on the other hand Koe 
criticises these arguments as there is an enormous gap between such theoreti-
cal arguments and the fact that Hungary and Slovakia shall establish a joint 
management system for the operation of the hydraulic power plant which may 
cause harmful environmental impacts.108
100  MCINTYRE, Owen: ’Environmental Protection of International Rivers: Case Concerning the Gabčikovo–
Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)’. Journal of Environmental Law 10 (1998) 1: 79-91., p. 88.
101  Ibid.
102  Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry, pp. 88-89.
103  CANELAS DE CASTRO op. cit. 21., 28.
104  Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry, p. 90.
105  Ibid 111-113.
106  Ibid 113-115.
107  KOE, op.cit. pp. 612-629.
108  Ibid. 622.
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 2.6.2 Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
On 20 April 2010, the International Court of Justice deliv-
ered its judgment in a subsequent significant environmental dispute between 
Argentina and Uruguay. The Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay109 
provided the Court with the opportunity to contribute to the further evolution 
of sustainable development. Similarly to the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case, the Pulp 
Mills case is centered around the interpretation of a treaty on the utilization of 
a shared river, namely the River Uruguay. Both cases involved joint projects 
with significant environmental implications that led one of the parties to stop 
the construction of the project. Both cases reveal the complexity of sustainable 
development and the approach of the Court toward this concept. Since 1997, 
there have been major developments in international sustainable development 
law including legal instruments110 elaborated by international organizations and 
the civil society as well as decisions111 of national, regional and international 
courts and tribunals.112 Consequently, the ICJ could use a wide range of materi-
als to elaborate the definition and principles underlying sustainable develop-
ment.
109  Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), ICJ judgment of 20 April 2010.
110  See e.g. the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, the 2010 
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising 
from the Utilisation to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the International Law Association’s 
New Delhi Declaration on Sustainable Development.
111  See especially the Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine (‘Ijzeren Rijn’) Railway (Belgium v The Neth-
erlands), Arbitral Award of 24 May 2005 and the Advisory Opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on matters relating to the Responsibilities and Obliga-
tions of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion 
of 1 February 2011.
112  TLADI, Dire: ‘Principles of Sustainable Development in the Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay’. International Development Law Organization Legal Working Paper, pp. 2-3. Available at 
http://www.idlo.int/Documents/Rio/01.%20Pulp%20Mills%20on%20the%20River%20Uruguay.pdf.
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Figure 5: Siting of the Orion (Botnia) Mill and the Planned CMB (ENCE) Mill (Not 
Built); Source: International Court of Justice, 2010113
The River Uruguay constitutes the border between Argentina and Uruguay 
according to the 1961 bilateral treaty between the two states. Pursuant to the 
so-called Montevideo Treaty, the parties established a regime for the use of 
the river. The common regime was regulated by the 1975 Statute of the River 
Uruguay. In 2003 and 2005 Uruguay unilaterally issued an authorisation for 
the construction of two pulp mills along the banks of the river, without having 
fully exhausted the communication process laid down in the 1975 Statute. In its 
judgment the Court found that Uruguay failed to comply with the procedural 
obligations to adequately inform Argentina and the Administrative Commis-
sion of the River Uruguay (the ‘CARU’) prior to the initial authorisation for the 
construction of the project. Nevertheless, the Court found that Uruguay did not 
violate the substantive obligations under the 1975 Statute relating to the protec-
tion of the environment. The Court confirmed the obligation of due diligence,114 
and reaffirmed that this obligation ‘is now part of the corpus of international 
law relating to the environment’.115 Rejecting the argument of Argentina, the 
ICJ underlined that due diligence is the obligation of conduct rather than one of 
result.116
113  See the judgment in the Case Concerning the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, p. 25.
114  ‘A State is thus obliged to use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take place 
in its territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment 
of another State.’ See paragraph 10 of the judgment in the Case Concerning the Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay.
115  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 242, para-
graph. 29.
116  See paragraph 187 of the judgment in the Case Concerning the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay.
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When assessing the relationship between procedural obligations and 
substantive obligations, the Court underlined the importance of coopera-
tion, which is a crucial element for the proper implementation of the Treaty: 
‘it is by cooperating that the States can jointly manage the risks of damage to 
the environment’.117 In this connection, the Court recalls its judgment in the 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case noting that the ‘need to reconcile economic develop-
ment with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of 
sustainable development’, adding that ‘[i]t is for the Parties themselves to find 
agreed solutions that takes account of the objectives of the Treaty’.118
In the context of the obligation to inform, the Court refers to the ‘principle of 
prevention’ as part of international environmental law. Pursuant to the Court’s 
judgment, the principle of prevention obliges states to ‘use all the means at 
its disposal in order to avoid causing significant damage to the environment 
of another state’.119 Uruguay should have submitted the relevant informations 
to the CARU without delay in order to enable the Commission to assess the 
possible harm to the environment on the territory of Argentina. Without prompt 
notification the CARU could not initiate the process to prevent the damage.120 
Nevertheless, the Court failed to address the effects of the preventative princi-
ple on the obligations of the parties subsequent to the consultation period, in 
particular, the role of the preventative principle in interpreting the content of the 
parties’ obligations, as well as the ensuing consequences.121
As regards the precautionary principle, Argentina argued that the principle 
implies a reversal of the burden of proof or the burden applies equally to both 
parties. The Court held that ‘while it may be relevant in the interpretation and 
application of the provisions of the Statute, it does not follow that it operates 
as reversal of the burden of proof’,122 thus the burden remains on the party 
asserting the breach of environmental obligations. The Court not only reduces 
the principle to a simple ‘approach’ that may be relevant to the case, but fails to 
explain the exact application of the principle.
At this point, we can draw another parallel between the two decisions of the 
International Court of Justice. As in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case, a number 
of judges elaborated dissenting and separate opinions to the judgment. The 
most remarkable is that of Judge Cançado Trindade, who focused his thoughts 
on general principles of law, including the principle of prevention and the 
117  Ibid. paragraph 77.
118  Ibid. paragraph 76.
119  Ibid. paragraph 101. The principle is also reflected in, inter alia, the Corfu Channel Case (United King-
dom v Albania) ICJ judgment of 9 April 1949 at 22 and the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996. See 
also the Trail Smelter Case (US v Canada) (1941) Vol III Reports of International Arbitral Awards pp. 
1905-1982 at 1965.
120  Paragraph 105 of the judgment in the Case Concerning the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay.
121  TLADI, op.cit. p. 6.
122  Paragraph 164 of the judgment in the Case Concerning the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay.
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precautionary principle. He is critical of the Court’s approach regarding these 
principles and observes that the ICJ did not show the same ‘zeal and diligence’ 
in respect of legal principles as it did when it examined the factual and scientific 
questions.123 According to him, these principles ought to have guided the Court 
in the interpretation and application of the 1975 Statute, and should have been 
taken into account in determining the procedural and substantive obligations of 
the parties.
The concept of sustainable development is considered by the Court in the 
context of balancing between economic and environmental interests. This 
narrow understanding of the concept of sustainable development ignores the 
fact that social concerns are integral elements of sustainable development and 
therefore reduces sustainable development to a mere tool of balancing economic 
development and environmental protection.124 In his Separate Opinion Judge 
Cançado Trindade describes sustainable development as ‘encompassing the 
fostering of economic growth, the eradication of poverty and the satisfaction 
of basic human needs (such as those pertaining to health, nutrition, housing, 
education).’125 Nevertheless, the Court recognises that each party has the right to 
make equitable and reasonable use of the shared watercourse for economic and 
commercial activities. The Court notes that Article 27 of the Statute embodies 
the ‘interconnectedness between equitable and reasonable utilization of a shared 
resource and the balance between economic development and environmental 
protection that is the essence of sustainable development’,126 placing the right of 
equitable use within the framework of sustainable development.127
The most significant contribution of the judgment to the development of 
international environmental law and the principles governing the law of shared 
watercourses is the recognition of the environmental impact assessment as a 
practice that has become an obligation under general international law by reason 
of its wide acceptance among the states:
‘[i]t is the opinion of the Court that in order for the Parties properly to comply 
with their obligations under…the 1975 Statute, they must, for the purposes of 
protecting and preserving the aquatic environment with respect to activities which 
may be liable to cause transboundary harm, carry out an environmental impact 
assessment.…In this sense, the obligation to protect and preserve, under … the 
Statute, has to be interpreted in accordance with a practice, which in recent years 
has gained so much acceptance among States that it may now be considered 
a requirement under general international law to undertake an environmental 
123  Paragraph 4 of the separate opinion of Cançado Trindade in the Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay. See also the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma at paragraph 27.
124  TLADI op.cit. p. 12.
125  Paragraph 132 of the separate opinion of Cançado Trindade in the Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay.
126  Paragraph 177 of the judgment in the Case Concerning the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay.
127  BOYLE op. cit. 4.
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impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may 
have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a 
shared resource. Moreover, due diligence, and the duty of vigilance and preven-
tion which it implies, would not be considered to have been exercised, if a party 
planning works liable to affect the régime of the river or the quality of its waters 
did not undertake an environmental impact assessment on the potential effects of 
such works.’128
In order to prevent pollution and preserve the aquatic environment, environ-
mental impact assessments must be performed prior to the implementation 
of projects that are likely to cause significant environmental harm. After the 
commencement of implementation, environmental effects must be continu-
ously monitored.129 As Alan Boyle asserts, it remains an important question 
as to whether the Court would ever review the adequacy of an environmental 
impact assessment. It is worth mentioning that the ICJ found nothing unac-
ceptable about the impact assessment of Uruguay except for the late notification. 
The Court accepted the argument of Uruguay – based on the ILC Draft Articles 
on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities130 – that 
the scope and content of an environmental impact assessment must be deter-
mined by each party on a case by case basis, as they are not specified by general 
international law.131 There is only one surprising element in the evaluation of the 
environmental impact assessment, and that is the question of public consulta-
tion. In paragraph 216 of the judgment the Court held categorically that ‘no 
legal obligation to consult the affected populations arises for the Parties from 
the instruments invoked by Argentina.’ According to Boyle, if Argentina would 
have argued properly when the Espoo Convention132 and the UNEP Principles133 
were invoked, there should have been no difficulty in convincing the ICJ of the 
128  ‘As the Court has observed in the case concerning the Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, 
there are situations in which the parties ’intent upon conclusion of the treaty was, or may be presumed to have 
been, to give the terms used … a meaning or content capable of evolving, not one fixed once and for all, so as to 
make allowance for, among other things, developments in international law’ (Dispute Regarding Naviga-
tional and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 242, paragraph 
64). See paragraph 204 of the judgment in the Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay.
129  Paragraph 205 of the judgment in the Case Concerning the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay.
130  Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with commentaries, 
2001. Adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to 
the General Assembly as part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/56/10).
131  BOYLE, Alan: ’Pulp Mills Case: A Commentary’, pp. 2-3. Available at http://www.biicl.org/files/ 
5167_pulp_mills_case.pdf.
132  Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 25 February 
1991.
133  United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact 
Assessment, 1987.
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general principle that public consultation is a necessary element of the environ-
mental impact assessment process.134
 2.7 Concluding Remarks
One can agree with the statement of Ida L. Bostian in connec-
tion with the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case: ‘The Court’s decision was not a clear 
victory for either party.’135 The Gabčikovo-Nagymaros problem was a particu-
larly sensitive dispute both for Slovakia and Hungary. The International Court 
of Justice was capable of elaborating a well-balanced, delicate decision, which 
guarantees that the most fundamental interests of both parties are safeguarded. 
However, the complexity of the international legal problem – which encom-
passes significant technical and scientific elements – made it impossible for the 
Court to provide for a detailed arrangement. The judgment rendered in 1997 
may have been perhaps disappointing for many. According to international 
scholarship, where the additional rights of the parties are determined, the provi-
sions of international environmental law, international water law and the law of 
treaties must be considered with equal weight. However, the judgment evidently 
favours the provisions of the law of treaties to the detriment of the other two 
areas of law. Thus the Court ‘missed the opportunity to give further definition to 
the concept of sustainable development’ in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case.136 Jan 
Klabbers finds it decisive that the Court is aware of the fact that certain determi-
nations of the case will ‘return and haunt’ in other cases as well. Consequently, 
the Court was facing a difficult problem. ‘The Court must have danced like a cat 
on a hot tin roof.’137 Although the International Court of Justice recommended 
the use of the concept of sustainable development, it ‘stopped short of declaring 
or referring to sustainable development as a norm of customary international 
law.’138
Twelve years after the judgment, in the Pulp Mills case the ICJ could have 
resolved the questions of international environmental law and the legal impli-
cations of sustainable development that had been left open in the Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros judgment.139 Nevertheless, in 2010 the Court was still reluctant to 
confirm sustainable development as a legal norm. The Court rather referred 
to sustainable development as an ‘objective’.140 Despite the Court’s signifi-
134  BOYLE, Alan: ’Pulp Mills Case: A Commentary’, 3.
135  BOSTIAN op. cit. 414.
136  KOE op. cit. 612.
137  KLABBERS, Jan: ’Case Analysis: Cat on a Hot Tin Roof: The World Court, State Succession, and the 
Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Case’. Leiden Journal of International Law (1998) 11: 345-355, p. 355.
138  TAYLOR, Prue: ’Case concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project: A Message from the Hague on Sustain-
able Development’. New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law 3 (1999): 109-126, p. 110.
139  TREVISAN, Lauren: ‘The International Court of Justice’s Treatment of ‘Sustainable Development’ and 
Implications for Argentina v. Uruguay’. Sustainable Development Law & Policy 10 (2009) 1, p. 40.
140  See paragraph 177 of the judgment in the Case Concerning the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay.
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cant contribution to the law on sustainable development brought about by the 
recognition of the requirement to conduct environmental impact assessments 
as forming part of customary international law, the ICJ did not altogether seize 
the opportunity to develop, clarify and elaborate the scope, application and the 
legal status of the principles relating to sustainable development. As Dire Tladi 
observes, ‘[t]he Court is quite clearly aware of sustainable development and 
related principles. However, there is clear unwillingness to fully integrate these 
concepts into the decision it reaches. The Court is content to merely refer to 
them, almost symbolically, without integrating them into the decision.’141
On the basis of the two cases, we may come to the conclusion that the Inter-
national Court will also be careful in the future with respect to its resolutions 
concerning international environmental law and it will recognise certain aspects 
of law only if it is absolutely necessary. Commentators agree that the Court must 
pay more attention to environmental issues and it should not be ‘deterred’ from 
determining the role of the continuously developing norms of international 
environmental law.142
141  TLADI, Dire: ’Principles of Sustainable Development in the Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay’, p. 13.
142  KOE op. cit. 629.
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 1 Environmental Policy and Legislation
Parallel with the growing global interest towards environmen-
tal protection, the necessary policy framework for environmental action had also 
been developed under the auspices of the EEC/EC, officially launched in the 
Paris summit in October 1972:1 
‘3. Economic expansion which is not an end in itself must as a priority help to 
attenuate the disparities in living conditions. It must develop with the participa-
tion of both sides of industry. It must emerge in an improved. quality as well as 
an improved standard of life. In the European spirit special attention will be paid 
to non-material values and wealth and to protection of the environment so that 
progress shall serve mankind;’.
As is known, European environmental action programs also have their origin in 
the Paris meeting. The First Environmental Action Programme2 laid down the 
foundations of EC environmental policy, while the Second Action Programme 
of 19773, for the period 1977–1981, provided for the gradual introduction of a 
comprehensive environmental policy. The Third Programme of 19834, for the 
period of 1982–1986, promoted environmental protection as a major objective of 
the EC, turning towards prevention, and among others urging for the integra-
tion of environmental considerations into the planning and improvement of 
enterprise. Policy integration is generally perceived as the most practical way of 
implementing sustainability.
The Fourth Action Programme of 19875 marks a turning point in the history 
of the environmental policy of the EC, with the Single European Act6 provid-
ing for a clear legal basis of environmental protection. At this point, sustain-
1  Meetings of the Heads of State or Government Paris 19-21 October 1972, The First Summit Conference 
of the Enlarged Community, Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 10, Brussels, p. 15-16, http://
aei.pitt.edu/1919/2/paris_1972_communique.pdf.
2  Declaration of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives of the Govern-
ments of the Member States Meeting in the Council of 22 November 1973 on the Programme of Action 
of the European Communities on the Environment, OJ C 112, 20.12.1973.
3  Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives of the Governments 
of the Member States Meeting within the Council of 17 May 1977 on the continuation and implementa-
tion of a European Community policy and action programme on the environment, OJ C 139, 13.6.77.
4  Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives of the Governments 
of the Member States Meeting within the Council of of 7 February 1983 on the continuation and imple-
mentation of a European Community policy and action programme on the environment (1982 to 1986) 
OJ C 46, 17.2.1983.
5  Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of the representatives of the Governments 
of the Member States, meeting within the Council of 19 October 1987 on the continuation and imple-
mentation of a European Community policy and action programme on the environment (1987-1992) 
Official Journal C 328, 07/12/1987 p. 1-44.
6  Single European Act, which entered into force on 1 July 1987, OJ L 169 of 29.6.1987.
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able development as a principle had just been officially established, while the 
principle of policy integration is further underlined as a vital requirement. The 
Fifth Environmental Action Programme7 had its basis in the UNCED process on 
sustainable development – note the title of the Programme: ‘Towards Sustain-
ability’ – and the Maastricht Treaty.8 Several new approaches are listed in the 
Programme, such as the interests of present and future generations; the need 
to build on shared responsibilities in a way that all sectors of society become 
involved, ranging from public administration to the private sphere; partnership; 
the implementation of a broad range of regulatory and other instruments; the 
further development of integration, etc. The entire process shall be based on 
subsidiarity in connection with the notion of shared responsibility.
The Programme reached its final stage during its revision in 1998.9 Its main 
focus was still the protection of the environment, however, this was linked into 
the wider context of integration and sustainability, as set forth in the preamble: 
‘(20) Whereas the further integration of environmental protection requirements 
into other policy areas is regarded as a key means of achieving sustainable devel-
opment...;’
The implementation of sustainable development became the key concept of 
the Sixth Environmental Action Programme.10 The Programme covered mate-
rial and social issues, linking living standards with sustainable development. 
The Programme is clear in its definition of the major elements of sustainability:
‘(6) A prudent use of natural resources and the protection of the global eco-
system together with economic prosperity and a balanced social development are 
a condition for sustainable development....
(13) The Programme should promote the process of integration of environmen-
tal concerns into all Community policies and activities in line with Article 6 of the 
Treaty in order to reduce the pressures on the environment from various sources.’
Par. (6) clearly reflects the essence of sustainability, namely to give priority to 
environmental protection, further reinforced in paragraph (8) with the practi-
cal side of integration in paragraph (13). The practical requirement relates to the 
special interest of integration, since there are no other direct means to imple-
ment sustainability and translate it into the language of regulation.
7  Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting 
within the Council of 1 February 1993 on a Community programme of policy and action in relation to 
the environment and sustainable development. Official Journal C. 138, 17.5.93.
8  Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), which entered into force on 1 November 1993, OJ C 
191 of 29.07.1992.
9  Decision No 2179/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 1998 on the 
review of the European Community programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and 
sustainable development ‘Towards sustainability’ Official Journal L 275 , 10/10/1998 p. 1-13.
10  Decision No 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 2002 laying down 
the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme, OJ L 242, 2002. 09. 10.
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If we take a look at Article 2 on principles and overall aims then the close 
correlation between integration and sustainability becomes even more self-
evident. We may arrive at the conclusion that sustainability and integration 
mark a bidirectional process:
»  integrating environmental concerns into all Community policies – para-
graph(1);
«  environmental measures should be coherent with the material and social 
dimensions of sustainable development – paragraph (4).
Paragraph (4) clearly states: ‘... measures proposed and adopted in favour of the 
environment should be coherent with the objectives of the economic and social 
dimensions of sustainable development and vice versa.’
The revision of the Programme took place in 2007. Among others, the 
Program noted that ‘the EU is not yet on the path of sustainable environmental 
development.’11 As such, there was a need for further integration of environmen-
tal policy considerations into EU policies. The SOER report12 from the end of 
2010 is also worth mentioning. From among the 10 key messages of the report, 
there are several which are directly connected with sustainable development, 
such as
‘Implementing environmental policies and strengthening environmental govern-
ance will continue to provide benefits’.
‘Transformation towards a greener European economy will ensure the long-term 
environmental sustainability...’
Meanwhile, the time was ripe to refurbish EU environmental policy. From a 
formal perspective, the Sixth Action Programme officially drew to a close in 
2012, while it also became necessary to renew policy considerations, due to the 
new development strategy issued in 2010.13 At this point we may also point out 
the outcomes of the Rio+20 process (The Future We Want), which also had 
to be taken into consideration in the framework of the burgeoning European 
environmental policy. The proposal for the new, seventh environmental action 
programme for the period lasting until 2020 was presented at the end of 2012. 
Certain elements of the new programme will only expire in 2050 (‘Living well, 
11  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Mid-term review of the Sixth 
Community Environment Action Programme, Brussels, 30.4.2007, COM(2007) 225 final, p. 17.
12  The European Environment State and Outlook 2010 Synthesis, published by the European Environment 
Agency, published by the European Environment Agency, http://www.eea.europa.eu/soer/synthesis/
synthesis,.
13  See, e.g.: Communication from the Commission Europe 2020, A strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth Brussels, 3.3.2010, COM(2010) 2020 final; Council Recommendation of 13 July 2010 
on broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union, Official Journal L 
191 , 23/07/2010 p. 28-34, European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2010 on EU 2020.
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within the limits of our planet’).14 Attached to the proposal are certain accom-
panying documents, the most important of which are the impact assessment15 
and the preliminary studies and reports,16 which substantiate the findings of 
the draft. In light of the antecedents, we should not expect any novelty. The 
wording of the Final Report for the Assessment of the 6th Environment Action 
Programme is clear in this respect17: ‘When assessing the effects of the over-
all Programme, rather than progress on individual parts of it, one can see the 
added value of the 6EAP in providing strategic direction and policy orientation 
and generating support for, and engagement with, EU environmental policy.’ 
Although certain areas have been successfully reformed, there remain others 
which are still lacking an effective solution, as highlighted by the proposed Pro-
gramme for Action18: ‘5. However, many environmental trends in the EU remain 
worrying, not least due to insufficient implementation of existing EU environ-
ment legislation.’
To introduce the entire proposal with all its background materials would be 
obsolete, since at the time of the finalization of the present book the proposal 
had not yet been adopted. Moreover, the majority of its elements had already 
been mentioned before, such as:
?? smart, sustainable and inclusive economy by 2020,
?? absolute decoupling of economic growth and environmental degradation,
?? environmental integration is essential,
?? transforming the global economy into an inclusive green economy in the 
context of sustainable development and the reduction of poverty.
We shall also refrain from going into the details of the nine priority objectives 
listed in the proposal, the details of which are listed in the Annex.19
14  Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a General Union Environ-
ment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of our planet’, Brussels, 2012.11.29. 
COM(2012) 710 final, 2012/0337 (COD).
15  Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment – Accompanying the document Proposal for 
a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a General Union Environment Action 
Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of our planet’, SWD(2012) 398 final, Brussels, 
29.11.2012.
16  Final Report for the Assessment of the 6th Environment Action Programme, DG ENV.1/
SER/2009/0044, Ecologic Institute, Berlin and Brussels in co-operation with Institute for European 
Environmental Policy, London and Brussels Central European University, Budapest, 21 February 2011. 
We may also mention studies such as The role of market-based instruments in achieving a resource efficient 
economy Under framework contract: ENV.G.1/FRA/2006/0073 Client: European Commission: DG 
Environment Rotterdam, October 2011, etc.
17  Final Report for the Assessment of the 6th Environment Action Programme, p. xiii.
18  ANNEX ‘Living well, within the limits of our planet’ A Programme for Action to 2020.
19  Art. 2 of the proposal presents the directory of these objectives: to protect, conserve and enhance the 
Union’s natural capital; to turn the Union into a resource-efficient, green and competitive low-carbon 
business and technology; to safeguard the Union’s citizens from environment-related pressures and 
risks to health and well-being; to maximise the benefits of the Union’s environment legislation; to 
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To illustrate the general stance of the proposal, the fourth priority objective 
related to environmental legislation may be mentioned. Three of the five items 
related to environmental legislation are somehow connected to public participa-
tion (access to information, citizens’ trust in institutions and access to justice). 
One may get the impression that the drafters have greater confidence in civil 
institutions and the partnership between such institutions and EU bodies, than 
in the very implementation systems of the Member States.
One accompanying document from the many issued together with the 
proposal is particularly noteworthy. Annex 2 of the impact assessment20 – ‘Link-
ages of environment policy issues’ – focuses on green economy, as a specific 
answer to the debate related to the general problem of weak or strong sustain-
ability. As it has already been presented above, there are three circles represent-
ing the major elements of sustainable development – environment, society and 
economy (or better said: business). The relationship of these elements is deci-
sive. According to Annex 2 green economy means the following: ‘The concept of 
a green economy recognises that ecosystems, the economy[business] and human 
wellbeing (and the respective types of natural, produced, social and human capi-
tal) are intrinsically linked.’ Although this statement is evidently true, the main 
question is still how this link will be presented.
improve the evidence base for environment policy; to secure investment for environment and climate 
policy and get the prices right; to improve environmental integration and policy coherence; to enhance 
the sustainability of the Union’s cities; to increase the Union’s effectiveness in confronting regional and 
global environmental challenges.
20  Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment – Accompanying the document Proposal for 
a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a General Union Environment Action 
Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of our planet’, SWD(2012) 398 final, Brussels, 
29.11.2012.
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The figure presented above illustrates the general and weaker concept of sustain-
ability with an interesting modification. First, we may notice the three major 
elements of sustainability with some specific explanations:
?? the ecosystem or natural capital must reach resilience (which is usually an 
immanent quality of the ecosystem);
?? the economy must be resource efficient;
?? human – originally: social – well-being must aim at equity and fair burden-
sharing. This may entail intergenerational and intragenerational equity in 
its genuine sense.
The above figure is largely based on the concept of weak sustainability, combin-
ing it with strong sustainability under the new title of ‘green economy’. As far 
as weak sustainability is concerned, sustainable development is limited to the 
intersection of the three circles representing the three elements of sustainable 
development. In the above figure, however, green economy embraces most of the 
three elements, only a part of human well-being is excluded. To some extent this 
may be acceptable in light of the fact that there are many elements of human 
well-being which may not be linked with material development and the financial 
interest of enterprise. On the other hand, even the non-material items of well-
being may be connected with the ecosystem, thus the other side of the same 
coin is less than satisfactory.
In order to provide a better understanding of the concept of green economy, 
it is worth referring to the Rio+20 documents:21 
‘56. ... we consider green economy in the context of sustainable development and 
poverty eradication as one of the important tools available for achieving sustain-
able development and that it could provide options for policymaking but should 
not be a rigid set of rules...’ 
The wording cited here is somewhat different from the EU proposal. Rio sees 
green economy as a tool for achieving sustainable development, while the 
proposal of the Seventh Action Programme suggests that green economy is 
somehow a substitute of sustainable development. In any case, we are faced with 
significant terminological change or innovation when it comes to sustainable 
development.
 2  The Study Commissioned by the EC on the Law of 
Sustainability in 2000
Before entering into the discussion on regulatory approach, we 
must point out that the problem surrounding the understanding of the concept 
21  The future we want, United Nations A/CONF.216/L.1*, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 20-22 June 2012, Distr.: 
Limited, 19 June 2012, Agenda item 10, point 56.
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of the law of sustainable development has always been a challenge for all levels 
of policy- and law-making. No wonder the EC Commission contracted a Greek 
legal expert to describe the main outline of sustainability law. According to Decl-
eris, the major characteristics of sustainability law22 are the following:
?? the statutes of sustainable development do not exist, they are yet to be 
created. Furthermore, the sustainable behaviour of the members of society 
is not given, but should be much rather be brought about;
?? the Law of sustainable development consists precisely in the creation of 
a broader concept of Ethics, which recognises moral obligations towards 
nature, future generations and the restoration of justice in relations between 
people and nations;
?? another characteristic of sustainability Law will be its full rationalization 
through the methods of science;
?? a further principle of sustainability Law is that it is dynamic and continu-
ously formulated;
?? finally, the new Law will be an open system in continuous communication 
with society.
We do not wish to engage in an all encompassing discussion of the entire docu-
ment numbering 146 pages, if nothing else because the system created by it is 
less than consistent. Certain elements of the paper are principles, others are 
axioms, while some are action programmes. The concept of the paper is similar 
to that of the UN 1995 expert group report discussed above, that is to create a 
comprehensive system, placing ecology in its centre. However, this paper may 
still be considered a landmark endeavour in its attempt at clarifying some basis 
concepts. There are 12 different ’principles’ listed in the study:
?? public environmental order – to find the voice of the environment;
?? sustainability – as somewhat of a tautology;
?? the carrying capacity of the ecosystem – a good example for this problem 
is the ecological footprint23: ‘The Ecological Footprint has emerged as the 
world’s premier measure of humanity’s demand on nature. This accounting 
system tracks, on the demand side, how much land and water area a human 
population uses to provide all it takes from nature... these accounts are able 
to compare human demand against nature’s supply of biocapacity.’
?? the mandatory restoration of the disturbed ecosystem – environmental 
damage may also lead to the worsening of human living conditions;
?? biodiversity – according to the CBD Convention:24 ‘Biological diversity’ 
means the variability among living organisms from all sources including, 
22  DECLERIS, Michael: The Law of Sustainable Development, Report to the Commission by Michael Decl-
eris, 2000, p. 42-43. Available at http://www.woodlandleague.org/documents/sustainability/sustlaw.
pdf.
23  http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/footprint_basics_overview/.
24  Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro 1992, Art. 2, definitions, http://www.cbd.int/conven-
tion/text/.
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inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecologi-
cal complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, 
between species and of ecosystems.’ Among others, the Sixth Environmen-
tal Action Programme of the EU perceives biodiversity as a priority issue.25
?? common natural heritage – a concept similar to that of the common herit-
age of mankind, which usually covers cultural heritage which is formulated 
by the author as a separate question26;
?? restrained development of fragile ecosystems;
?? spatial planning, which may be considered much more of an instrument 
than a principle. Here again, we may refer to the Sixth Action Programme, 
which, in its Article 3(10) underlines the need for sustainable land use 
planning and considering the use of regional planning as an instrument for 
improving environmental protection;
?? cultural heritage – usually forming part of the common heritage concept 
and also mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights27 in its 
Article 27;
?? sustainable urban environment – for example, Agenda 21 of the UNCED 
covers local initiatives and on this basis the ‘Local Agenda 21’ programme 
may emerge;28
?? aesthetic value of nature – a good example is the Landscape Convention, the 
preamble of which reads: ‘Believing that the landscape is a key element of 
individual and social well-being and that its protection, management and 
planning entail rights and responsibilities for everyone;’
?? environmental awareness – referring to the need to involve society as a 
whole, in particular, through the processes of environmental democracy as 
a means of enhancing awareness.
Decleris holds that the major conditions for sustainable development law are29:
?? A new, minimum system of public values for all the states of the World, a 
system well-grounded and mandatory, dominated by the values of sustain-
ability, justice and frugality.
?? Rapid progress of the new science of sustainable development.
?? State control over markets.
?? A strong, moral, intelligent and effective State.
?? An open, just and effective legal system.
25  Decision No 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 2002 laying down 
the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme, OJ L 242, 2002. 09. 10.
26  As the concept of the common heritage of mankind has already been discussed above, it is worth taking 
a look at the details, see e.g. the concise summary in the Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public Inter-
national Law, © 2012 Max Planck Institute for Comparagraphtive Public Law and International Law, 
Heidelberg and Oxford University Press 1, by Rüdiger Wolfrum: Common Heritage of Mankind.
27  Decision No. 217 A (III) of the UN General Assembly, 10 December 1948, http://www.un.org/en/docu-
ments/udhr/.
28  For futher information, consult www.iclei.org.
29  DECLERIS, op. cit. 37.
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All these elements amount to the well-known concept of good governance or 
better governance,30 which is again a complex system, usually covering the full 
respect of human rights, the rule of law, effective participation, multiparty coop-
eration, political pluralism, transparent processes, efficient and conscious public 
service, access to education and knowledge, equity, sustainability, solidarity, 
tolerance, etc. It is worth taking a look at the UN human rights website, which 
refers to resolution 2000/64 of the Commission on Human Rights and identi-





?? responsiveness (to the needs of the people)
In summary, it is clear that the list of principles and other elements of sustain-
able development law described above either cover similar issues as the previ-
ous report – such as common heritage – or mention issues which are self-
explanatory – for example biodiversity, awareness -, or may not be considered as 
principles – for example spatial planning – or may not really withstand proper 
interpretation – restrained development of fragile ecosystems, etc. As of yet, the 
law of sustainable development cannot be said to exist.
 3 Sustainability and Development Strategies
Sustainability became part of the environmental policy long 
before an overall strategy had time to evolve. Sooner or later the need for a com-
plex, integrated, uniform strategy became vital. The first step in this direction 
was the Göteborg strategy, but we shall begin our account with its predecessor, 
the Cardiff process, which proved to be the launch of a more uniform approach, 
albeit based on environmental protection, but with the potential of encompass-
ing a wider scope.
 3.1 Cardiff – Integration
The 1998 ‘Cardiff process’ did not turn out to be a success 
story: its basic document32 did not even feature in the Official Journal. The aim 
of the process was to implement sustainability in practice, via the integration of 
30  See e.g.: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/governance/20120608-communica-
tion-2012-259-2_en.pdf.
31  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx.
32  Communication from the Commission to the European Council of 27 May 1998 on a partnership 
for integration: a strategy for integrating the environment into EU policies (Cardiff- June 1998) 
[COM(1998) 333 – Not published in the Official Journal].
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environmental objectives into the implementation of other EU policies. It was 
apparent that so far such integration had not taken place. The two major issues 
of the Cardiff Strategy were the implementation of Agenda 21 of the UNCED 
and the combat against climate change. One of the tangible results of the pro-
cess is the development of the strategic environmental assessment (SEA) as a 
means of implementing the integration principle – considered an obligation – 
on the Community level.
Accordingly, integration may be understood as a counterpart or even syno-
nym for the principle of sustainable development, in a sense that integration 
signifies the procedure by way of which the different aspects of the protection of 
environmental interests are integrated into decision making procedures beyond 
the scope of environmental protection (external integration). As demonstrated 
above, integration forms part of Community environmental policy, manifested 
even in the Treaty provisions (see below). The complex problem of integration 
was clearly summarized in the mid-term review process of the Sixth Environ-
mental Action Programme,33 under the heading of ‘2.3.1. Poor integration of 
policies’.34 The Communication35 in its elaboration on the impact assessment is a 
bit more to the point: ’However, the integration of environmental concerns into 
other areas has been less successful. The Cardiff process – which was set up in 
1998 in order to in institutionalise this type of integration – has not lived up to 
expectations.’
 3.2 Göteborg and Aftermath – SDS
The next major step was the EU Strategy for Sustainable Devel-
opment.36 As it was pointed out: ‘... the review will confirm the quintessential 
three-dimensional nature of sustainable development as the cornerstone of the 
strategy, i.e. a development that can only be achieved if economic growth, social 
inclusion and environmental protection go hand in hand, both in Europe and in 
other parts of the world’.37 The requirement to meet the needs of present genera-
33  Mid-term review of the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme – Impact Assessment, 
COM(2007)225 final, {SEC(2007)547}, p. 18-19.
34  ‘Environmental integration was given an institutional boost in 1998 with the launch by the European 
Council of the ‘Cardiff process’, requiring different Council formations to develop strategies to this 
underpin integration.’.
35  COM(2007) 225 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the mid-term 
review of the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme, p. 15.
36  Commission Communication of 15 May 2001 ‘A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European 
Union Strategy for Sustainable Development’ (Commission proposal to the Gothenburg European 
Council) [COM(2001) 264 final – not published in the Official Journal].
37  Annex 3, The 2005 Review of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy: Initial Stocktaking and Future 
Orientations, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
{Com(2005) 37.
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tions without threatening the needs of future generations was also discussed. 
The Strategy emphasizes the primary role of developing an effective policy, 
one which must be coherent, where prices correspond with real costs, science 
and technology are improved, finally, the policy must be coupled with proper 
communication. The Strategy sought to incorporate several topics, from climate 
change to the management of natural resources, from poverty to aging society. 
Although the Strategy covered certain proposals, it nevertheless failed to clarify 
the most important interrelationships of the relevant elements.
Soon after the adoption of Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS), the 
concept of ‘global partnership’38 also appeared in EU policy, positioning the EU 
as an active and leading partner in respective international cooperation. Natu-
rally, the potential positive effects of globalisation were also raised, such as the 
implementation of Millenium Development Goals in combating poverty. Accord-
ing to this concept, the sustainable management of natural and environmental 
resources should form an integral part of all policies, while the basic conditions 
for this are to establish the coherence of EU policies, to improve the implementa-
tion of better governance and to ensure financing for all such initiatives.
Soon to follow was the revision of national sustainability programmes by the 
Commission in 2004,39 and the delineation of common challenges as follows: 
‘7.1. Common challenges ...
?? Getting the process right ...
?? Creating a sense of ownership: ...
?? International collaboration: ...
?? Finding a coherent vision or an agreed path for long-term development: ... 
Many decisions that are contrary to the aims of NSDS also prevail....
?? Prioritisation and concretisation of policies: ... Many objectives lack a 
concrete understanding of what they actually imply and how they should be 
reached. ...
?? Financial implications of the NSDS ...
?? Matching intentions with action...’
The SDS was revised in 2005,40 emphasizing: 
‘... Europeans value quality of life. They want to enjoy prosperity, a clean environ-
ment, good health, social protection and equity. ... The challenge is to maintain a 
momentum that mutually reinforces economic growth, social welfare and environ-
ment protection.’ 
38  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Rregions – Towards a global partnership for sustainable 
development, Brussels, 13.2.2002, COM(2002) 82 final.
39  Commission staff working document – National Sustainable Development Strategies in the European 
Union A first analysis by the European Commission April 2004.
40  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: On the review of 
the Sustainable Development Strategy A platform for action Brussels, 13.12.2005 COM(2005) 658 final.
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Very much the same was articulated, albeit with somewhat different wording 
and in more detail, with a more complex vision in the individual Declaration 
attached to the review,41 mentioning among others quality of life on earth of 
both current and future generations, life diversity, democracy and the rule of law 
and respect for fundamental rights, solidarity within and between generations 
and of course dynamic economy, social and territorial cohesion and environmen-
tal protection, with due respect for cultural diversity.
The most important principles of SDS were also listed, very similarly to the 
international interpretations of sustainable development, embracing a wide 
range of aspects: protection of fundamental rights, inter- and intragenerational 
equity, open and democratic society, public involvement, involvement of busi-
ness companies and social partners, coherent policy and governance, policy 
integration, precautionary principle, polluter pays principle. Finally, in Annex 3, 
point 5.2 there is also a direct reference to the EU’s Better Regulation agenda.
Based on the revision the Council adopted a new SDS in 2006,42 the major 
objectives of which are mostly identical with those mentioned in connection 
with the 2005 revision, covering 7 main and broad challenges with their diffe-
rent operational aims and measures. These are very similar to those mentioned 
previously: climate change and clean energy, sustainable transport, sustain-
able production and consumption, conservation and management of natural 
resources, public health, social inclusion, demography and migration, global 
poverty and global challenges in connection with sustainable development. 
Besides this less tangible set of topics, knowledge based society coupled with 
education, research and the necessary funding were also added. At the same 
time, it was still unclear, what was to be understood under the term sustainable 
development and what would be the means of putting this concept into effect.
The new SDS underlined that the Lisbon Strategy and the SDS must be 
harmonized in a way that the two strategies complement each other. This SDS 
also emphasizes the role of necessary material development in the process of 
creating a sustainable society. ‘The EU SDS forms the overall framework within 
which the Lisbon Strategy, with its renewed focus on growth and jobs, provides 
the motor of a more dynamic economy. These two strategies recognise that 
economic, social and environmental objectives can reinforce each other and they 
should therefore advance together.’ Hence it is clear that the EU does not wish to 
depart from growth as such.
41  Annex 1 of the Declaration on Guiding Principles for Sustainable Development, Council of the Euro-
pean Union Presidency Conclusions DOC 10255/05 Brussels European Council 16 and 17 June 2005, 
p.23.
42  Review of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy (EU SDS) − Renewed Strategy Council of the Euro-
pean Union, Brussels, 26 June 2006 10917/06.
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The subsequent revision43 had the potential to address several areas of the 
above mentioned seven challenges, however, the conclusion was too vague, 
encompassing all priority areas. The SDS underlined the importance of the 
dynamic Lisbon strategy, while the SDS itself was conceived of as a long-term 
strategy. This reference to the Lisbon strategy notwithstanding, the opportunity 
of merging the two strategies was meagre, what with the great differences is their 
respective roles. At the same time, the complementary relationship of the two 
strategies remained a characteristic attribute of the SDS.
There was a third and most recent revision of the SDS took place in 2009.44 
Focusing on issues of regulation, mention should first be made of point 2 of the 
document. The part entitled: ‘The evolving role of sustainable development in 
EU policy-making’ identifies some major policy tools of the EU:
?? the EU Better Regulation agenda,
?? the renewed Social Agenda,
?? the Employment guidelines,
?? Corporate Social Responsibility,
?? integrating the SDS agenda into external policies,
?? good examples from the Member States.45
Point 4 is also worthy of further elaboration. Under the heading ‘Taking sustain-
able development into the future’, it requires ‘greater synergy’ between the strat-
egies, highlights the need to monitor the implementation of SDS and to develop 
new trends, such as energy security, adaptation to climate change, food security, 
land use, sustainability of public finances and managing the external dimen-
sion of sustainable development. One of the major issues raised was the prob-
lem of monitoring and the urgency of developing the indicators of sustainable 
development, which may facilitate the measuring results. The first steps in this 
direction were taken in a 2005 semi-official Communication.46 We do not wish 
to go into the details of this effort, but restrict ourselves to listing the 10 diffe-
rent topics the Communication dealt with, which clearly reflect the extremely 
complex and rather inscrutable nature of the problem:
1. Economic (or better said: ‘material’) development
2. Poverty and social exclusion
3. Ageing society
43  COM(2007) 642 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment Progress Report on the Sustainable Development Strategy 2007 {SEC(2007)1416}.
44  Brussels, 24.7.2009, COM(2009) 400 final Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Mainstreaming sustainable development into EU policies: 2009 Review of the European 
Union Strategy for Sustainable Development.
45  Such as ‘France ‘Grenelle de l’Environnement’ brought together the government, business and civil 
society into a high-level debate on new measures for sustainable development.’
46  Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 9.2.2005, SEC (2005) 161 final Communication 
from Mr. Almunia to the members of the Commission.
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4. Public health
5. Climate change and energy
6. Production and consumption patterns




Finally, we should mention a critical exploratory opinion47 from the year 2010, 
which set the following priorities: low-carbon production technology, biodiver-
sity, protection of water and other natural resources, improving social inclusion 
and finally, the development of international cooperation. In its exploratory opin-
ion, the Economic and Social Committee also made some recommendations to 
fill the gaps of the original proposal. The Committee arrived at fairly general 
conclusions. The most important elements of the exploratory opinion are the 
following:
As regards the concept on the whole it states: ‘1.6. The Committee urges the 
Council and the Commission to make the EU SDS a meta-strategy for all EU 
policies.’ As for the reasons: ‘1.10. Explicit responsibility must be assumed by 
policymakers to ensure that the strategy for sustainable development is imple-
mented.’ As such, the Committee emphasizes that it is inexpedient to speak 
about the complementary nature of different strategies, since one of them must 
have a univocal priority over the others and this should be the SDS.
The Committee makes several other straightforward critical points regard-
ing the shortcomings of the SDS:
‘3.5. The problem was more a lack of real will (or ability) to start implementing the 
visions in a concrete action programme...
 4.2. The EESC has identified three factors that together can be said to explain 
why the effects of the strategies have diverged:
One reason is their different political weight: the Lisbon strategy responds to 
immediate policy issues, whereas sustainable development addresses the ques-
tion of long-term priorities. The difference can also be seen as a question of spon-
sors: whereas Lisbon is backed by the heads of state or government, sustainable 
development is often managed by the ministers for the environment. ...
Policy instruments and evaluation: the Lisbon strategy has a rigorous system for 
planning and monitoring, with common standards and calendars, while sustain-
able development has a looser arrangement which involves adopting common 
priorities and joint evaluation. As a result, the Lisbon strategy can exert stronger 
pressure on the Member States, whereas the sustainable development strategy is 
more about producing general intentions. ...’
47  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Outlook for the sustainable develop-
ment strategy’ (exploratory opinion) (2010/C 128/04).
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And there are also clear references going to the core of the implementation 
dilemma:
‘5.2. One of the many problems with the strategy in its current form is the large 
number of priorities: ...
 5.3. Moreover, we can no longer shy away from the fact that, despite the three 
pillars underpinning sustainable development, not all measures can always be 
equally beneficial from environmental, social and economic perspectives. Not all 
situations can be ’win-win-win’. Rather, we need to set priorities, ...’
In summary, we are still far from having an executable strategy, there is still 
much to be done, first of all ‘7.2. ... political responsibility [must] be actively 
taken’, and also ‘7.4. A stronger governance structure is essential for successful 
implementation of the EU’s sustainable development strategy.’ So far, none of 
these main conditions have emerged.
 3.3  Lisbon Strategy – Material and Financial Issues, Growth
In 2000 the heads of state and government adopted the Lisbon 
Strategy:48 
‘The Union has today set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.’ 
The strategy reflected the vision of an active welfare state, covering many 
aspects from information society and R&D to structural reforms for competi-
tiveness and innovation, from modernising the European social model to 
sustaining the healthy economic outlook and favourable growth, from regional 
cohesion to new coordination methods, but the issues of security and defense 
and environmental protection were not omitted either. As such, it contained the 
same set of complex issues as listed above under the SDS.
The original strategy proved to be a far too complex set of ideas, providing 
for a diffuse system of responsibilities, therefore it was relaunched in 2005. 
The strategy’s primary priority is ‘Growth and Jobs’, together with a substantial 
support for the development of infrastructure, social and economic cohesion, as 
well as research and development. Nevertheless, the major overlap among the 
different topics required the approximation of the same – the establishment of 
interrelationships, as already mentioned in connection with the SDS.
48  Lisbon European Council Presidency conclusions, 23 and 24 March 2000.
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The proposal for a new Lisbon Strategy49 listed ten different areas which 
were in dire need of susbtantial reform by 2010. Again, the new strategy puts 
forward a very multifaceted vision:
?? a renewed Social Agenda,
?? a common policy on immigration,
?? a Small Business Act,
?? the reduction of EU administrative burdens,
?? strengthening the single market,
?? making a reality of the fifth freedom (the free movement of knowledge),
?? improving the framework conditions for innovation,
?? completing the internal market for energy and adopting the climate change 
package,
?? industrial policy geared towards more sustainable production and consump-
tion,
?? opening up new opportunities for international trade and investment, and 
creating a common space of regulatory provisions and standards.
The first implementation report50 – issued just around the beginning of the 
global financial crisis – was very optimistic, listing results such as the new 
package of climate change and energy resources, as well as the action plan of 
sustainable production and consumption.
 3.4 Europa 2020, Sustainable Growth
As a result of the economic crisis a new concept of development 
had to be elaborated for the 2020 target year. First, a Commission proposal51 
was adopted, followed by the recommendation of the Council.52 Even the Com-
mission proposal may give rise to concern, since it deviates from the original 
harmonized idea of sustainability. In the introduction authored by Commis-
sion President Barroso,53 the proposal claims that the future of Europe 2020 is 
49  Brussels, 11.12.2007, COM(2007) 804 final Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Proposal for a Community Lisbon Programme 2008 – 2010.
50  Brussels, 16.12.2008 COM(2008) 881 final Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Implementation Report for the Community Lisbon Programme 2008 – 2010.
51  Brussels, 3.3.2010 COM(2010) 2020 final Communication From The Commission Europe 2020, A 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.
52  Council Recommendation of 13 July 2010 on broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member 
States and of the Union (2010/410/EU) OJ, L 191 23.7.2010 p. 28-34.
53  ‘To achieve a sustainable future, we must already look beyond the short term. Europe needs to get back 
on track. Then it must stay on track. That is the purpose of Europe 2020. It’s about more jobs and better 
lives. It shows how Europe has the capability to deliver smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, to 
find the path to create new jobs and to offer a sense of direction to our societies. European leaders have 
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‘about more jobs and better lives’. What remains today of the ecological pillar of 
sustainability is climate change and energy. This is a narrower understanding of 
sustainability, subject to material aspects. The wording itself is also adverse, yet, 
several elements of the original ecological qualities of sustainable development 
were maintained:
‘Europe 2020 puts forward three mutually reinforcing priorities:
- Smart growth: developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation.
- Sustainable growth: promoting a more resource efficient, greener and more 
competitive economy.
- Inclusive growth: fostering a high-employment economy delivering social and 
territorial cohesion.
These targets are interrelated. ... Such an approach will help the EU to prosper 
in a low-carbon, resource constrained world while preventing environmental 
degradation, biodiversity loss and unsustainable use of resources. It will also 
underpin economic, social and territorial cohesion.’
At times even virtually eco-friendly titles may end up in a different direction. 
A vivid illustration of this is ‘Combating climate change’ where our estimated 
carbon capture is not presented as a solution to avert environmental crisis, but 
is much rather a testament to our inability to handle the problem. Similarly, the 
point entitled ‘strengthen our economies’ resilience to climate risks, and our 
capacity for disaster prevention and response’ does not contain a proactive set 
of measures, but reads as a simple response to the problems without offering a 
solution on how to accommodate ourselves to the changes lying ahead.
The wording of the Council recommendation – which also clearly demon-
strates the relationship with the Lisbon strategy – also departs from the previous 
trends, speaking about ‘sustainable growth’, instead of sustainable development, 
with an additional new phrase: inclusive growth. The preamble mentions most 
of the major issues, with the additional aspect of green technology, such as 
greenhouse gas emission, resource efficiency or biodiversity. Inclusive growth is 
more about anticipating and managing change,54 which may even mean that in 
a common analysis on the lessons to be drawn from the crisis. ... The Commission is proposing five 
measurable EU targets for 2020 that will steer the process and be translated into national targets: for 
employment; for research and innovation; for climate change and energy; for education; and for combat-
ing poverty. They represent the direction we should take and will mean we can measure our success.’
54  ‘(9) ... Sustainable growth means decoupling economic growth from the use of resources, building 
an energy and resource-efficient, sustainable and competitive economy, a fair distribution of the cost 
and benefits and exploiting Europe’s leadership in the race to develop new processes and technologies, 
including green technologies. Member States and the Union should implement the necessary reforms 
to reduce greenhouse gases emissions and use resources efficiently, which will also assist in preventing 
environmental degradation and biodiversity loss. They should also improve the business environment, 
stimulate creation of green jobs and help enterprises modernising their industrial base. (10) The poli-
cies of the Union, and Member States’ reform programmes should finally also aim at ‘inclusive growth’. 
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case we are unable to solve a problem, we should just take the lead and try and 
turn profit from it.
Within the general concept, specific guidances are set forth, some closer to 
the traditional concept of sustainability than others. For example ‘Guideline 5: 
Improving resource efficiency and reducing greenhouse gases’ reflects the main 
idea of internalising externalities.55
The 2008 crisis did not further the issue of sustainability, but reorganized 
its structure and priorities instead. The change of wording from development to 
growth may give rise to serious concerns, as it is not absolutely clear, whether it 
merely reflects a difference in phrasing or rather an actual change in approach. 
In terms of different phrasing, we may agree with Jans, who believes that 
sustainable growth is a much weaker concept than sustainable development.56
The Council clarified that the 2020 strategy incorporates the previous strate-
gies, including environmental requirements.57 Besides the strategy, different, 
more detailed strategies are also elaborated, such as the one on transport.58 
Under the heading measures, Annex I of this strategy contains several elements, 
very few of which are truly eco-friendly. Energy 202059 is also based on the new 
sustainable growth concept, within the framework of which the main focus 
is on the production of energy, putting renewables and energy saving into the 
centre of attention.
Inclusive growth means building a cohesive society in which people are empowered to anticipate and 
manage change, thus to actively participate in society and the economy. Member States’ reforms should 
therefore ensure access and opportunities for all throughout the lifecycle, thus reducing poverty and 
social exclusion, through removing barriers to labour market participation especially for women, older 
workers, young people, the disabled and legal migrants.’
55  ‘Member States and the Union should put measures in place to promote the decoupling of economic 
growth from resource use, turning environmental challenges into growth opportunities and making 
more efficient use of their natural resources, which also assists in preventing environmental degrada-
tion and ensuring biodiversity... Member States should make extensive use of market-based instru-
ments, supporting the principle of internalisation of external costs, ... Member States and the Union 
should use regulatory, non-regulatory and fiscal instruments, ...’
56  JANS, Jan H.: Stop the Integration Principle?, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol 33, 2010, p. 1538.
57  Improving environmental policy instruments – Council conclusions – Environment Council meeting 
Brussels, 20 December 2010.
58  Brussels, 28.3.2011 COM(2011) 144 final White Paper Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – 
Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system SEC(2011) 359 final SEC(2011) 358 final 
SEC(2011) 391 final.
59  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Energy 2020 A strategy for 
competitive, sustainable and secure energy, SEC(2010) 1346, Brussels, 10.11.2010 COM(2010) 639 final
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 4 Sustainable Development in Primary Legislation
Prior to the Single European Act60 there was no express legal 
basis for environmental regulation, therefore, the legal basis was ensured 
through the concept of implied powers. Obviously, the concept of sustainable 
development could not appear in the document of 1986, nevertheless, the SEA 
established the general legal basis for environmental legislation under Title VII 
(Articles 130r-130t). It is important to note that subsidiarity – as an essential ele-
ment of sustainable development – was also included in the environmental title 
in Article 130r. In order to give a full picture, in addition to the environmental 
title, the legal basis for the harmonization of law under Article 100a should also 
be mentioned.
With the 1992 Maastricht Treaty sustainability also found its way into 
primary law,61 first in the preamble in recital 7: 
‘DETERMINED to promote economic and social progress for their peoples, 
within the context of the accomplishment of the internal market and of reinforced 
cohesion and environmental protection, and to implement policies ensuring that 
advances in economic integration are accompanied by parallel progress in other 
fields.’ 
Although the preamble did not explicitly mention sustainability, Art B of the 
Treaty proved to be more concrete:
‘The Union shall set itself the following objectives: ...
- to promote economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable, 
in particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the 
strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through the establishment of 
economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single currency in accord-
ance with the provisions of this Treaty; ....’
Interestingly enough, environmental protection was not mentioned along with 
sustainable development, instead, the focus was on the economic and monetary 
union, proving that the major interest of the Union lies with business.
The Maastricht Treaty also amended the original Treaty of Rome, covering in 
the new Article 262 everything related to sustainability: environment, solidarity, 
60  OJ L 169 of 29.06.1987.
61  Treaty on European Union (Treaty on Maastricht) OJ C 191 of 29.7.1992.
62  ‘The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and 
monetary union and by implementing the common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 3a, 
to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, 
sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of 
economic performance, a high level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the standard 
of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.’
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social protection, quality of life, etc. In this article environmental protection is 
an equally important element of sustainability. Apart from these provisions, it is 
important to mention the extension of the list of Community actions in the new 
Article 3, now covering also environmental policy. Subsidiarity became a general 
concept of Community law, moved from Article 130r to the new Article 3b (5), 
adding also the requirement of proportionality to the test.63 Finally, the Maas-
tricht Treaty slightly amended the environmental title as well.
The Amsterdam Treaty64 did not modify sustainability and the environmen-
tal elements of the Treaty to a great extent. The preamble of the Treaty of the 
Union – in its recital seven65 – was amended to include in the first place within 
the objectives of the Union that social, material and business progress shall take 
into consideration sustainable development and environmental protection. Arti-
cle B66 was also amended, and the order of objectives within the article clearly 
mirrors the essential objectives of the EU. Sustainable development appears 
here as a stand alone issue.
Article 267 of the Treaty of Rome, listing the objectives of the European 
Community incorporated sustainable development, referring also to the harmo-
nization of economic growth and the high level of environmental protection. 
63  Article 3b: ‘The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty 
and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, 
the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far 
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can 
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this 
Treaty.’
64  Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the treaties establishing the European 
Communities and related acts Official Journal C 340, 10 November, 1997.
65  ‘DETERMINED to promote economic and social progress for their peoples, taking into account the 
principle of sustainable development and within the context of the accomplishment of the internal 
market and of reinforced cohesion and environmental protection, and to implement policies ensuring 
that advances in economic integration are accompanied by paragraphllel progress in other fields,’
66  ‘Article B: The Union shall set itself the following objectives: - to promote economic and social progress 
and a high level of employment and to achieve balanced and sustainable development, in particular 
through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and 
social cohesion and through the establishment of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a 
single currency in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;’
67  Article 2: ‘The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic 
and monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 
3a, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of 
economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, equality between men and 
women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of 
economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, 
the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity 
among Member States.’
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This latter is an obligation towards every policy area. The location of legal basis 
of this obligation and sustainability is now in harmony with the system of the 
Treaty. Finally, the integration of environmental protection requirements was 
also reinforced and coupled with sustainable development, since the Treaty 
was completed with the following article: ‘Article 3c: Environmental protection 
requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the 
Community policies and activities referred to in Article 3, in particular with a 
view to promoting sustainable development.’
The 2001 Treaty of Nice68 did not make any amendments in respect of 
sustainable development.
The Lisbon Treaty69 brought about substantial changes in respect of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). Beginning with the TEU, we must first mention the 
preamble, within which the previous (Amsterdam) version recital seven left 
unchanged but was moved to recital nine.
Art. 3 TEU replaced the previous Article 2 on the objectives of the EU, bring-
ing with it substantial changes and providing for a much more elaborate and 
extensive approach, covering a wider context and interrelationship of sustain-
ability, while the previous elements remained.70 At the same time Article 3(5) 
articulated the global role of the EU in promoting sustainable development.71 
As a result, most of the constituents of sustainable development were featured, 
from the interests of future generations to its relationship with peace, solidarity, 
human rights, etc. The international commitments were mentioned yet again 
in Article 21 TEU, first without a direct reference to sustainable development, 
however, in a way that it implicitly forms part of cooperation.72 Finally, the 
commitment towards sustainability within the ambit of international coopera-
tion was also clearly articulated in connection with developing countries. As 
such, it covered the three pillars of sustainability in connection with environ-
68  OJ C 80 of 10.03.2001.
69  Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007 OJ 2007/C 306/01, 17 December 2007.
70  ‘Art. 3(3). The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development 
of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market 
economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improve-
ment of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance. It shall 
combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality 
between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.’
71  5. ... It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and 
mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human 
rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of 
international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.’
72  See, for example Art. 21(1), last sentence: ‘It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, 
in particular in the framework of the United Nations.’
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mental protection as a priority, including the sustainable management of global 
resources.73
It is worth noting that the Lisbon Treaty finally ’legalized’ the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in Article 6 (1) TEU. The Charter also refers to sustainable 
development, however, Article 3774 itself may not necessarily be interpreted as 
giving rise to a right to environment provision. Naturally, jurisprudence may 
well interpret this article as a veritable human right provision, however, at the 
moment it much rather seems like a summary of objectives and principles.
The preamble of the TFEU focuses more on financial and material develop-
ment, without further mentioning the concept of sustainable development. A 
good illustration of this new approach is the wording in recital 4 and 5 of the 
preamble.75 In essence they refer to material, financial expansion and even 
harmonious development – which may otherwise exhibit some connection with 
sustainability – but are clearly much rather an issue of regionalism and not 
sustainability. In any case, this is a relatively significant change as compared 
with the previous Treaty.
As integration may be taken as a tool of the practical implementation of 
sustainable development, Article 11 on environmental integration is imperative, 
even containing a direct reference to sustainable development.76 Unfortunately, 
the likely potential of integration was narrowed down, due to the fact that while 
the principle of environmental integration had been a stand-alone integration 
principle until 2009, later, the proliferation of integration principles seriously 
hampered its original effect. The TFEU mentions integration in several provi-
sions:
?? Art. 8: equality of men and women,
?? Art. 9: social protection, employment,
?? Art. 10: all forms of discrimination,
?? Art. 12: consumer protection,
73  Art. 21(2) ‘The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a 
high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: (d) foster the sustainable 
economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of 
eradicating poverty; ... (f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the 
environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustain-
able development;’
74  ‘A high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must 
be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable 
development.’
75  ‘RECOGNISING that the removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted action in order to guarantee 
steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competition, 
ANXIOUS to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious development by 
reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured 
regions.’
76  ‘Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of 
the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.’
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?? Art. 13: animal protection,
?? Art. 194 energy policy, which also contains some references to the integra-
tion principle.
No wonder that certain authors believe that Article 7 TFEU on consistency may 
be considered the only integration principle, rendering all the other such prin-
ciples superfluous.77 Others warn about the consequences: ‘The next problem 
concerns the question of whether the integration principle implies that the 
Union’s environmental policy has been given some measure of priority over 
other European policy areas.’ And the answer is in the negative, this priority is 
amiss.78 ‘The conclusion must therefore be that there is no hierarchy between 
the various integration principles...’79 In consequence, integration as the practi-
cal materialization of sustainable development has lost its position in the Lisbon 
Treaty.
Finally, apart from Article 114 on the harmonization of laws, the environ-
mental title of the TFEU today is Title XX, which is almost identical to the previ-
ous versions, only the numbering is different.
In summary, there are no provisions on sustainability with direct legal 
consequences in the Treaty: no enforceable legal bases or legal requirements are 
mentioned. At the same time, the original theoretical foundations are in place, 
even if some regression can be noted – as in the case of the integration principle. 
Thus, the key to the effective implementation of the principle of sustainable 
development lies in the institutional and organizational structure of the EU and 
their willingness to give effect to this principle. It is not a legal obligation and 
depends largely on political motivation.
If one looks at the respective articles of the Lisbon Treaty, it becomes clear 
that sustainable development is on the one hand a principle and on the other 
hand an objective, the content of which has not been defined in the Treaty. The 
traditional elements of sustainability are present, however, the EU has failed to 
further develop the concept. The wording lacks both legal clarity and the sense 
of legal responsibility. The essence of the provisions is that we should ‘aim at’ 
or ‘take into account’ sustainable development, as a sort of general guidance, 
but it is not possible to consider it an obligation. We cannot even state that the 
EU shall be obliged to take a specific action or single approach to achieve this 
objective, rendering sustainability a rather weak political challenge. The main 
question could therefore be: to what extent may this general expectation be 
implemented in practice and in exactly which regulatory fields? And finally: in 
what way can we achieve a level of legal certainty in this respect?
77  MCINTYRE, Owen: The integration challange, Integrating environmental concerns into other EU policies 
in Suzanne Kingston: (Ed.): European Perspectives on Environmental Law and Governance, Routledge, 
2013, p. 137.
78  JANS, Jan H. – VEDDER, Hans H.B.: European Environmental Law, Europa Law Publishing, 2012, p. 23.
79  Ibid. p. 11.
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The EU itself is not obliged to arrive at any direct conclusion or to take any 
concrete action. The general obligation is to come closer to the realisation of the 
requirements set forth. As such, the duty of the Union does not amount to a 
legal obligation, but constitutes a relatively weak political commitment instead. 
The main challenge at present is to try and identify the particular areas where 
these general requirements may be specified and implemented in an feasible 
way.
 5 Examples of Sustainability in Secondary Legislation
In introduction, we agree with those commentators80 who 
believe that EU secondary legislation describe the principle of sustainable devel-
opment with different connotations in the various legal regulations. The exam-
ples listed below – since we do not claim to provide a full picture – undoubtedly 
support this view.
 5.1 Around 2000
This was the time when the Göteborg strategy and other 
documents were prepared, as such, it marked a favourable period for relevant 
legislation as well. Less relevant81 in this context is the document related to sup-
porting developing countries’ efforts in the field of environmental protection. 
The regulation also included the ‘legal’ definition of sustainable development. 
The preamble of the Regulation clearly reflects the double pressure underlying 
this source of law: on the one hand, the aspiration to provide the necessary sup-
port to developing states, and on the other hand, the fear that non-sustainable 
development tendencies may emerge in the respective countries.82
While referring to most of the relevant contemporary international conven-
tions, the preamble also includes an important reference to the concept of 
integration in paragraph (11). Indeed, the objective of the Regulation itself refers 
to the need for integration: according to Article 1 paragraph (1) ‘The Community 
shall support developing countries in their efforts to integrate the environmen-
tal dimension into their development process.’ In its subsequent provisions the 
80  DURÁN, Gracia Marin and MORGERA, Elisa: Environmental Integration in the EU’s External Relations, 
Hart Publishing, 2012, p. 36.
81  Regulation (EC) No 2493/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 November 2000 on 
measures to promote the full integration of the environmental dimension in the development process of 
developing countries, Official Journal L 288 , 15/11/2000 p. 1-5.
82  ‘(1) Depletion of natural resources and environmental degradation have direct effects on economic devel-
opment and especially on the livelihoods of local communities, including indigenous peoples, and thus 
counteract the alleviation of poverty through sustainable development. (2) Current patterns of produc-
tion and consumption have undeniable transboundary and global consequences, in particular where the 
atmosphere, the hydrosphere, soil condition and biological diversity are concerned.’
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Regulation enumerates all the basic elements of support, its conditions, sources, 
procedure, monitoring, etc.83
The most important innovation of the Regulation is by all means the legal 
definition of the term sustainable development. Article 2 provides: ‘For the 
purposes of this Regulation: ‘sustainable development’ means the improve-
ment of the standard of living and welfare of the relevant populations within the 
limits of the capacity of the ecosystems by maintaining natural assets and their 
biological diversity for the benefit of present and future generations.’ As such, 
it includes a clear reference to the Brundtland terminology, albeit with different 
words.
The degradation of tropical forests84 was also a core issue in those times, 
therefore, the relevant Regulation on tropical forests emphasized the specific 
role of forests: ‘(1) Forests have a variety of functions and values for mankind 
and can contribute to the achievement of Community development and environ-
ment objectives such as the campaign against poverty, sustainable economic 
and social development and the protection of the environment…’. According to 
Article 1, the goal of the regulation is to promote sustainable forest manage-
ment.85 Two sustainability definitions are mentioned, one which corresponds 
to the term described above (Art.2.4), while the other one featured in Article 2 
paragraph 3 is more specific, going to the heart of sustainable forest manage-
ment.86 This divergence in the definition of sustainability terms is based on 
their different functions.
83  Some examples of Art.3, referring directly to sustainability: ‘1. The activities to be carried out under this 
Regulation shall address in particular:  
- sustainable patterns of production and consumption, 
- sustainable management and use of natural and environmental resources in all productive sectors 
such as agriculture, fisheries and industry, 
- environmental problems caused by the non-sustainable use of resources due to poverty, 
- sustainable production and use of energy and in particular encouragement of the use of renewable 
energy sources, increased energy efficiency, energy saving and the replacement of especially damaging 
energy sources by others which are less so, 
- sustainable production and use of chemical products, in particular hazardous and toxic substances, 
- conservation of biological diversity – especially by protecting ecosystems and habitats and the conser-
vation of species diversity – the sustainable use of its components, ....’
84  Regulation (EC) No 2494/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 November 2000 on 
measures to promote the conservation and sustainable management of tropical forests and other forests 
in developing countries Official Journal L 288 , 15/11/2000 p. 6-10.
85  ‘The Community shall provide financial assistance and appropriate expertise to promote the conserva-
tion and sustainable management of tropical forests and other forests in developing countries, so as to 
meet the economic, social and environmental demands placed on forests at local, national and global 
levels....’
86  ‘Sustainable forest management’ means the management and use of forests and wooded lands in a way, 
and at a rate, that maintains their biological diversity, productivity, regeneration capacity, vitality and 
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The fisheries policy of the time also put sustainability in the centre of its 
focus,87 again in connection with the sustainable use of this specific natural 
resource. The preamble is clear in this respect, coupling business and environ-
mental conditions: ‘(4) The objective of the Common Fisheries Policy should 
therefore be to provide for sustainable exploitation of living aquatic resources 
and of aquaculture in the context of sustainable development, taking account of 
the environmental, economic and social aspects in a balanced manner...’ This is 
more or less repeated under Article 2 on the objectives or regulation, incorporat-
ing several basic principles of sustainability, from the general three pillars to 
precautionary approach and good governance.88 From among the list of defini-
tions provided by Article 3, the most noteworthy are first, the specific definition 
of sustainable development adapted to the problem of fisheries,89 and second, 
the precautionary approach which follows the general conceptual line.
Sustainable urban development90 was a new trend, implying also the 
cooperation with local governments. The preamble refers to the need for good 
practices between local authorities and awareness raising. According to Article 1 
the following good practices shall receive financial and technical support:
?? implementation of EU environmental legislation on the local level,
?? sustainable urban development,
?? local Agenda 21,
?? Networking – among local governments or with universities – is another 
basic concept.
their potential to fulfil, now and in the future, relevant ecological, economic and social functions, at 
local, national, and global levels, without causing any damage to other ecosystems.’
87  Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and sustain-
able exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy Official Journal L 358, 
31/12/2002 p. 59-80.
88  ‘Objectives 
1. The Common Fisheries Policy shall ensure exploitation of living aquatic resources that provides 
sustainable economic, environmental and social conditions. For this purpose, the Community shall 
apply the precautionary approach in taking measures designed to protect and conserve living aquatic 
resources, to provide for their sustainable exploitation and to minimise the impact of fishing activities 
on marine eco-systems. It shall aim at a progressive implementation of an eco-system-based approach to 
fisheries management. ... 
2. The Common Fisheries Policy shall be guided by the following principles of good governance:...’
89  ‘(e) ‘sustainable exploitation’ means the exploitation of a stock in such a way that the future exploitation 
of the stock will not be prejudiced and that it does not have a negative impact on the marine eco-
systems;’
90  Decision No 1411/2001/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on a 
Community Framework for cooperation to promote sustainable urban development Official Journal L 
191, 13.7.2001 p. 1-5.
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 5.2 Financial Funds Since 2005/6
The primary issue of funding was related to agricultural policy. 
The foundations of the current system were laid down in 2005 .91 According to 
the preamble of the fundamental regulation: ‘1) ... two European agricultural 
funds should be created, namely the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund 
(hereinafter ‘EAGF’), for the financing of market measures, and the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (hereinafter ‘EAFRD’), for the financ-
ing of rural development programmes.’
From among the two funds, the second – the EAFRD92 – is the one impor-
tant for us from the aspect of sustainability. The preamble delineates the essence 
and the system of policy interrelationships: ‘1) ... Rural development policy 
should also take into account the general objectives for economic and social 
cohesion policy set out in the Treaty and contribute to their achievement, while 
integrating other major policy priorities as spelled out in the conclusions of the 
Lisbon and Göteborg European Councils for competitiveness and sustainable 
development.’
Within the concept of sustainable development, there are different environ-
mental elements that are essential for agriculture, covering mostly environmen-
tal services:
‘(11) ... agricultural and forestry competitiveness, land management and environ-
ment, quality of life and diversification of activities in those areas, ...
(31) Support for specific methods of land management should contribute to 
sustainable development by encouraging farmers and forest holders in particular 
to employ methods of land use compatible with the need to preserve the natural 
environment and landscape and protect and improve natural resources. ...
(32) ... sustainable management of forests and their multi-functional role...
(35) Agri-environmental payments should continue to play a prominent role in 
supporting the sustainable development of rural areas and in responding to soci-
ety’s increasing demand for environmental services. ’
To shed light on the basic policy interrelationships, it is worth examining Article 
3 under the heading ‘Missions’: ‘The EAFRD shall contribute to the promotion 
of sustainable rural development throughout the Community in a complemen-
tary manner to the market and income support policies of the common agricul-
tural policy, to cohesion policy and to the common fisheries policy.’ The system 
of funding within agricultural policy is continuously changing.93 Its main objec-
91  Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 of 21 June 2005 on the financing of the common agricultural 
policy OJ L 209, 11.8.2005 p. 1-25.
92  Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), OJ L 277, 21.10.2005 p. 1-40.
93  Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support 
schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes 
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tive is set forth under Article 6.1: ‘Member States shall ensure that all agricul-
tural land, especially land which is no longer used for production purposes, is 
maintained in good agricultural and environmental condition.’ Member States 
shall define ‘minimum requirements for good agricultural and environmental 
condition’, which may later serve as a basis for comparison.
Similar to agriculture, the funding of regional development (ERDF) has also 
taken a turn towards sustainability.94 There are several different links between 
regional development and sustainable development, such as
?? competitiveness and innovation, creating and safeguarding sustainable jobs, 
as well as sustainable integrated regional and local economic development 
and employment (Art. 4);
?? European territorial cooperation (Art. 6);95
?? sustainable urban development (Art. 8).
In 2006 several regulations were adopted in relation to the funds. One such 
regulation was on the European Social Fund,96 exhibiting a rather vague 
connection with sustainability.97 The Cohesion Fund98 also belongs to the 
general system of funding. Article 1 paragraph (1) devotes special attention to 
sustainable development,99 furthermore, environmental protection is one of the 
for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/200 OJ Lap L 030, 31.1.2009 p. 16-99.
94  Regulation (EC) No 1080/2006 of the European Parliament and of The Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
European Regional Development Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1783/199 Hivatalos Lap L 210, 
31/07/2006 p. 1-11.
95  For example paragraph 2.d) sustainable urban development: ‘strengthening poly-centric development 
at transnational, national and regional level, with a clear transnational impact. Actions may include: 
the creation and improvement of urban networks and urban-rural links; strategies to tackle common 
urban-rural issues; preservation and promotion of the cultural heritage, and the strategic integration of 
development zones on a transnational basis.’
96  Regulation (Ec) No 1081/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
European Social Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1784/199 OJ L 210, 31.7.2006 p. 12-18.
97  Article 2.2: ‘In carrying out the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, the ESF shall support the priorities of 
the Community as regards the need to reinforce social cohesion, strengthen productivity and competi-
tiveness, and promote economic growth and sustainable development.’
98  Council Regulation (EC) No 1084/2006 of 11 July 2006 establishing a Cohesion Fund and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1164/94 Official Journal L 210 , 31/07/2006 p. 79-81.
99  ‘A Cohesion Fund ... is hereby established for the purpose of strengthening the economic and social 
cohesion of the Community in the interests of promoting sustainable development.’
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priority areas mentioned in Article 2.100 The Fisheries Fund101 specifically refers 
to sustainability on several occasions, summarizing the classical three-dimen-
sion concept in the preamble.102 The entire Fund focuses on sustainability, as 
underlined in Article 1 on the scope.103 Many specific aspects of sustainability 
are also included, for example in Article 15 in connection with national strategic 
planning, forming the basis of operative programmes (Art.19), the principles 
of which again contain sustainable development, among others the integrated 
sustainable management of fishing areas.
 5.3 Recent Examples
Organic production104 is one of the most popular examples of 
linking environment and agriculture, while sustainability is one of its major 
components. According to the preamble of the Regulation on organic products: 
‘(1) Organic production is an overall system of farm management and food 
production ... [it] plays a dual societal role, where it on the one hand provides 
for a specific market responding to a consumer demand for organic products, 
and on the other hand delivers public goods contributing to the protection of 
the environment and animal welfare, as well as to rural development.’ The most 
important issue regards the control of production, and the use of a special logo. 
Sustainability is included in a general reference in Article 1 on the scope and 
mentioned again in Article 3 as an objective.105
100  ‘1. Assistance from the Fund shall be given to actions in the following areas, ensuring an appropriate 
balance, and according to the investment and infrastructure needs specific to each Member State receiv-
ing assistance: 
(a) trans-European transport networks, in particular priority projects of common interest as identified 
by Decision No 1692/96/EC; 
(b) the environment within the priorities assigned to the Community environmental protection policy 
under the policy and action programme on the environment. In this context, the Fund may also 
intervene in areas related to sustainable development which clearly present environmental benefits, 
namely energy efficiency and renewable energy and, in the transport sector outside the trans-European 
networks, rail, river and sea transport, intermodal transport systems and their interoperability, manage-
ment of road, sea and air traffic, clean urban transport and public transport.’
101  Council Regulation (EC) No 1198/2006 of 27 July 2006 on the European Fisheries Fund 
Official Journal L 223 , 15.8.2006 p. 1-44.
102  ‘(2) The objective of the common fisheries policy should be to provide for sustainable exploitation of 
living aquatic resources and of aquaculture in the context of sustainable development, taking account of 
environmental, economic and social aspects in a balanced manner.’
103  ‘This Regulation establishes the European Fisheries Fund (hereinafter EFF) and defines the framework 
for Community support for the sustainable development of the fisheries sector, fisheries areas and 
inland fishing.’
104  Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 of 28 June 2007 on organic production and labelling of organic 
products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 2092/9 OJ L 189, 20.7.2007 p. 1-23.
105  ‘ (a) establish a sustainable management system for agriculture that: (i) respects nature’s systems and 
cycles and sustains and enhances the health of soil, water, plants and animals and the balance between 
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Even timber import may have implications for sustainability,106 first of all 
due to the possible endangerment of the world’s forest stock. Again, the pream-
ble of the relevant regulation provides an excellent summary of the problem: ‘(1) 
Forests provide a broad variety of environmental, economic and social benefits 
including timber and non-timber forest products and environmental services 
essential for humankind, such as maintaining biodiversity and ecosystem func-
tions and protecting the climate system.’
Plant protection products – pesticides – were the subject of numerous 
environmental research projects already decades ago, due to the suspected 
adverse effects of chemicals. In order to define a common legal framework for 
the sustainable use of pesticides a directive was adopted in 2009.107 Here again, 
the preamble is our main point of reference: ‘(4) Economic instruments can play 
a crucial role in the achievement of objectives relating to the sustainable use of 
pesticides.’ The new approach is marked by integrated plant protection detailed 
in Article 14108 , while Annex III summarizes the general principles of inte-
grated plant protection.
 5.4 Renewable Energy – RED Directive
Renewable energy is a cornerstone of sustainability. An 
important part of the respective legislative framework is the former directive on 
bio-fuels,109 repealed by the new and more extensive directive of 2009, which 
entered into force in 2012.110 The original bio-fuel directive takes the sustainable 
development strategy as its basis. The activities prescribed under the directive 
them;  (ii) contributes to a high level of biological diversity; (iii) makes responsible use of energy and 
the natural resources, such as water, soil, organic matter and air; (iv) respects high animal welfare 
standards and in particular meets animals’ species-specific behavioural needs.’
106  Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying 
down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market Text with EEA 
relevance Official Journal L 295 , 12/11/2010 p. 23-34.
107  Directive 2009/128/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing 
a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides Text with EEA relevance. 
Official Journal L 309 , 24/11/2009 p. 71-86.
108  ‘(1) Member States shall take all necessary measures to promote low pesticide-input pest management, 
giving wherever possible priority to non-chemical methods, so that professional users of pesticides 
switch to practices and products with the lowest risk to human health and the environment among 
those available for the same pest problem. Low pesticide-input pest management includes integrated 
pest management as well as organic farming ...’
109  Directive 2003/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 May 2003 on the promotion 
of the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport Official Journal L 123 , 17/05/2003 p. 42-46.
110  Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promo-
tion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 
2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC Text with EEA relevance Official Journal L 140 , 05/06/2009 p. 16-62.
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may be combined with sustainable farming and forestry practices, sustainable 
rural development, as well as innovative agricultural production.
The effective legislation forms part of sustainable energy policy, reflecting a 
complex vision, seeking to avoid as far as possible the likely secondary negative 
consequences in the design of renewables. Not all renewable energy resources 
may meet the requirements of sustainability. Below we list the major items from 
the preamble, which all underline the complex vision of the ‘RED-directive’:
‘(3) ... establishing economic growth through innovation and a sustainable 
competitive energy policy ...
(6) ... decentralised energy production has many benefits, including the utilisa-
tion of local energy sources, increased local security of energy supply, shorter 
transport distances and reduced energy transmission losses. …
(9) ... it is essential to develop and fulfil effective sustainability criteria for biofu-
els and ensure the commercial availability of second-generation biofuels., ...
(12) ... Biogas installations can, as a result of their decentralised nature and the 
regional investment structure, contribute significantly to sustainable development 
in rural areas and offer farmers new income opportunities....
(76) Sustainability criteria will be effective only if they lead to changes in the 
behaviour of market actors.. ...’
Article 1 on the scope of the directive provides a list of its main elements:
?? a common framework for the promotion of energy from renewable sources,
?? mandatory national targets for the overall share of energy from renewable 
sources,
?? rules relating to statistical transfers,
?? joint projects between Member States and with third countries,
?? establishing sustainability criteria for biofuels and bioliquids.
We do not wish to go into the details of directive’s definitions or activity plans. 
However, it is worth emphasizing a real innovation of EU law undr Article 17, 
which develops the sustainability criteria for the relevant energy sources: 
‘1. Irrespective of whether the raw materials were cultivated inside or outside the 
territory of the Community ...’ 
There are several important novel elements, which all seek to avoid secondary 
handicaps. A good example of this effort is provided under paragraph 3: 
‘Biofuels and bioliquids taken into account ... shall not be made from raw material 
obtained from land with high biodiversity value …’. 
The directive also determines the exact meaning of land with high biodiversity 
value, these are primary forest and other wooded land, areas designated for 
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nature protection purposes, highly biodiverse grassland. The directive enumer-
ates all necessary details of this classification, while Article 18 covers the control 
and verification of biofuel sources, even in case these originate from outside the 
EU.111
 6 Judicial Practice and Sustainability
The judicial practice of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union – the Court of Justice and the General Court – is extremely important, 
providing the necessary points of reference for the possible use of general princi-
ples such as integration, precaution, prevention, participation or other elements 
of sustainable development. It is beyond doubt, that the practice of these courts 
is decisive for the development of environmental law: 
‘We can safely assert that the European Court of Justice plays a decisive role in the 
establishment of the practical efficiency of EU environmental law.’112 
To quote an author perceiving the wider context: 
‘The precedents of the Court’s judicial practice are important sources of shaping 
and interpretation of the law.’113 
This role of the Courts is even more significant, knowing that ‘In reality, the 
Court has generally interpreted regulations related to environmental protection 
in a broad way, where possible making decisions at the environment’s advan-
tage, and being innovative in the interest of improving current regulations.’114 
There are also other perspectives on judicial practice that we may refer to: ‘It is 
therefore important to view the ECJ’s role from a dynamic, rather then static, 
perspective’115 In any case, there are several principles and provisions of EU envi-
ronmental law, which received their present shape as a result of the development 
in case-law, but unfortunately, sustainable development or sustainability does 
not belong to this sphere. One thing is however certain: several judgments refer 
to these terms whithout however providing them with more substance.
111  ‘(4) 4. The Community shall endeavour to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements with third 
countries containing provisions on sustainability criteria that correspond to those of this Directive.’
112  LAVRYSEN, Luc: The European Court of Justice and the Implementation of Environmental Law, in Reflec-
tions on 30 Years of EU Environmental Law, ed. by: Richard Macrory, Europa Law Publishing, Gronin-
gen, 2006, p. 447.
113  KISS, Alexandre – SHELTON, Dinah: Manual of European Environmental Law, Grotius Publications, 
Cambridge, 1993, p. 22.
114  KRÄMER, Ludwig: Casebook on EU Environmental Law, Hart Publishing, 2002, p.V.
115  CRAIG, Paul Craig – DE BURCA, Gráinne: EU Law, Fourth Edition, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 
73.
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 6.1 Impact Assessment
Environmental impact assessment116 is one of the fundamental 
instruments of EU environmental law. According to the facts of the Commis-
sion v Ireland case,117 domestic law already referred to sustainability, while the 
Commission found that Ireland infringed EU law for employing vague requi-
sites: ‘26 According to the Commission, Article 3 of Directive 85/337 is of pivotal 
importance, since it sets out what constitutes an environmental impact assess-
ment and must therefore be transposed explicitly. The provisions relied upon by 
Ireland as adequate transposition of Article 3 of the directive are insufficient.’
Ireland claimed that there are some basic concepts which appear in domestic 
law and which must satisfy the demands of EIA legislation: 
‘32 In the alternative, Ireland refers to the concept of ‘proper planning and sustain-
able development’ ... It is, in Ireland’s submission, the principal criterion which 
must be taken into consideration by any planning authority when deciding on 
an application for planning permission.’ Using such broad conditions instead of 
direct legal wording, belongs according to Ireland to the 
‘(33) ... discretion which a Member State enjoys under Article 249 EC as to the 
form and methods for transposing a directive.’ The respondent also claimed that 
there is a ‘ ... body of legislation and case-law built up in Ireland over 45 years 
surrounding the concepts of ‘proper planning’ and ‘sustainable development’.’
The general attitude of the Court as regards this kind of transposition is clear: 
‘46. ... according to settled case-law, the transposition of a directive into domes-
tic law does not necessarily require the provisions of the directive to be enacted 
in precisely the same words in a specific, express provision of national law and 
a general legal context may be sufficient if it actually ensures the full applica-
tion of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner ... the fact remains 
that, according to equally settled caselaw, the provisions of a directive must be 
implemented with unquestionable binding force and with the specificity, precision 
and clarity required in order to satisfy the need for legal certainty, which requires 
that, in the case of a directive intended to confer rights on individuals, the persons 
concerned must be enabled to ascertain the full extent of their rights ...’
The main question now is, whether concepts such as sustainable development 
satisfy the needs of clarity, precisions and specificity? The answer is in the nega-
tive:
116  The current version is the codified Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the envi-
ronment Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, p. 1-21.
117  Case C-50/09. European Commission v Ireland. 3 March 2011, Reports of Cases 2011 I-00873.
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‘48 As regards the concepts of ‘proper planning’ and ‘sustainable development’ to 
which Ireland also refers, it must be held that, even if those concepts encompass 
the criteria referred to in Article 3 of Directive 85/337, it is not established that they 
require that those criteria be taken into account in all cases for which an environ-
mental impact assessment is required..
49 It follows that neither the national case-law nor the concepts of ‘proper 
planning’ and ‘sustainable development’ can be invoked to remedy the failure to 
transpose into the Irish legal order Article 3 of Directive 85/337.’
The judgment is clear in that sustainable development may not be taken as a solid 
legal basis for the enforcement of permitting criteria without any further clarifica-
tion:  
‘59. ... The concept of ‘proper planning and sustainable development’, to which 
the PDA refers, is a very broad one,...’.
 6.2 Public Procurement
A case from the year 2010118 discusses sustainability in con-
nection with pubic procurement.119 According to the facts of the case, 5% of the 
conditions for tender related to a proposed framework contract covered environ-
mental sustainability. Although this is the single reference to sustainability in 
the case, we must mention it, since it proves that sustainability may well be a 
part of such procedures. At the same time, it must be pointed out that unfortu-
nately no clear conditions were listed besides the general concept.
 6.3 Energy (Biofuels)
In the Plantanol-case120 the use of biofuels and their conse-
quences for energy taxation, as well as the general principles of legal certainty 
and the protection of legitimate expectations played the central important role. 
The core issue was the withdrawal of tax reductions by the state, which was then 
challenged by the applicants. Among the different arguments of the plaintiffs, 
sustainable development was one element: 
118  Case C-406/08. Reference for a preliminary ruling: High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Queen’s 
Bench Division – United Kingdom in case between Uniplex (UK) Ltd v NHS Business Services Author-
ity. 28 January 2010 Reports of Cases 2010 I-817.
119  Two directives are at the heart of the problem: Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relat-
ing to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts Official Journal L 209, 
24/07/1992 p. 1-24 and Council Directive of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regula-
tions and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of 
public supply and public works contracts (89/665/EEC) (OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p. 33).
120  Case C-201/08, preliminary ruling issued by Hessisches Finanzgericht – Germany in case between 
Plantanol GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt Darmstadt, 10 September 2009. Reports of Cases 2009 
I-8343.
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‘27 ... In addition, the withdrawal of the exemption has not been the subject of any 
assessment concerning its effect on the criteria for sustainable development. ...’ 
No further explanation was given about the criteria for sustainability itself, but 
the verdict is very easy and simple, and again it is clear that a general reference 
to broad issues such as sustainable development is unsatisfactory, furthermore, 
there is no right to tax exemption: 
‘37 It follows that the provisions of Directive 2003/30 do not require the Member 
States to introduce, or maintain in force, a tax exemption scheme for biofuels. ... 
other means may also be envisaged, such as financial assistance for the process-
ing industry and the establishment of a compulsory rate of biofuels for oil compa-
nies.’
 6.4  Cooperation with Developing Countries, Peace, Security 
and Rule of Law
A completely different aspect of sustainable development 
formed the main question in a case from the year 2008121 – as clear evidence of 
the complexity of the sustainable development concept. The case related to devel-
opment aid based on the Cotonou Agreement between EC and the ACP States 
with sustainable development as its central element: 
‘(3) ... in order to promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social develop-
ment’, ‘the partnership shall be centred on the objective of reducing and eventu-
ally eradicating poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development 
and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy.’ 
This form of international cooperation has the integrated approach at its fore-
front: 
‘ taking account at the same time of the political, economic, social, cultural and 
environmental aspects of development..…’
While the main legal question related to the divison of regulatory and admin-
istrative powers, the case serves as a good example of the wider horizon of 
sustainable development as a principle connecting peace, security, human 
rights, democracy and sustainability as interrelated elements of a general 
concept.122 Paragraph 66 of the judgment is clear in this respect, accepting the 
finding that: 
121  C91/05. Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union, 20 May 2008. 
Reports of Cases 2008 I-03651.
122  ‘65 Articles 177 EC to 181 EC, which deal with cooperation with developing countries, refer not only 
to the sustainable economic and social development of those countries, their smooth and gradual 
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‘...there can be no sustainable development and eradication of poverty without 
peace and security and that the pursuit of the objectives of the Community’s new 
development policy necessarily proceed via the promotion of democracy and 
respect for human rights ...’
Finally, a seemingly remote problem is mentioned, which – according to the 
agreement and the judgment – also forms part of sustainable development. 
This is ‘the excessive and uncontrolled accumulation and spread of small arms 
and light weapons’, considered not only ‘a threat to peace and security’, but also 
something that ‘reduces the prospects for sustainable development (93), and 
constituting ‘an obstacle to the sustainable development of those countries.’ (98)
 6.5 Support for Developing Countries
In a judgment from the year 2007123 the main issue was the 
division of powers between the different EC institutions. According to the Par-
liament the Commission went beyond the limits of its powers when implement-
ing a regulation.124 In this case again one may also find a proof of the wide and 
complex meaning of sustainable development, without any concrete legal defini-
tion of the principle. This time the international cooperation under scrutiny 
regarded Asia and Latin America – ‘the ALA developing countries’. The coopera-
tion included several traditional elements, such as human rights, the process of 
democratisation, good governance, environmental protection, trade liberalisa-
tion and strengthening the cultural dimension, etc. Furthermore, Article 5 of 
Regulation No 443/92 states that the ‘protection of the environment and natural 
resources, and sustainable development, shall be long-term priorities. …’
integration into the world economy and the campaign against poverty, but also to the development and 
consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, as well as to respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, in compliance also with commitments in the context of the United Nations and other interna-
tional organisations (C-403/05 Parliament v Commission [2007] ECR I-0000, paragraph 56).’
123  C403/05. European Parliament v Commission of the European Communities, 23 October 2007, Reports 
of Cases 2007 I-09045 .
124  By its application, the European Parliament seeks annulment of the decision of the Commission of the 
European Communities approving a project relating to the security of the borders of the Republic of the 
Philippines to be financed by budget line 19 10 02 in the general budget of the European Communities 
(Philippines Border Management Project, No ASIA/2004/016-924) (not published in the Official Jour-
nal of the European Union, ‘the contested decision’), adopted in implementation of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 443/92 of 25 February 1992 on financial and technical assistance to, and economic coopera-
tion with, the developing countries in Asia and Latin America (OJ 1992 L 52, p. 1), as amended by Coun-
cil Regulation (EC) No 807/2003 of 14 April 2003 adapting to Decision 1999/468/EC the provisions 
relating to committees which assist the Commission in the exercise of its implementing powers laid 
down in Council instruments adopted in accordance with the consultation procedure (unanimity) (OJ 
2003 L 122, p. 36; ‘Regulation No 443/92’), to the extent that the Commission exceeded the implement-
ing powers conferred upon it by that regulation.
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The complexity of the items of cooperation substantiates the special impor-
tance of sustainable development within the different aid projects prepared for 
developing countries. These individual items all represent a different dimension 
of development.125 In paragraph 57 the same arguments are listed, as mentioned 
in paragraph 66 of the above judgment. The Court did not accept the very broad 
understanding of powers, consequently it is not enough to make a reference to 
the interrelationship of different aspects of development, a specific authorization 
is also needed: ‘68 ... the fight against terrorism and international crime which 
falls outside the framework of the development cooperation policy pursued by 
Regulation No 443/92, so that the Commission exceeded the implementing 
powers conferred by the Council in Article 15 of that regulation.’
 6.6 Fisheries
In a 2004 case126 the dispute centred around two issues: the 
action in connection with fishery and the conditions of using interim measures, 
both in relation to the concept of sustainable fishing,127 or the ‘sustainable exploi-
tation of fisheries resources’. At the heart of the case was the classical concept of 
sustainability, directly linked with environmental protection: ‘10 Articles 1 and 2 
of the Base Regulation respectively provide that the scope of the CFP is to ‘cover 
conservation, management and exploitation of living aquatic resources …’ and 
that the CFP shall ‘ensure exploitation of living aquatic resources that provides 
sustainable economic, environmental and social conditions’...’
According to the plaintiffs, the actions (the contested regulation) of the 
Council infringe the ‘Base Regulation’, among others, because: 
‘76. First, the applicant contends that the Contested Regulation is in breach of 
environmental law, in particular Articles 6 and 174(1) to (3) EC and the Base Regu-
lation by failing to respect important environmental principles which are manda-
tory in the context of legislation in the field of the CFP, namely the sustainability, 
125  ‘56. Admittedly, Articles 177 EC to 181 EC, inserted by the EU Treaty and dealing with cooperation with 
developing countries, refer not only to the sustainable economic and social development of those coun-
tries, their smooth and gradual integration into the world economy and the campaign against poverty, 
but also to the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, as well as to respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, whilst complying fully with their commitments in the 
context of the United Nations and other international organisations.’
126  T37/04. R. Região autónoma dos Açores v Council of the European Union, 1 July 2008. Reports of Cases 
2008 II-00103.
127  ‘1. The legislative framework relevant to the present demand for interim measures is that pertaining to 
the Community’s Common Fisheries Policy (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CFP’), in particular, with 
regard to a zone within Portuguese jurisdiction of up to 200 nautical miles (‘nm’) from the baseline of 
the Azores (hereinafter referred to as ‘Azorean waters’), corresponding to the exclusive economic zone 
of the Azores. The legislative framework is complex with a large number of secondary legislative acts 
regulating fishing activities in that area....’
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precautionary, preventive action, rectification at source, and polluter pays princi-
ples. According to the applicant, all the above principles are infringed because the 
Contested Regulation will lead to intensification of fishing effort, damage to the 
marine environment and depletion of fish stocks ...’
The plaintiff seeks the Court to take interim measures, among others due to the 
infringement of sustainable development principles: 
‘87 ... This would alter the delicate environmental balance, which is already close 
to unsustainable levels, leading to a ‘boom and bust’ effect and the rapid and 
irreversible depletion of fish stocks. In this respect, the applicant stresses that the 
special nature of deep-sea fish (low fecundity rates, late maturity, longevity) makes 
recovery extremely slow.’ 
Again, no clear vision of sustainability was presented, therefore, the arguments 
failed to convince the Court.
 6.7 Rivers
In a relatively recent case128 sustainability is mentioned yet 
again, without arriving at any direct conclusion. The case is interesting because 
it covers a complexity of different fundamental environmental directives 
(water framework directive,129 environmental impact assessment,130 strategic 
assessment,131 habitat132). Unfortunately, sustainability is employed here as a 
permissive element and not as a constraint: 
‘139 Consequently, the answer to the fourteenth question is that Directive 92/43, 
and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 6(4) thereof, interpreted in 
the light of the objective of sustainable development, as enshrined in Article 6 
EC, permits, in relation to sites which are part of the Natura 2000 network, the 
conversion of a natural fluvial ecosystem into a largely manmade fluvial and lacus-
128  C43/10. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Symvoulio tis Epikrateias – Greece, in case between Nomar-
chiaki Aftodioikisi Aitoloakarnanias and Others v Ypourgos Perivallontos, Chorotaxias kai Dimosion 
ergon and Others. 11 September 2012. Reports of Cases Not yet published.
129  Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing 
a framework for Community action in the field of water policy OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1-73.
130  Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 providing for 
public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the 
environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council Directives 
85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC – Statement by the Commission OJ L 156, 25.6.2003, p. 17-25.
131  Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assess-
ment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment OJ L 197, 21.7.2001, p. 30-37.
132  Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna 
and flora Official Journal L 206 , 22/07/1992 p. 7-50.
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trine ecosystem provided that the conditions referred to in that provision of the 
directive are satisfied.’
 6.8 Plant Genetics
Plant genetics is the central question in our next example,133 
which concerns the excessive use of seeds, infringing – according to the plain-
tiffs of the instant case – several EU134 and international requirements.135 As a 
general rule, international conventions form a vital part of EU law: 
‘84 It has consistently been held that, by virtue of Article 216(2) TFEU, where inter-
national agreements are concluded by the European Union they are binding upon 
its institutions and, consequently, they prevail over acts of the European Union ...’ 
If one argues that these international requirements are directly applicable, 
certain conditions have to be met, first of all that the provisions must be ‘... 
unconditional and sufficiently precise’.
In this case these conditions were not met, since the wording of the Conven-
tion is far from being precise: 
‘88 In addition, in accordance with Article 6 of the ITPGRFA, the Contracting 
Parties are to develop and maintain appropriate policy and legal measures that 
promote the sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.
89 Thus, under those provisions, the measures to be adopted in any given case 
are left to the discretion of the Member States. ...
92 Accordingly, that article does not contain an obligation that is sufficiently 
unconditional and precise to challenge the validity of Directives 2002/55 and 
2009/145 either.’
Our conclusion again must be that sustainability as a general obligation may 
exist, however, it does not satisfy the requirement of necessary legal accuracy.
133  C59/11. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Cour d’appel de Nancy – France in case between Association 
Kokopelli v Graines Baumaux SAS. 12 July 2012. Not yet published in the ECR.
134  For example: Council Directive 98/95/EC of 14 December 1998 amending, in respect of the consolida-
tion of the internal market, genetically modified plant varieties and plant genetic resources or Council 
Directive 2002/55/EC of 13 June 2002 on the marketing of vegetable seed (OJ 2002 L 193, p. 33), etc.
135  ‘4. According to Article 1 of the ITPGRFA, the objectives of the Treaty are ‘the conservation and sustain-
able use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising out of their use, in harmony with the Convention on Biological Diversity, for sustainable 
agriculture and food security’.’
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 6.9 Cogeneration Plant and Green Certificates
Of course it would be impossible to analyse each and every case 
that mentions sustainable development, since there are always new examples 
propping up. Our last case is from September 2013,136 the facts of which relate 
to a cogeneration plant, which makes use of the waste deriving primarily from 
the sawmill for the purpose of ensuring its own energy supply. The application 
for additional green certificates was refused by the Walloon Government, which 
stated that the plant ‘did not satisfy three of the conditions required by that pro-
vision as, first, it used wood for cogeneration, secondly, it did not make use of a 
particularly innovative process and, thirdly, it did not act with a view to sustaina-
ble development.’ (25) The CJEU and the Conseil d’État agree that ‘56 According 
to recitals 1 and 2 in the preamble to that directive, such promotion of renewable 
energy sources, which is a high priority for the European Union, is justified 
in particular because the exploitation of those energy sources contributes to 
environmental protection and sustainable development, and can also contribute 
to security and diversification of energy supply and make it possible to meet the 
Kyoto Protocol targets more quickly.’ Notwithstanding these findings, we must 
conclude that no further elements of sustainable development were laid down.
 7 Conclusions
When seeking to determine the legal content of sustainable 
development, our most important starting point shall be primary law, covering 
principles and general provisions and providing the legal basis for all further 
secondary legislation – and via secondary legislation for domestic law – and 
jurisprudence. The prevalence of the sustainability issue within the realm of 
international cooperation also plays a role in the development of primary legisla-
tion, as demonstrated by the correlation of UNCED and the Maastricht Treaty of 
1992. Sustainability, sustainable development may also be considered a trendy 
buzzword, at the same time, in the framework of European integration, it may 
also have a crucial role to play in connection with the market or economy at 
large. This is clear from Article B of the TEU, supplying the impression that the 
development angle is a bit stronger than sustainability.137
Maastricht also amended the EC Treaty. Article 2 TEC reflects the same 
attitude, mixing development and growth, emphasizing the qualitative aspects – 
harmonious and balanced development respecting the environment – in connec-
tion with economic activities, and as an inverse, in the case of environmental 
136  Case C195/12, preliminary ruling from the Cour constitutionnelle (Belgium), in the proceedings 
between Industrie du bois de Vielsalm & Cie (IBV) SA and Région wallonne, 26 September 2013, Not 
yet published in the ECR.
137  ‘To promote economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable.’
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protection it reminds us of the requirements of ‘sustainable and non-inflationary 
growth’, which is more of a quantitative character.
The Amsterdam Treaty reinforces the idea of sustainability, featuring the 
term already in the preamble as a principle coupling economic and social 
development as an objective together with environmental protection. All further 
elements of the Treaty are similar in terms of providing a dominant role to 
economy or the market – balanced and sustainable development, also harmo-
nious development. At the same time, the role of environmental protection is 
expanding, requiring a high level of protection even in the set of general provi-
sions. Finally, integration – integrating environmental considerations in other 
policies – should also receive a stronger vision.
Thus, the triad of sustainability is present in primary law: although the 
economic dimension qualifies as the most important role of the EU, the need to 
find a balance is also obvious.
The Lisbon Treaty was not drafted in order to further interpret the concept 
of sustainability. No wonder the basics of sustainability turned out very similar, 
with a more extensive and broader approach – sustainable development of the 
Earth, future generations. In the TFEU, goals and values such as peace, solidar-
ity, human rights and the fight against poverty create a complex system, together 
with sustainable development marking the broader backdrop of activities. The 
role of EU within international cooperation – primarily in relation to developing 
countries – is to serve sustainability together with its three components. Inte-
gration is a fundamental part in this setting, while environmental integration 
loses its primary role and importance. Finally, we must mention the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, covering sustainable development in its Article 37 on 
environment.
It is understandable that the principle of sustainable development is partly 
an objective, partly a principle – the Treaty itself does not wish to specify its 
exact content. Of course, traditional components of sustainable development 
are also present, however, no new elements or development can be discerned. 
The wording is not sufficiently clear for the purposes of legal clarification and 
does not serve as a basis for any legal obligation either. Its essence is to ‘aim 
at’ or ‘take into account’ sustainability, as such, it may be considered a general 
guidance, with a limited chance of enforcement. We may not even say that the 
EU institutions themselves are obliged to take any concrete measure in relation 
to sustainable development. Their responsibility is merely political, but even on 
this level, it seems to be weak.
In terms of legislation in general, Better Regulation may have a greater role 
to play, using measures such as impact assessment, consultations or simplifica-
tion. Better regulation also requires certainty and stability.138 As regards sustain-
ability, its implementation should be monitored, and there are also indicators 
138  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Smart Regulation in the European 
Union Brussels, 8.10.2010 COM(2010) 543 final.
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under development for this purpose. Furthermore, better governance is a core 
issue, covering among others regional and local initiatives.
In the past years, the sustainable development strategy has been focusing on 
its relationship with the Lisbon strategy, which includes many direct elements 
and feasible implementation mechanisms than sustainability. Lisbon reflects 
the main course of the EU – economy, competitiveness, growth, innovation, etc. 
The establishment of the Lisbon strategy is very similar to the sustainable devel-
opment strategy, they may proceed side by side, but a more complex, integrated 
perspective became a must. Currently, we are witnessing some proposals which 
call for the possible leading role of sustainability in this process.
At the same time there is also an opposite tendency, starting with the 
economic crisis in 2008, focusing more on economics and market growth. This 
is also reflected in the new terminology: sustainable growth instead of develop-
ment. Sustainable growth resembles sustainable development, but it is not the 
same.139 Consequently, sustainable economy is included, but as a part of the 
process and not the replacing entire system. Inclusive growth also diverts the 
focus from sustainability. From among the complex system of the guidance 
formulated in relation to the concept of inclusive growth, only one requirement 
comes close to the concept of sustainable development. Thus, most recently the 
direction of strategies and policies have been changed and this had an impact 
on the further conditions of sustainable development. This trend does not seem 
absolutely positive.
The elements of sustainability, which appear in primary legislation or 
in the different strategies, do not allow us to speak of an exact legal content. 
The concept does not give rise to enforceable obligations, neither towards the 
EU institutions, nor towards Member States, or towards any legal entities or 
persons. Consequently, sustainability shall be understood also in the future as 
a principle, less of a legal principle, but rather as a policy principle, the actual 
content of which is subject to changes. A good example of this is the emergence 
of the term sustainable growth. Most probably it is only the result of the inte-
gration of the components of sustainable development which are feasible in 
practice, however, the available instruments have yet to be clarified.
Secondary EU law even contains direct provisions on sustainability, but 
again it is more feasible to use sustainability/sustainable development as a point 
of reference or a principle and less as a real legally binding term. Moreover, this 
approach usually accentuates the environmental content of the concept. If one 
wishes to find more direct references, these are all connected with sustainabil-
ity implications of special objectives enshrined in the different secondary legal 
sources.
139  To recall the broades definition featured in the preamble of the new strategy: ‘(9) ... Sustainable growth 
means decoupling economic growth from the use of resources, building an energy and resource-
efficient, sustainable and competitive economy, a fair distribution of the cost and benefits and exploiting 
Europe’s leadership in the race to develop new processes and technologies, including green technolo-
gies.’
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The first piece of secondary legislation was adopted in 2009 which formu-
lates sustainability criteria as enforceable requirements, in connection with 
renewable energy, more precisely with biofuels. This is a significant innovation, 
as the complexity of the term may be operationalized, even if in a narrower field, 
but possibly affecting a much wider context. There is finally a legally perceiv-
able obligation, which is manifested in sustainability criteria. The approach is 
somewhat negative, defining what is not sustainable, and it does not cover the 
complexity of the relevant issues on the whole, but still it extends to such crite-
ria, which contain environmental, economic and even ’fair-trade’ elements.
Sustainability references may also be found in case-law, therefore we can say 
that it is in the process of becoming a legal requirement. The most important 
messages of the relevant judgments are – unfortunately not a clear definition, 
since this is still missing –two important elements
?? the mere fact that the principle of sustainable development may appear as a 
reference in jurisprudence, and
?? that this issue may have an impact on a variety of cases, from environmen-
tal protection to development aid, from fisheries to public procurement. It 
is even more important that under the notion of sustainability, issues such 
as cultural dimensions, peace, security, democracy and rule of law are all 
considered together in a complex vision.
Summing it up, there is no such thing as a clear legal definition of sustainable 
development, which may be invoked in legislation or in a legal dispute. Some 
elements of the terminology and also the principle of sustainable development 
are nevertheless available, meaning that the concept may not be circumvented, 
but must form a part of legal reasoning, even if it takes the form of a principle. 
With the exception of the sustainability criteria laid down in the RED directive, 
the available legal terms may not be understood as real requirements, however, 
sustainability, sustainable development has frequently become a point of refer-
ence. Sustainability may also be taken as a widely accepted, general concept, 
broad enough to accomodate different interpretations.
The EU is willing to accept growth, employment, competitiveness as political 
priorities, but it is not really willing to turn sustainability into a direct legal obli-
gation. This is even more the case after 2008. It is also clear that if we always 
tailor the content of sustainability to the actual problems, there is a chance to 
leave, for example, the environmental issues behind.
We may agree with Krämer,140 who is not very optimistic in connection with 
the realization of sustainable development within the EU, concluding, that
?? there is no manageable definition of sustainable development in EU law, but 
it is rather used to render programmes and measures ‘green’;
?? any kind of measure and action may be considerd sustainable, as there is no 
clear legal reference;
140  KRÄMER, Ludwig: Sustainable development in EC law in Sustainable Development in International and 
National Law, ed. by: BUGGE, Hans Christian and VOIGT, Christina, Europa Law Publishing, 2008, p. 
243.
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?? from the beginning of the 21st century, the political goal is growth and 
employment and there are no serious attempts to give teeth to the concept of 
sustainable development.
This also means, according to the same author141 that if in order to find a 
political compromise, we wish to collect all contradictory interests of environ-
mental protection and economy into one sustainable development concept as it 
happened in Article 3 of TEU and Article 11 of TFEU, it must end up in a fiasco. 
Of course, looking at the simple fact that the content of sustainable development 
is designed by politicians, tailored to their current needs, there is also a chance 
for improvement in this matter.
141  KRÄMER, Ludwig: Az Európai Unió környezeti joga, Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2012, p. 363.
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 1 Sustainable Development Law in Legal Scholarship
Above, we sought to summarize the major attempts in inter-
national law and European law to come closer to the meaning of sustainable 
development. Now, we will present the views of legal scholars, in order to have a 
more complex picture. Before entering into a short discussion of some relevant 
views in legal literature, we should refer to the actual impact of understanding 
what sustainable development really means, looking at the international career 
of this notion. 
‘It is included in over 300 international conventions... References to sustainable 
development can indeed be found in 112 multilateral treaties, roughly 30 of which 
are aimed at universal participation. This points to a certain level of consensus 
among the international community concerning the relevance of sustainable 
development for international law. ... an empirical analysis shows that 207 of these 
references are to be found in the operative part of the conventions which is techni-
cally binding on the parties.... Clearly, then, sustainable development has widely 
penetrated treaty law. ... The wording can be vague and imprecise...’1
Consequently, international law is rich with references to sustainability or 
sustainable development, but the major question remains the same: what is 
the exact legal content of such references, how is it possible to implement this 
term in everyday life, in practice. How far can these expectations be considered 
as guidance, general provisions, or real requirements? With other words: what 
is the essence of sustainable development for law? We should also be aware of 
the material content – instruments, means and methods – of the expression. 
As we already presented some examples provided by internationally recognized 
expert groups or committees, it is time to get acquainted with the ideas of legal 
scholars.
One of the most distinguished authors of sustainable development law2 tries 
to deliver a balanced interpretation: ‘In this way, a principle of sustainable devel-
opment, in accordance with the Bruntland Report and other global ’soft law’ 
processes, could be argued to have a fundamentally normative character that is 
binding on State, though is a double-edged sword. It would not forbid develop-
ment as such. Rather, it would require States not to prevent or frustrate each 
other from promoting sustainable development, and ‘where development may 
cause significant harm to the environment’ would require states to take steps to 
address a duty ‘to prevent, or at least mitigate, such harm’.’3
1  BARRAL, Virginie: Sustainable Development in International Law: Nature and Operation of an Evolu-
tive Legal Norm, The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 23. no. 2, 2012, p. 384.
2  Director of the Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, http://cisdl.org/people.html.
3  CORDONIER SEGGER, Marie-Claire: Sustainable Development in International Law, in Sustainable 
Development in Sustainable Development in International and National Law, ed. by: Hans Christian 
Bugge and Christina Voigt, Europa Law Publishing, 2008, p. 128.
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A truly encyclopaedic, but equally legal summary is provided by the Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law: 
‘Today, SD is broadly understood as a concept that is characterized by (1) the 
close linkage between the policy goals of economic and social development 
and environmental protection; (2) the qualification of environmental protection 
as an integral part of any developmental measure, and vice versa; and (3) the 
long-term perspective of both policy goals, that is the States’ inter-generational 
responsibility.’4
Of course, not all authors define the components of sustainability along the 
same lines, but most of the descriptions use similar interpretations: ‘It is by 
now well established that this definition is widely considered to encompass 
three main strands. These are: (i) economic development; (ii) environmental 
protection and conservation; and (iii) human equity.’5 Equity in this respect is 
connected to social issues, listed usually as the third component of sustainable 
development.
At the beginning of our short survey we may also mention another impor-
tant matter that is the distinction between or similarity of the terms sustain-
ability and sustainable development. Many authors underline the major differ-
ence6: ‘sustainability and sustainable development are not the same, but often 
used without caution as if they are. The former is an ongoing function of the 
ecosystem or use of a resource, and implies steady demands; the latter implies 
increasing demands for improving well-being and lifestyles and probably, in the 
foreseeable future, for a growing population.’ Others believe that sustainability 
is too complex, leading to uncertainty.7 Most likely the easiest way to begin is 
with sustainability, that is to provide well-being and ensure the common interest 
of the present generations, while not exploiting the resources available for next 
generations. Sustainable development is a method of material development, 
which may most probably reach the target of sustainability.
The different scholars, based on their respective attitudes and legal back-
ground may arrive at different conclusions. Some do not believe that sustainable 
development may be afforded a legal content, which does not mean at the same 
time that the problem is underestimated. It is much rather the case that the real 
nature of sustainable development is revealed:8 
4  BEYERLIN, Ulrich: Sustainable Development in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
www.mpepil.com © 2012 Max Planck Institute for Comparagraphtive Public Law and International 
Law, Heidelberg and Oxford University Press, point 9.
5  PEDERSEN, Ole W.: Environmental Principles and Environmental Justice, Environmental Law Review, 
2010, vol 12, p. 43.
6  BARROW, C.J.: Environmental Management for SD, Routledge, 2006, p. 11.
7  RICHARDSON, Benjanim J, – WOOD Stepan: Environmental Law for Sustainability in Benjanim J. 
Richardson, Stepan Wood (ed) Environmental Law for Sustainability, Hart Publishing 2006, p. 40.
8  WINTER, Gerd: A Fundament and Two Pillars in International Law, in Sustainable Development in 
Sustainable Development in International and National Law, ed. by: Hans Christian Bugge and Chris-
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‘Taking this terminology as a basis I believe the proposition of sustainable devel-
opment can neither be regarded as a principle of international customary law nor 
as a general principle of law or international law. The most widely accepted defini-
tion (the three pillars concept) is just too vague to qualify for legal bindingness.’ 
The same may also be affirmed in connection with EU law, in light of the legal 
exactness of the term: 
‘The different provisions in the Treaty on sustainable development and their 
practical application thus constitute more of a guideline to policy action than any 
meaningful legal concept...’9 Neither of the above comments lead to the assump-
tion that the legal substance may vanish, but both authors point to the fact that we 
should not have high hopes of reading the definition in the different legal docu-
ments.
Other authors summarize the views of different scholars, helping us in drawing 
up a clear picture: 
‘For some, the answer to the question of relationship to the law is straightforward: 
sustainable development does not belong to law; it may be an important philo-
sophical or political objective, but is in not a legal one.... Others avoid the issue of 
ascertaining the legal nature of sustainable development by pointing to its lack of 
relevance... A variant of this approach is to consider sustainable development, not 
as a legal principle, but as a new branch of international law altogether.’10 
Thus, there is a wide margin of perspectives, from the legally unfathomable 
to the individual new field or branch of law. What kind of conclusions may we 
draw? The straightforward conclusion is to accept that nothing is clear yet, the 
concept is less mature, the quality and the content of the definition is far from 
constant. What’s more: even with the passing of 25 or 100 years, the answers 
may still vary.
Lawyers of international environmental law have sought to confer as soon 
as possible concrete legal content on the concept of sustainable development. It 
may be said that currently the international legal society and therefore also the 
theory of international law are to a certain degree divided on the international 
legal status of sustainable development. As an early and general assessment we 
may wrap up that some international lawyers consider sustainable development 
as a binding norm of international law: for example Beyerlin, Malanczuk, Pinto 
and Redclift11 belong to the group of international lawyers who argue in favour 
tina Voigt, Europa Law Publishing, 2008, p. 40.
9  KRÄMER, Ludwig: EC Environmental Law, Sixth Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London 2007., pp. 9. and 
12.
10  BARRAL, Virginia: Sustainable Development in International Law: Nature and Operation of an Evolu-
tive Legal Norm, The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 23. no. 2, 2012, p. 378.
11  See REDCLIFT, M. R.: Sustainable Development: Exploring the Condradictions. London: Routledge, 1987.
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of its binding nature. Meanwhile, others, e. g. Schrijver12 and Philippe Sands13 
described the concept of sustainable development as a concept of public interna-
tional law, stating that the international legal status of sustainable development 
is debatable.
A number of authors find that the uncertainty surrounding the concept 
of sustainable development is the major obstacle for recognizing its binding 
nature under international law.14 Lowe, for instance writes that the concept of 
sustainable development is rooted in ‘obscurity and turmoil.’15 Nevertheless, 
Lowe acknowledges that the concept of sustainable development has some legal 
relevance, since it may be a tool in the judges’ hands to achieve certain amend-
ments and it may play a prominent role in interstate negotiations when diverg-
ing interests and principles must be brought into balance. Dire Tladi assessed 
the consequences of the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros judgment of the International 
Court of Justice in Hague. According to Tladi, the fact that the Court defined 
sustainable development as a concept, can only mean, at best, that the Court is 
not committed to the legal significance of sustainable development, at worst, it 
suggests that the in the opinion of the Court, sustainable development does not 
12  SCHRIJVER, Nico J.: Development – the Neglected Dimension in the Evolution of the International Law 
of Sustainable Development. Paper Presented at International Seminar: International Law and Sustain-
able Development: Principle and Practice, Amsterdam, Nov. 29.–Dec.1, 2001.
13  SANDS, Philippe: ’International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development’. British Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law, 1994/65, 379.
14  See inter alia BEYERLIN, Ulrich: ’The Concept of Sustainable Development’. In: WOLFRUM, R. 
(ed.): Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic Mechanisms as Viable Means? Berlin: Springer, 
1996, p. 640.; MALANCZUK, P.: ’Sustainable Development: Some Critical Thoughts in the Light of 
the Rio Conference, Sustainable Development and Good Governance’. In: GINTHER, Konrad et al. 
(eds.): Sustainable Development and Good Governance. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992; 
PALLAMAERTS, M.: ’International Environmental Law in the Age of Sustainable Development: A Criti-
cal Assessment of the UNCED Process’, 15 J.L. & CoM. (1996), pp. 623, 653; PINTO, M.C.W.: ’Reflec-
tions on the Term Sustainable Development and its Institutional Implications’. In: GINTHER, Konrad 
et al. (eds.): Sustainable Development and Good Governance. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1992; PINTO, M.C.W.: ‘The Legal Context: Concept, Principles, Standards and Institutions’. In WEISS, 
F. – DENTERs, E. – DE WAART, P. (eds.): International Economic Law with a Human Face. The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1998; PORRAS, Ileana: ’The Rio Declaration: A New Basis for International 
Cooperation’. In: Sands, Philippe (ed.): Greening International Law. London: Earthscan Publications, 
1993; REDCLIFT, M. R.: Sustainable Development: Exploring the Condratictions. London: Routledge, 
1987; RIEU-CLARKE, Alistair: ’International Law and Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Law 
of International Water Courses’. International Water Association Publishing (IWA Publishing),1 November 
2005. LOWE, Vaughan: ’Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Practices’, In: BOYLE, Alan 
E. – FREESTONE, David (eds), International Law and Sustainable Development – Past Achievements and 
Future Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 19-23.
15  LOWE, Vaughan: ’Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Practices’. In: BOYLE, Alan E. – FREE-
STONE, David (eds.): International Law and Sustainable Development – Past Achievements and Future 
Challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 23.
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have a legal status at all.16 Dire Tladi notes that the peoples’ right to self-determi-
nation is, undoubtedly, one of the most important principles of international law 
in spite of the fact that its exact content and the rights and obligations arising 
from it are usually disputed in the concrete cases.17 According to Alistair Rieu-
Clarke, the authors who accept the normative nature of the international legal 
status of sustainable development represent a minority position. On the basis of 
the majority view, the concept of sustainable development is merely considered 
lex lata, as a consequence of which international scholarship does not consider 
sustainable development a consolidated international legal principle capable of 
conveying legal obligations.18
By contrast, authors such as Schrijver are of the view that sustainable devel-
opment has a certain international legal status as a concept of public interna-
tional law and as an objective of the international community.19 One of the most 
prominent scholars of international environmental law, Philippe Sands, holds 
that the concept of sustainable development has become widely recognized in 
international law, even if its exact meaning is yet uncertain, since sustainable 
development is a legal term concerning processes, principles and objectives 
referred to under various international environmental conventions.20
Professor Alexander (Sándor) Kiss, the greatest Hungarian scholar of inter-
national environmental law, elaborated the details of the concept of sustainable 
development to its fullest.21 Kiss describes sustainable development as a legal 
concept, similar to the constitutional concept of a state. The constitution of a 
state describes the basic principles related to the operation of a state; thereby it 
ensures the legal framework for state operation. The concept of the state set out 
in the constitution is, in itself, not binding; only the principles that constitute 
part of the concept of the state are binding. Likewise, the concept of sustainable 
development is a legal concept that includes the prevailing principles of interna-
tional environmental law. Without this concept, the international legal means 
are not available, either, which would impose legal obligations on the state in the 
interest of preserving the natural condition of our Earth.
16  TLADI, Dire: Sustainable Development in International Law: An Analysis of Key Enviro-Economic Instru-
ments, op. cit. 96.
17  Ibid. 101.
18  RIEU-CLARKE, Alistair: ’International Law and Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Law of 
International Water Courses’. International Water Association Publishing (IWA Publishing), 1 November 
2005.
19  SCHRIJVER, Nico J.: ’Development – the Neglected Dimension in the Evolution of the International 
Law of Sustainable Development’. Paper Presented at International Seminar: International Law and 
Sustainable Development: Principle and Practice, Amsterdam, Nov. 29. –Dec.1, 2001.
20  SANDS, P. : ’International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development’, BYIL LXV (1994), pp. 303, 379.
21  See e.g. KISS, Alexandre – SHELTON, Dinah: Guide to International Environmental Law. Leiden/Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007; KISS, Alexandre – SHELTON, Dinah: International Environmental 
Law. Ardseley, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1999.
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We may also agree with the observation, which has difficulties with accept-
ing the legal nature of sustainability, but does not exclude it at the same time, so 
it is as ambivalent as the term itself: 
‘The legal challenge for sustainable development is enormous: a legal framework 
is needed in which environmental and social considerations are integrated into 
developmental processes along with economic analyses so that decision making 
reflects the ‘real’ values and services that nature provides. Despite incorporation 
of sustainable development into treaties, and domestic environmental and plan-
ning legislation, the concept largely remains one of rhetoric and policy without 
clear legal parameters. Much discussion has occurred but little international law 
has emerged.’22
Law should also be sincere when looking at its own system, if it wishes to 
comprehend the concept of sustainability. 
‘The international law, and also EC law, is clearly insufficient for securing environ-
mental sustainability. This conclusion might seen upsetting, even theoretically, 
because the larger the controlling system, the more it can control. The reason 
is at least partly because these two legal systems are – as already mentioned – 
internally inconsistent. None of them is sustainable. For one thing, they reflect 
conflicting goals, nor is sustainable development among the highest priorities. For 
another, they are simply too inflexible to adapt to whatever occurs in the environ-
mental anywhere within the Union for the purpose of controlling the environment 
for ecological sustainability.’23 
As a consequence, law is not necessarily a proper device to manage sustain-
ability or any other problem that is equally emerging and in constant flux. On 
the one hand, the scheme we wish to adapt is far from homogeneous, and on 
the other hand, the legal technique is not really capable of controlling flexible, 
moving targets (finding harmony with legal certainty, with the limitation of 
discretion, the difficulties of definitional ambiguities, just to mention a few of 
the practical problems).
If we wish to have a clear picture why it is so difficult to take hold of sustain-
able development, there are several arguments: 
‘Sustainability is about visions, but the law as applied is not. The law is about how 
we can resolve specific disputes in specific circumstances. Because sustainability 
22  PALASSIS, Stathis M.: Beyond the Global Summits: Reflecting on the Environmental Principles of 
Sustainable Development, Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, Vol. 22:1, 
2011, p. 42.
23  WESTERLUND Staffan: Theory for Sustainable Development in Sustainable Development SD in 
International and National Law, ed. by: BUGGE, Hans Christian and VOIGT, Christina, Europa Law 
Publishing, 2008, p. 63.
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is about creating places and communities, and thus primarily about purpose and 
implementing visions, specific-resource-focused legal regimes are too narrow--or 
more appropriately, operate on the wrong scale-to effectuate any comprehensive 
vision of a sustainable community.’24 
Thus the key of the enigma of the law of sustainable development is to deter-
mine how far and with whatever methods we wish to legally manage the subject 
or whether is it really necessary to do so? This is equally important in law, public 
and economic/financial administration or virtually any field of management.
It would be impossible today to meet the general requirements towards a 
clear definition as required among others by the case law of ECJ/CJEU25 on clear 
conceptual basis. The case cited here regards environmental impact assessment, 
but is of much greater importance, referring to the need for an unambiguous 
and clear wording, serving as a basis for laying down obligations for national 
legislation: 
‘43 The need for uniform application of Community law and the principle of 
equality require that the terms of a provision of Community law which makes no 
express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining 
its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform inter-
pretation throughout the Community; that interpretation must take into account 
the context of the provision and the purpose of the legislation in question (Case 
327/82 Ekro v Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees [1984] E.C.R. 107, paragraph 11).’
In any case, we should come closer to a clear definition, as the Spanish author 
underlined: ‘However, terminological precision is not only important for the 
legal community, it is vital, for the Law is a science of words.’26
A good practical example of why we need clear-cut definitions in European 
environmental law may be the issue of ‘significant effect’, which emerges in 
environmental areas in a number of provisions. The most illustrative cases are 
connected with environmental impact assessment, the essence of which is to 
clarify the significant environmental impact, or likely environmental impact, 
24  LONG, Jerrold A.: Realizing the abstraction: using today’s law to reach tomorrow’s sustainability, Idaho 
Law Review 2010, vol. 46, p. 348.
25  Case C-287/98, preliminary ruling submitted by the Tribunal d’Arrondissement de Luxembourg in the 
legal dispute between the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and the Berthe Linster, Aloyse Linster, Yvonne 
Linster, September 19, 2000. Reports of Cases 2000 I-06917.
26  Angel-Manuel Moreno: EC Environmental Law and National Administrative Law; A Reciprocal Influ-
ence with Problematic Implications, in Recht un Um-Welt (Essays in Honour of Prof. Dr. Gerd Winter) 
ed. by: Ludwig Krämer, Europa Law Publishing, Groningen 2003, p. 334.
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to be assessed before any decision is made. There are many examples in this 
context, such as the Kraaijeveld case27 or the Irish bogs28 and many others.
The Irish bogs case is a good example for the difficulty of establishing an 
exact content for the term significant effect, as is clear from the judgment:
‘64 As far as the objection to thresholds is concerned, although the second 
subparagraph of Article 4(2) of the Directive confers on Member States a mea-
sure of discretion to specify certain types of projects which are to be subject to 
an assessment or to establish the criteria or thresholds applicable, the limits of 
that discretion lie in the obligation set out in Article 2(1) that projects likely, by 
virtue inter alia of their nature, size or location, to have significant effects on the 
environment are to be subject to an impact assessment (Kraaijeveld, cited above, 
paragraph 50)
65 Thus, a Member State which established criteria or thresholds taking account 
only of the size of projects, without also taking their nature and location into 
consideration, would exceed the limits of its discretion under Articles 2(1) and 4(2) 
of the Directive.
66 Even a small-scale project can have significant effects on the environment if 
it is in a location where the environmental factors set out in Article 3 of the Direc-
tive, such as fauna and flora, soil, water, climate or cultural heritage, are sensitive 
to the slightest alteration.
67 Similarly, a project is likely to have significant effects where, by reason of its 
nature, there is a risk that it will cause a substantial or irreversible change in those 
environmental factors, irrespective of its size.’
A number of other examples may be mentioned in to demonstrate the impli-
cation of the definition, but here we restrict ourselves to only one more case. 
In relation to the construction of a motorway, the Italian regional legislature 
committed the mistake of excluding projects from the environmental impact 
assessment without providing for an opportunity to get acquainted with its 
substantial issues.29 The ECJ emphasized also in this case: 
‘44 Consequently, whatever the method adopted by a Member State to determine 
whether or not a specific project needs to be assessed, be it by legislative designa-
tion or following an individual examination of the project, the method adopted 
must not undermine the objective of the Directive, which is that no project likely 
to have significant effects on the environment, within the meaning of the Direc-
tive, should be exempt from assessment, unless the specific project excluded 
could, on the basis of a comprehensive screening, be regarded as not being likely 
to have such effects (WWF, paragraph 45).’
27  Case C- 27/95, preliminary ruling in proceedings between the Aannemersbedrijf P.K. Kraaijeveld BV 
e.a. from the Dutch State Council vs. Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland, October 24, 1996. (ECR 
1996, page I-05403).
28  Case C- 392/96, Commission vs. Ireland, September 21, 1999. Reports of Cases 1999 I-05901.
29  Case C- 87/02, EC Commission vs. Republic of Italy, June 10, 2004, Reports of Cases 2004 I-05975.
129
chapter 5 sustainable development law in legal scholarship
Finally, it can be stated that the content of the term ‘significant effect’ had 
not actually been circumscribed by the judicial practice, the real requirement 
was much rather to come as close as possible to the notion. Thus the lesson is 
that we may not always achieve absolute sharpness in terms, if the underlying 
conditions are not clear enough. But the idiom ‘significant effect’ is much less 
complex and much easier to handle than sustainable development, since it is 
more closely connected with the objective of the respective legal requirement. In 
case of sustainable development, even the objective is ambiguous. In any case, 
the legally tangible requirement is that we should move in a given direction, we 
should aim at a given objective.
In light of the problem of sustainable development, the challenge to legisla-
tion may be defined as follows: 
‘But as we move away from the natural rights of individuals, we find that the law is 
nothing more than the formalization of our particular preferences at a particular 
point in time. We create laws to achieve or maintain particular economic condi-
tions, to manage and allocate risk, to create a specific aesthetic, or to protect, 
preserve, or restore particular natural resources that otherwise possess no inher-
ent rights ... my position is that we protect these landscapes, plants, animals, 
and ecological systems because we choose to do so, not because they are granted 
rights under our ‘rule of law.’’30
Let us now turn back to the major question: how to define the legal content of 
sustainable development? At this point it is worth presenting some views of 
distinguished authors: 
‘As such, it is difficult, at present, to describe sustainable development as a bind-
ing international principle at the traditional sense ... Rather, sustainable devel-
opment, in international law, can be understood through a combination of two 
complementary approaches. First, it can be seen as an emerging area of interna-
tional law in its own right. … a corpus of international legal principles and treaties 
which address the areas of intersection between international economic law, 
international environmental law and international social law aiming toward devel-
opment that can last. Procedural and substantive norms and instrument, which 
help to balance or reconcile these fields, form a part of this body of international 
law and play a role in its implementation. And secondly, sustainable development 
may also serve as a different type of norm in its own rights, one that facilitates 
and requires a balance and reconciliation between conflicting legal norms relating 
to environmental protection, social justice and economic growth.’31
30  LONG, Jerrold A.: Realizing the abstraction: using today’s law to reach tomorrow’s sustainability, Idaho 
Law Review 2010, vol. 46, p. 349-350.
31  CORDONNIER SEGGER, Marie-Claire and KHAFLAN, Ashfaq: Sustainable Development Law – Princi-
ples, practices and prospects, Oxford Univ. Press 2004, p. 46-47.
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Thus, the potential regulatory area of sustainable development law is ever so 
complex, its borderlines are indefinite, and if we wish to find some legal clar-
ity, then our best choice must be environmental law. It is not very likely that we 
may get a clear and uniform answer on the question of what we mean under 
sustainable development law. European environmental law specialists aim for 
the recognition of the concept:32 
‘Being perhaps more a guideline to political action than a normative-legal 
concept, the political importance of the concept ’sustainable development’ cannot 
be underestimated....’
Thus we are not able – and most probably we should not try – to give a concrete 
legal definition of sustainable development, instead we may try to come closer, 
even with serious limitations. As a consequence, sustainable development is 
somewhat a guidance, an objective, a theoretical fundament, we should strive 
for,33 and less a legal requisite. Of course, there are many possible legal conse-
quences, in case politics is willing to implement such requirements. The major 
problem here is that we cannot really discern the respective political will, 
therefore the enigmatic phrasing is still capable of covering the legally binding 
obligations in a penumbra of mystery. If there is in fact any legal requirement, it 
is still too vague, and may only be implemented indirectly, via a more concrete, 
direct set of targets. This is finding is substantiated by the examples presented 
in our title on EU legislation and the seemingly legal definition of sustainable 
development.34
The complexity of the concept of sustainable development – as evidenced 
by our excursions into international law and European integration – includ-
ing factors of development, poverty, social security, public health, indigenous 
people, natural resources, environmental protection, water, etc. makes it impos-
sible to set up a consistent system. 
‘Sustainable development is not a static concept ... hence inherently varies ratione 
temporis... The contents of sustainable development thus vary ratione personae. 
They also vary ratione materiae.’35
32  JANS, Jan H. – VEDDER, Hans H.B.: European Environmental Law, After Lisbon, 4th Edition, Europa 
Law Publishing, 2012, p. 8.
33  Similarly to the wording enshrined in international law, see for example: ‘Striving at a lasting improve-
ment and protection of Danube River and of the waters within its catchment area’ – Convention on 
Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River (Danube River Protection 
Convention), Sofia, 1994 www.icpdr.org.
34  See Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2493/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 
November 2000 on measures to promote the full integration of the environmental dimension in the 
development process of developing countries, Official Journal L 288 , 15/11/2000 p. 1-5.
35  BARRAL. Virginie: Sustainable Development in International Law: Nature and Operation of an Evolu-
tive Legal Norm, The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 23. no. 2, 2012, p. 382.
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Indeed, there are several variations, based on the above mentioned three factors. 
As regards the variations over time, the best approach is to look at the changes 
in wording in EU policies in response to the 2008 crisis, replacing sustainable 
development with the notion of sustainable growth. As far as the personal factor 
is concerned, the lawyer or the economist, the sociologist or the engineer may 
have completely different vision of the same concept. Moreover, environmental 
and development texts do not necessarily use the same language.
We may also add that besides the different factors listed above, at least 
two further elements must be identified, namely the variations according to 
geographical area (ratione territorii) or the variations related to the level of devel-
opment (ratione progressionis). As regards these two variations it is safe to say 
that the understanding of developing and developed countries is usually diffe-
rent. Contextual changes and the variations of the extent, scope or coverage of 
the problem are constant, and this may also be considered the differentia specifica 
of the subject.
Embarking upon the assessment of the content of the term, several authors 
share a similar understanding, claiming36 that there are four elements of 
sustainable development: environmental integration, intergenerational and 
intragenerational equity and sustainable use – although the latter is much rather 
a tautology than a particular element. Cordonnier-Segger and Khaflan in their 
foundational work on sustainability law37 discuss the main principles of interna-
tional legal documents related to sustainable development in separate chapter, 
as follows:
?? the principle of integration, as well as the correlation, coherence of social, 
material and environmental objectives;
?? the sustainable use of natural resources as the obligation of the state;
?? common heritage of mankind;
?? equity and eradication of poverty;




Thus, the vision of legal science and the picture presented by international docu-
ments is very similar with some minor variations. At the end of this chapter, we 
provide a summary of lessons learnt.
Consequently, it is expedient to return to the concurrent meanings of 
sustainability and sustainable development, summarized by Bosselmann in a 
simple and clear form, which comes closest to our perception of the concept: 
36  DURÁN, Gracia Marin and MORGERA, Elisa: Environmental Integration in the EU’s External Rela-
tions, Hart Publishing, 2012, p. 41-41.
37  CORDONNIER SEGGER, Marie-Claire and KHAFLAN, Ashfaq: Sustainable Development Law – Princi-
ples, practices and prospects, Oxford Univ. Press 2004, p. 103-166.
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‘The concept of sustainable development owes its meaning and legal status to 
the principle of sustainability... This characterization has three important implica-
tions for the sustainability discourse. The first is that sustainability is separate 
from sustainable development. Both terms are often used interchangeably, but 
needs to be kept separated from each other. The second implication ... the former 
is grounder in the latter.... The third implication is that sustainability is the most 
fundamental of environmental principles...
The conceptual argument is that the principle of sustainability has been in 
existence for centuries with never any other object than the natural resource base. 
... This core of sustainability cannot be different from ’sustainable’ in the context 
of ’development’. The fact that social and material aspects are included in the 
concept of ’sustainable development’ does, therefore, not require any deviation 
from the ecological core. On the contrary, only because of this core is it possible 
to relate the social and business components of sustainable development to a 
central point of reference. As a consequence, the entire concept becomes oper-
able: development is sustainable if it tends to preserve the integrity and continued 
existence of ecological systems; it is unsustainable if it tends to do otherwise.’38
This approach relativizes the entire sustainable development-sustainability 
dilemma, stating that there is no reason to differentiate the two terms, since 
they are nothing more than the two sides of the same problem from two interre-
lated perspectives. Furthermore, the most important lesson learnt is that ecology 
or environment is the core element of the concept of sustainable development. 
As a result, we must consider environmental law as the core element of sustain-
able development legislation.
The essence of sustainable development may be summarized in simple way 
(which we shall use in order to provide a solid basis for the relevant discussion): 
‘A synthesis of these core documents show that the meaning of ’sustainable 
development’ can be reduced to the combination of two principles that can be 
seen as axiomatic to understanding sustainable development: intergenerational 
and intragenerational equity. ... Development will be sustainable only when both 
intergenerational (environmental protection) and intragenerational (fair economic 
and social development) equity are granted, and this is to be achieved through 
their integration.’39
The same author has a formula for the equation:
Sustainable development = (Intergenerational Equity + Intragenerational Equity)
x Integration
38  BOSSELMANN, Klaus: The Principle of Sustainability (Transfomring Law and Governance), Ashgate, 
2008, see first p. 62, then p. 53.
39  BARRAL, Virginie: Sustainable Development in International Law: Nature and Operation of an Evolu-
tive Legal Norm, The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 23. no. 2, 2012, p. 380.
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We must not forget that overemphasizing the economic side (stressing rules of 
materialistic profit-seeking, as is the case today) leads to a dead-end, and may 
easily leave sustainability behind. A Jesuit economist from Leuven Catholic 
University underlined40 that the creator of the current business order is neither 
an ’invisible hand’, nor the price-mechanism of the market, but man. Business 
is not governed by blind mechanisms, but by man. That is the reason why – so 
Muzslay – while the laws of the physical world mean absolute force, the laws 
of business are only relative. Consequently, the laws of business may be trans-
formed to accommodate a more sustainable direction, if the necessary motiva-
tion is available within all levels of governance.41
Existing misunderstandings, divergent interpretations, covert contexts – 
most of which are intentional or at least knowingly developed – may lead to a 
change of emphasis in the use of words by the iconic figure of sustainable devel-
opment. Meadows claims:42 
‘In my opinion this (sustainable development – the authors) is an oxymoron, a 
term with nonsense meaning. To many people, ‘development’ seems to imply that 
we can simply keep going as we have for the last 100 years, depleting resources 
on a large scale and polluting heavily. And adding some kind of ‘sustainabil-
ity’ makes the detrimental effects of our model of development go away. I am 
more interested in the term ‘resilience.’ This concept is about how to structure a 
company or a city or a country so that it can continue to function quite well even 
in the face of major shocks. Implementing policies that give you resilience tends 
to make the system more sustainable.’ 
Does this mean that the era of sustainable development has come to an end 
before it could really begin? We do not think so, and we shall come back to this 
below to present our view of this process of transformation.
In summary, it is worth taking a look at the language of regulation. Is there 
any piece of legislation willing to determine the meaning of sustainable develop-
40  Muzslay István: Gazdaság és erkölcs, http://www.ppek.hu/k120.htm, In Belgium he works under the 
name István Muselay.
41  Muzslay employs the terms ’economy’, ’economic’, but in the present book we will use the terms 
‘business’ or ‘material’ development instead, since these terms give rise to misunderstings between 
economists and other social scientists. In modern economics, the demarcation between’economy’ 
and’society’ is very problematic. In the terminology of economics, the economy is not a sphere of the 
social structure. Every social interaction (’economic’ or ’other’) may have economical aspects, in case the 
parties make rational decisions, if they see consider their relationships as an exchange – they transfer 
something and they receive something else in exchange. These rational exchanges do not always exhibit 
material, financial or business aspects – the way other branches of science would implicitly require from 
economics.
42  MEADOWS, Denis: http://www.siemens.com/innovation/apps/pof_microsite/_pof-spring-2010/_html_
en/prof-dennis-meadows.html.
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ment, and does it provide us with a better solution? For example, an EU legal 
definition from 200043 presented above reads: 
‘Article 2
For the purposes of this Regulation:
‘sustainable development’ means the improvement of the standard of living and 
welfare of the relevant populations within the limits of the capacity of the ecosys-
tems by maintaining natural assets and their biological diversity for the benefit of 
present and future generations.’
Although this seems to be a legal definition, in practice this wording does not 
provide us with the necessary basis for arriving at direct regulatory or imple-
mentative conclusions, to give flesh to the bones of the concept. One thing is 
certain: sustainable development may be defined by law and this definition puts 
ecology in its centre. Thus, our conclusion can be that it is closely related to 
environmental law. Furthermore, the Regulation presents a clear picture, cover-
ing standard of living and welfare as the economic element, present and future 
generations as the social component, requiring that these aspects also accom-
modate the capacity of the ecosystem. We cannot expect anything more from 
legislation.
 2 Resilience?
One of the main protagonists of the Club of Rome, an author of 
The Limits to Growth, Denis Meadows spoke about resilience in several recent 
meetings, claiming: ‘This concept is about how to structure a company or a city 
or a country so that it can continue to function quite well even in the face of 
major shocks.’44
The IUCN Draft Covenant in its Article 9 also covers resilience. Actually, 
this article is relatively new in the Draft Covenant, inserted only in the fourth 
edition in 2010 – while the third edition in 2004 did not contain this expres-
sion, but at this time Article 9 enshrined ‘eradication of poverty’ –, stating: ‘The 
capacity of natural systems and human communities to withstand and recover 
from environmental disturbances and stresses is limited, and shall be sustained 
or restored as fully as possible.’ Turning to the commentaries on the IUCN 
Draft,45 we do not learn much more, at least there is no mention made of any 
43  Regulation (EC) No 2493/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 November 2000 on 
measures to promote the full integration of the environmental dimension in the development process of 
developing countries, Official Journal L 288 , 15/11/2000 p. 1-5.
44  http://www.siemens.com/innovation/apps/pof_microsite/_pof-spring-2010/_html_en/prof-dennis-
meadows.html.
45  ‘Nonlinear (accelerating or abrupt) changes have been previously identified by a number of individual 
studies of ecosystems. The Millennium Assessment concluded that ecosystem changes are increas-
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legal conditions or consequences. Article 9 and the commentaries attached to it 
both refer to a phenomenon, an attribute of natural or social systems. Meadows, 
by contrast, considers resilience a management tool, something worth using. If 
resilience is so important, that even the IUCN added resilience as a fundamen-
tal principle to its environment and development draft; if it is as important as 
prevention, precaution, proportionality, eradication of poverty, then we also have 
to consider this principle (?), concept (?), tool (?), method (?) a bit more carefully.
Again, our major question here, besides the content of the concept itself, 
is whether any legal consequences may flow from resilience. And even more 
importantly: what is the relationship between resilience and sustainability? Does 
it mean that sustainability is not workable, has it been overused in too many 
aspects by too many actors – sustainable banking, sustainable financing etc. -, 
without achieving any result, and thus it is time to change the wording to some-
thing similar but new? Shall we solve the problem by rebooting the system as in 
the case of computer programs, when they do not work properly? Of course, we 
should first try to define the concept, in order to understand its purpose.
In its introductory paper, the Resilience Center of the Stockholm Univer-
sity46 states: 
‘Resilience is the capacity of a system, be it an individual, a forest, a city or an 
economy, to deal with change and continue to develop. It is about the capacity 
to use shocks and disturbances like a financial crisis or climate change to spur 
renewal and innovative thinking. Resilience thinking embraces learning, diversity 
and above all the belief that humans and nature are strongly coupled to the point 
that they should be conceived of as one social-ecological system.’ 
The original definition is thus imported from ecology. 
The ‘mother’ of resilience in social sciences is the Nobel-prize winner 
economist, Elinor Ostrom, who – together with her husband, Vincent – in their 
oeuvre47 focus on sustainability of socio-ecological systems (SES). This science 
aims at the integrated study of ecological, technological, social, economic and 
political factors including with their interrelationship, with the objective of 
understanding whether the users of resources invest enough time and energy 
into their adaptation to changing circumstances, what is generally called ‘the 
tragedy of commons’. According to the researchers, the interaction between indi-
ing the likelihood of nonlinear changes in ecosystems. Examples of such changes include disease 
emergence, abrupt alterations in water quality, the creation of ‘dead zones’ in coastal waters, the collapse 
of fisheries, and shifts in regional climate. Because of the danger of irreversible, sudden changes, the 
resilience of natural systems and the human communities that depend upon them must be a priority.’.
46  What is resilience? An introduction to social-ecological research, see: http://www.stockholmresilience.
org/download/18.5ea7abe0139d0dada521ac/resilience_summary_lowX.pdf.
47  This opus has been discussed by many authors, e.g.: TOONEN, Theo: Resilience in Public Administra-
tion: The Work of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom from a Public Administration Perspective, Public Admin-
istration Review, Volume 70, Issue 2, March/April 2010, pp. 193-202.
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viduals and their environment shall determine whether we safeguard or exploit 
our natural resources. The SES system is also a manifestation of polycentricism, 
since the governance system is formulated as the network of government and 
non-governmental organs, their associations and companionships.
Ostrom and others write:48 
‘What is a SES? A SES is an ecological system intricately linked with and affected 
by one or more social systems. An ecological system can loosely be defined as 
an interdependent system of organisms or biological units. ... Broadly speaking, 
social systems can be thought of as interdependent systems of organisms. Thus, 
both social and ecological systems contain units that interact interdependently 
and each may contain interactive subsystems as well. We use the term ’SES’ 
to refer to the subset of social systems in which some of the interdependent 
relationships among humans are mediated through interactions with biophysical 
and non-human biological units. A simple example is when one fisher’s activities 
change the outcomes of another fisher’s activities through the interacting biophys-
ical and non-human biological units that constitute the dynamic, living fish stock. 
... When social and ecological systems are so linked, the overall SES is a complex, 
adaptive system involving multiple subsystems, as well as being embedded in 
multiple larger systems.’
There is a whole new field of science emerging in connection with the social 
responses to the clear signals of unsustainability. One major characteristic 
of these scientific reactions is polycentrism, which supports strengthening 
the adaptive capacity of the different systems. Ostrom provides the complete 
picture49: 
‘Many of the capabilities of a parallel adaptive system are retained in a polycentric 
governance system while obtaining some of the protections of a larger system. 
By polycentric, I mean a system where citizens are able to organize not just one 
but multiple governing authorities at differing scales (see V Ostrom et al 1961; 
V Ostrom 1987, 1991, 1997). Each unit may exercise considerable independence 
to make and enforce rules within a circumscribed scope of authority for a speci-
fied geographical area. In a polycentric system, some units are general-purpose 
governments, whereas others may be highly specialized (McGinnis 1999a,b,c). 
Self-organized resource governance systems, in such a system, may be special 
districts, private associations, or parts of a local government. These are nested in 
several levels of general-purpose governments that also provide civil equity as well 
as criminal courts. ...
48  ANDERIES, John M., JANSSEN, Marco A., and OSTROM, Elinor: A Framework to Analyze the Robust-
ness of Soc ial-ecological Systems from an Institutional Perspective, Ecology and Society, 2004, vol. 9 
no. 1, Article 18 http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss1/art18.
49  OSTROM, Elinor: Coping with tragedies of the commons, Annual Review of Political Science 1999. vol. 
2, available at www.annualreviews.org, p. 528.
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In a polycentric system, the users of each common-pool resource would have 
authority to make at least some of the rules related to the use of that particular 
resource. ...
Polycentric systems are themselves complex adaptive systems without one 
dominating central authority.’
Resilience and polycentric systems or the SES system mean more or less similar 
things. See, for example again on resilience50: 
‘The ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, accom-
modate, or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient 
manner, including through ensuring the preservation, restoration, or improvement 
of its essential basic structures and functions.’
Resilience is futher elaborated in this recent comprehensive study:51 
‘Resilience, a concept fundamentally concerned with how a system, community, 
or individual can deal with disturbance and surprise, ... Resilience perspectives 
can be used as an approach for understanding the dynamics of human environ-
mental systems and how they respond to a range of different perturbations ... For 
social-ecological systems (examined as a set of interactions between people and 
the ecosystems they depend on), resilience involves three properties: the amount 
of change a system can undergo and retain the same structure and functions; the 
degree to which it can reorganize; and the degree to which it can build capacity 
to learn and adapt (Folke, 2006). Resilience can also be considered a dynamic 
process linked to human agency, as expressed in the ability to deal with hazards 
or disturbance, to engage with uncertainty and future changes, to adapt, cope, 
learn, and innovate, and to develop leadership capacity (Bohle et al., 2009; Obrist 
et al., 2010). Resilience approaches offer four key contributions for living with 
extremes: first, in providing a holistic framework to evaluate hazards in coupled 
social-ecological systems; second, in putting emphasis on the capacities to deal 
with hazard or disturbance; third, in helping to explore options for dealing with 
uncertainty and future changes; and fourth, in identifying enabling factors to 
create proactive responses (Berkes, 2007; Obrist et al., 2010)....
Recent work on resilience and governance has focused on communication of 
science between actors and depth of inclusiveness in decision-making as key 
determinants of the character of resilience. In support of these approaches it is 
50  O’BRIEN, Karen (Norway), PELLING, Mark (UK), PATWARDHAN, Anand (India): Managing the 
Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation Special Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 8. Toward a Sustainable and Resilient Future, Coordinat-
ing Lead Authors: Karen O’Brien (Norway), Mark Pelling (UK), Anand Patwardhan (India): Cambridge 
University Press Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107607804 © Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change 2012, p. 563.
51  Ibid. p. 453.
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argued that inclusive governance facilitates better flexibility and provides addi-
tional benefit from the decentralization of power. ...’
Of course, there are several other papers on this topic. Most of them were issued 
recently, since this area of research is relatively new – at least in the field of 
social sciences. The best and easisest synopsis would be to state in summary, 
that the essence of resilience is the ability to adapt ourselves to different crisis 
situations, or the ability to react in a flexible way. This general definition covers 
several components, such as the system approach, precaution, risk manage-
ment, adaptation, flexibility, cooperation, involvement of the public, subsidiarity, 
integration, complexity, adaptation, adaptation, adaptation ... New concepts also 
feature in the notion of resilience, such as polycentrism, meaning diversity in 
the given context. These are all familiar terms, yet the major novelty is that they 
appear in a certain context and relationship, acquiring a slightly different char-
acter in the process.
Is resilience different from sustainability? Do they have opposite meanings 
or even parallel issues, probably supplementary elements? Or is resilience an 
instrument of sustainability? Or is it perhaps that case that we are simply replac-
ing the definition of sustainable development with a new, less commonplace 
concept? There is no simple answer. Sustainable development, as an objective – 
with primarily ecology at its heart instead of material development or economic 
growth – may well be used, but we are far from achieving it. Resilience, for its 
part, may be considered an implementation method or variety of sustainable 
development, probably the most important from the set of instruments, since its 
objective is something we tend to forget or disregard. Namely, to be prepared for 
the unexpected, rendering resilience to be the science or art of managing such 
situations.
A fine example for such situations is climate change. We can no longer 
avoid facing the issues of climate change, however, due to the lack of global 
agreement and also the physical conditions of the atmosphere, the most viable 
variation today is to accommodate ourselves to the actual situation and develop 
the ability and modality of adaptation. The EU has an entire website52 dedicated 
to this topic. There is ‘An EU strategy on adaptation to climate change – Council 
Conclusions’,53 mentioning in point 
‘1. RECALLS that the EU objective of keeping the global mean surface temperature 
increase below 2°C compared with pre-industrial levels requires urgent and ambi-
tious mitigation action by the global community; UNDERLINES that adaptation is 
a necessary and unavoidable complement to mitigation;’,
taking the followings as facts:
‘6. EMPHASISES the need for increased action across all levels and by all rele-
vant actors in order to address adaptation to climate change in the most effective 
52  http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/adaptation/documentation_en.htm.
53  Council of the European Union, Brussels, 18 June 2013 11151/13.
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way; UNDERLINES that the impacts of climate change such as floods, droughts, 
heat waves, sea level rise and erosion, can vary considerably between territories 
and localities across Europe and that therefore most adaptation measures would 
need to be taken at national, regional and local level, as well as at cross-border 
level, and should be based on the best available knowledge and practices and the 
specific circumstances of the Member States;’
Therefore, the best solution is to set up adaptation strategies. Accordingly, such 
strategies shall not hinge on either sustainable development or resilience, but 
much rather: both sustainable development and resilience.
There are several legal principles, and instruments which may well be 
included in the toolbox of resilience, for the complex adaptive system requires 
complex institutional system as well. These instruments and principles are not 
much different from the set of tools of sustainable development, it is only their 
emphasis that may be different.
The Hungarian economist, Sándor Kerekes, described the characteristics 
of a resilient society.54 ’The resilient, adaptive, and therefore sustainable socio-
economic system may be characterized by the following:
?? maintaining and safeguarding diversity (biological, landscape, economics 
and social diversity),
?? the limitation of the man-made ‘control’ over ecological diversity,
?? the honour of modularity (communicating systems may better tolerate 
shocks),
?? learning, and the recognition of and emphasis on the importance of social 
networks and locally designed rules.’
In some way or another, all of the above elements appear in the variety of views 
on this subject. This renders our endeavours towards finding a proper solu-
tion extremely difficult, since in the framework of the current socio-economic 
reality the majority of social and business regulatory systems do not tend in this 
direction. Thus, while we argue for decentralization, centralization is the reality; 
while we argue for the interests of diversity, in many aspects uniformity is the 
answer; while the activity of social networks is essential, they have less and less 
support, etc.
We may agree with van Rijswick that it is indispensable to put the emphasis 
on environmental legislation:55 
‘Achieving a sustainable society also assumes a resilient society that can cope with 
new environmental problems and risks and is able to adapt to new circumstances. 
A changing environment, changing political conceptions with respect to or relating 
54  KEREKES Sándor: Fenntarthatóság és társadalmi felelősség – A globalizálódó világ megoldatlan prob-
lémái, Magyar Bioetikai Szemle, 2011. 1. p. 10.
55  RIJSWICK van, Helena F.M.W.: The Road to Sustainability: How Environmental Law Can Deal with 
Complexity and Flexibility, Utrecht Law Review, Volume 8, Issue 3 (November) 2012, point 7.
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to administrative expenses and regulatory pressure, or new scientific discoveries 
which highlight the deficiencies of older instruments and principles, all call for the 
adjustment and modernization of organizational forms, instruments and princi-
ples which are central to environmental law. 
‘Resilience’ is concerned with the capacity of the legal system and society to 
adapt to changing circumstances and the way in which uncertainties are dealt 
with. This ability to adapt is especially important in environmental law since the 
use of the environment and its natural resources requires long-term policies. In 
environmental law it is therefore necessary to take into account any uncertain-
ties regarding future developments such as those related to the effects of climate 
change. In turn, this requires flexibility on the part of the legal system and in 
standard setting. However, this immediately raises the question of how such a 
requirement of flexibility can be reconciled with the requirements of legitimacy 
and legality. The aim is to achieve a balance between flexibility and legal certainty 
in order to facilitate adaptive governance that safeguards legitimacy. Furthermore, 
the question arises how to cope with complexity in legal and societal issues.’
Below, as an illustration, we provide a ‘shopping list’ of those legal instruments, 
which may serve resilience or polycentrism in a wider context. In short, these 
elements best fit the idea of the SES:






?? human rights and pubic participation (which may both be treated as basic 
postulates of the system);




?? forming associations, and
?? other forms of cooperation,
?? diversity of civil society;
C) legal instruments
?? different forms of environmental assessment (EIA, SEA),
?? risk assessment and management,
?? proper discretion,
?? cooperative instruments (such as contractual relations),
?? incentives (not restricted to market incentives),
?? control – monitoring – feed-back,
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?? extensive and constant supervision of the implementation of decisions, with 
the need for adjusting the same,
?? complex, multi-polar systems.
 3 Some Conclusions
In the previous chapters we covered several aspects of interna-
tional and European law, including ethical considerations. In the present short 
survey we presented the most important sources of and ideas on sustainable 
development with all their possible implications – all in a nutshell. We arrived at 
the conclusion that sustainable development law cannot be considered a self-
evident concept, with a definite meaning and clear-cut instruments. It is much 
rather a general concept, which can and should exert an influence on different 
policy fields. Not only is it impossible to provide a legal definition of the con-
cept, references to sustainable development also lack direct legal consequences. 
Indeed, even the wording of the concept is in flux – sustainable growth, green 
economy, etc. Moreover, the components of the theory may also be presented in 
different variations, covering several issues ranging from the environment to 
poverty, from peace to development, from solidarity to security. None of these 
characteristics serve legal certainty or legality, but all components have some 
normative nature with a diverse set of respective enforcement means and meth-
ods.
It would be impossible to have several equally important priorities from 
among the major components of sustainable development. Thus, it is best 
to focus on the original source of the idea of sustainability – that is the envi-
ronmental, ecological aspect. We are convinced that there is no such thing as 
‘neutral’ sustainability. It is not necessarily a manifestation of the so called 
‘strong sustainability’56 vision, but it is important to define it as a priority.
Finally, we try to provide a selection of those components, which may actu-
ally have legal consequences and at the same time also serve sustainable devel-
opment (for example, peaceful settlement of disputes – mentioned by the UN 
expert group in our previous chapters – is an important element of sustainable 
development, but it does not particularly characterize the subject, but belongs 
rather to the general toolbox of international law). These elements are not 
special to international issues (although, admittedly, the concept of ’common 
but differentiated responsibilities’ is a sustainable development instrument of 
international law, but it was construed for the interests of international coopera-
56  For a simple explanation it is best to go online, where we may find complex and simple answers, such 
as: ‘To remain and grow, natural capital needs to be maintained, as the functions it performs can not be 
duplicated by manufactured capital. In the Strong sustainability model, the environment and natural 
resources form the all-embracing foundation for society and its institutions, with the economy as one 
subset of society.’ Available at http://www.swedesd.se/what-we-do/education-for-strong-sustainability-
and-agency-essa/strong-sustainability.
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tion). We shall now turn to those instruments and components, which are indis-
pensable for sustainable development, and – as a consequence of our previous 
choice of focus – also have environmental protection as their central attribute. 
In the following we present an outline of the basic components – or a strict 
minimum – of all sustainable development schemes. As such, these elements 
constitute the immanent essentials of the concept.
Rights of future generations
The rights of future generations or intergenerational equity. According to 
current trends, this concept does not have a special set of institutions of its own. 
Therefore, it would be expedient to attach to it the right to environment or in other 
words to translate this equity into the language of environmental human rights. 
This relationship has already been mentioned in several documents, both in the 
field of equity and environmental rights. A recent example is an – unfortunately 
unsuccessful – commission proposal within the Council of Europe:57 
‘A. Draft recommendation ... 9. Bearing in mind that society as a whole and each 
individual in particular must pass on a healthy and viable environment to future 
generations, in accordance with the principle of solidarity between generations, 
the Assembly invites the governments of member states to:..’
Intragenerational equity
This is coupled with intragenerational equity, i.e. the rights of current genera-
tions, with a clear link to the right to environment issue. At this point it is worth 
introducing an important cornerstone of the international legal development 
of the concept of sustainable development. The International Court of Justice 
rendered its judgment in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) 
case on 25 September 199758 and discussed the concept of sustainable develop-
ment in paragraph 140 of the judgment. Judge Weeramantry’s opinion attached 
to the judgment is even more widely known than the judgment itself. Herein 
he describes sustainable development as the right of people to the furtherance 
of their happiness and welfare, which is, at the same time, counterbalanced by 
the right to the protection and preservation of the environment. According to 
Judge Weeramantry, the balance between the two opposing principles is created 
by sustainable development.59 The recognition of this concept is also apparent 
from the literature following the judgment. For example, in the work of Patricia 
Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell entitled International Law and the 
57  Doc. 12003 Parliamentary Assembly, 11 September 2009, Drafting an additional protocol to the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights concerning the right to a healthy environment, Report Doc. 11729, 
Reference 3497 of 28 November 2008, Draft recommendation adopted unanimously by the committee 
on 4 September 2009.
58  Case concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia). judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, 
pp. 7-84.
59  See the Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry, p. 92.
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Environment, the authors claim that the right to sustainable development creates 
the balance in the conflict of the human right concerning environmental protec-
tion and the right to economic development.60
Public participation
Public participation is also fundamental, together with all of its three major 
pillars (access to information, participation in decision-making and access to 
justice). Stemming from the idea of environmental democracy, this principle 
also covers environmental justice and provides a better chance for the imple-
mentation of generational equity. Article 1 of the Aarhus Convention61 reads: 
‘Objective – In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every person 
of present and future generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her 
health and well-being, each Party shall guarantee the rights of access to informa-
tion, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmen-
tal matters in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.’62
Cooperation
Cooperation or cooperative instruments play a primary role in all levels, 
either in the form of international cooperation or stakeholder cooperation, etc., 
constituting an additional element of public participation. Cooperation forms 
part of the general provisions of all international conventions related to sustain-
able development or environmental protection. The IUCN Draft63 has a full Part 
– Part VIII. – dedicated to implementation and cooperation. Indeed, most obliga-
tions related to the achievement of sustainable development necessitate coop-
eration – suffice to mention the common heritage of mankind, shared natural 
resources, common and differentiated responsibilities, eradicating poverty, etc.
Integration
Integration is a summary and the institutionalization of sustainability, 
providing a simplified or handy version of the major contents of sustainable 
development. Its main objective is to manage social, material, financial and 
environmental interests in one system, instead of considering them as separate 
issues. In its Gabčikovo-Nagymaros judgment,64 the ICJ emphasized:
60  Birnie, Patricia – Boyle, Alan – Redgwell, Catherine: International Law and the Environment. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 115.
61  Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, done at Aarhus, Denmark, on 25 June 1998, available at http://www.unece.org/
fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf.
62  The concept of environmental democracy was discussed in detail in ’Environmental Democracy’ (ed. by: 
BÁNDI, Gyula), Europa Law Publishing, 2014.
63  Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development Fourth Edition: Updated Text, 2010 
IUCN.
64  ICJ 25 September, 1997, Official citation: Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary-Slovakia), Judgment, 
1.C. J. Reports 1997, p.7, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/7375.pdf.
144
sustainability, law and public choice
 ‘140. ... Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other reasons, 
constantly interfered with nature. In the past, this was often done without consid-
eration of the effects upon the environment. Owing to new scientific insights and 
to a growing awareness of the risks for mankind – for present and future genera-
tions – of pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, 
new norms and standards have been developed, set forth in a great number of 
instruments during the last two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into 
consideration, and such new standards given proper weight, not only when States 
contemplate new activities but also when continuing with activities begun in the 
past. This need to reconcile economic development with protection of the envi-
ronment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development.’ 
There are many well-know instruments serving integration, among others the 
environmental impact assessment, strategic environmental assessment, or the 
work of the different sustainable development councils or committees operating 
in most countries.
Integration and sustainable development are the two sides of the same coin. Usually 
three basic elements are identified which must cooperate but which are still 
separate from each other – environment, society and business. However, it is 
essential for these dimensions to serve a common strategy or action in light 
of their interrelatedness. The essence of integration is to ensure the necessary 
representation for the environment, so that it has some chance in the reconcili-
ation process. From the point of view of sustainable development, integration 
is a real challenge for legislation, as clearly stated in the above judgment and in 
related assessments.65 Integration may be considered a practical path to imple-
ment sustainable development.
The precautionary principle
The precautionary principle covers among others prevention and risk assess-
ment. It has a substantial moral content, covering an extended responsibility for 
different conducts. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration66 covers possible practical 
solutions, and provides the principle with a global character: ‘In order to protect 
the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postpon-
ing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.’ The CJEU 
65  See, for example Sands, who underlines that the central element of sustainable development is integra-
tion SANDS, Philippe: The ‘Greening’ of International Law: Emerging Principles and Rules, Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies: Vol. 1: Issue 2, 1994, pp. 302-303. Available at: http://www.repository.
law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol1/iss2/2.
66  UNCED conference, 3-14 June, 1992. Rio de Janeiró, http://www.nfft.hu/dynamic/Rio_Decl_m.pdf.
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(ECJ) rendered several important judgments67 in order to clarify the content of 
the principle, among others introducing the concept of ‘scientific uncertainty’.
Subsidiarity
Finally, we must mention subsidiarity, which covers not only the effective 
distribution of competences and duties, but also the involvement of different 
institutional systems – state and local governments, social organs, NGOs, busi-
nesses, churches, small communities, etc. ‘Subsidiarity is therefore a somewhat 
paradoxical principle. It limits the state, yet empowers and justifies it. It limits 
intervention, yet requires it. It expresses both a positive and a negative vision 
of the role of the state with respect to society and the individual.’68 The same 
author later provides the following summary: ‘It is not limited to the market and 
to maximizing the sphere of rational economic self-interest; nor is it directed 
merely to fostering individual self-realization through a rich and diverse ‘civil 
society’; nor yet can it be exhausted by application to legislative or democratic 
processes in the political sphere. It comprehends all of these, as separate aspects 
of a common good, the sum total of the conditions necessary for individual 
human flourishing. In this way subsidiarity can be regarded as a principle of 
distribution of the diverse social functions that together make up the common 
good.’69
67  Case N. 180/96, United Kingdom vs. Commission, which was also supported by the Council, May 5, 
1998, Reports of Cases 1998 I-02265 or First Instance Court, T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA vs. The 
Commission (2002), E.C.R. II-3305, September 11, 2001, or First Instance Court, joint cases T-74,76, 
83-85,132,137 & 141/00, Artegodan GmbH and others vs. The Commission, November 26, 2002. E.C.R. 
II-4945., etc.
68  CAROZZA, Paolo G.: Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, The 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 97, 2003, p. 44.
69  CAROZZA op. cit. 45-46.
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 1 Introductory Remarks
The present and the following chapter examine compliance and 
obedience issues: in what way do we expect the principle of sustainable develop-
ment to affect the actions of the nations (more precisely of their governments)? 
In the previous chapters of the book we demonstrated that the principle of 
sustainable development appears in international law not as a binding legal term 
but only as an ‘objective’, a ‘goal’. On the other hand, there are clear examples 
when international treaties, agreements between nations define the meaning of 
the different elements of the definition of sustainability. This is in particular the 
case in the field of international environmental law or for example in the case of 
public participation (Aarhus Convention).1 But even in these ‘hard law cases’ the 
classical critics of international law voice their concerns: international law lacks 
the legal ’teeth’ to enforce its provisions2; it is not really law, because its rules 
are not enforced by sovereign coercion. Under such conditions, compliance even 
with clear requirements is expected to be sporadic. These are the well-known 
arguments of the realist (Machiavellian, Austinian) view of international law.3 
According to this perspective, nations only follow international law because 
it serves their self-interest, or there exists some form of external enforcement 
mechanism – for example reprisals. At the same time the opposing radical view, 
the so-called optimistic theory claims that enforcement is not a real problem. 
As Henkin’s famous statement goes: ‘it is probably the case that almost all 
nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their 
obligations almost all of the time’.4 This school of thought denies the fact that 
realistic view has a clear and strong empirical basis. The general dominance of 
non-compliance can be simply a selection bias: the cases when nations violate 
the international law receive more publicity and consequently they seem to 
outnumber the cases of compliance.5 Contrary to these two classical theories, 
1  FRENCH, Duncan: Sustainable Development. in: Malgosia Fitzmaurice – David M. Ong – Panos 
Merkouris (eds.): Research Handbook on International Environmental Law. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2010, p. 56.
2  See HIRSCH, Philip – MØRCK JENSEN, Kurt et al.: National Interests and Transboundary Water Govern-
ance in the Mekong op. cit. 27.
3  Machivelli argued that ‘a prudent ruler cannot keep his word, nor should he, where such fidelity would 
damage him, and when the reasons that made him promise are no longer relevant.’ MACHIAVELLI, 
Niccolo: The Prince (Quentin Skinner and Russell Price, eds) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988, p. 61-62. For Austin’s theory see: AUSTIN. John: Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Posi-
tive Law. Vol. I. Fifth edition. London: John Murray, 1873.
4  HENKIN, Louis: How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York : Published for the Council on 
Foreign Relations by Columbia University Press, (1979) 2d ed. p. 47.
5  An interesting counter-argument to Henkin’s general compliance theory concentrates on the ’shallow-
ness’ of rules. Raustalia and Slaughter term the difference between a requirement defined in a rule and 
the actual conduct as deepness or shallowness of a rule. The deeper the regime, the greater the required 
change. The critics argue that ‘much of the evidence of high compliance with international law is merely 
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the present and the next chapters attempt to demonstrate that international law, 
as such, does not induce compliance, but the lack of sovereign does not induce 
breaches in every case where the nations’ short term interest would speak for 
breaching the law, the international treaties. The models presented here attempt 
demonstrate the difference between the effects of the particular rules under 
international law, answering the question: why do nations comply under some 
circumstances and violate rules in other cases?
We begin with the traditional law and economics analysis which analyses the 
problem of the nation’s choice in the international context. The decision makers 
in these models are the nations (more precisely the government) and the main 
effects influencing their behaviour originate from other nations, transnational 
politics, members of the ‘international society’).
According to the traditional law and economics view of enforcement, 
premised on Becker’s path-breaking article, compliance is influenced by three 
factors: (i) the compliance cost or the parties’ respective national benefit from 
the project, (ii) the probability of the sanction in case of breach, and (iii) the 
extent of the sanction. Imagine a nation planning a project which pollutes the 
environment, causing environmental losses. It will compare the national benefit 
resulting from the project with the probability and extent of ensuing sanctions. 
The national benefit, the compliance cost is the difference between the national 
cost and benefit resulting from the project if the project remains unsanctioned. 
If the national benefit is reduced or in case either the probability or the extent of 
the sanction rises, then the chance of accepting the project will decrease. (For 
the sake of simplicity, the term of compliance cost will be applied. The cost is 
the opportunity cost: a cost of foregoing the project equals the benefit which it 
would have yielded.)
In his famous work, Ellickson distinguishes among three types of control 
or enforcement mechanisms: first-, second- and third party control. (See Table 
1.) The actor imposing sanctions on himself in case of violating the rules is the 
first party controller. The self-control system arises from a person’s moral values 
rather than from external forces. As Ellickson emphasises, ‘the overall system 
of social control must depend vitally on achieving cooperation through self-
enforcement.’6 The typical form of second party control is the self-help, or the 
promisee-enforced contract. The partner conducts rewards and punishments. 
Third party control may take the form of spontaneous social forces, hierarchical 
organizations – non-governmental institutions, courts or the government.
indicative of the ‘shallowness’ of many international agreements and should not be generalized to more 
demanding cases’ RAUSTIALA, Kal and SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie: International Law, International 
Relations and Compliance,’ in CARLSNAES, Walter – RISSE, Thomas and SIMMONS, Beth A. (eds.), 
Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage Publications, Ltd., 2002, p. 543.
6  ELICKSOn, Robert: Order Without Law. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991, 126.
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Controller Rules Sanction Combined System
1. First party Control
Actor personal ethics self-sanction self-control
2. Second party Control
Person Acted Upon contracts personal self-help promisee enforced 
contracts
3. Third party Control
Social Forces norms vicarious self-help informal control




Government law state enforcement legal system
Table 1. Elements of a Comprehensive System of Social Control;  
Ellickson, Order Without Law 131
In the language of the traditional enforcement model, second and third party 
enforcements provide a range of potential sanctions against a norm-breaching 
action. First party enforcement reduces the compliance cost. According to this 
concept, the preferences of the actor will change, the national cost of the project 
(even where there is no sanction) increases, since the self-image of the actor as a 
norm-abiding entity is corrupted.
The first three subchapters analyse these enforcement mechanisms in the 
framework of international and European law. They present a model where 
international law is capable of changing the behaviour of nations, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the traditional form of (domestic third party) enforcement – 
through court – is far from effective in the international context.
The fourth subchapter concentrates on the ex ante choice made by nations: 
why do they accept the restrictions set forth under international law? It is worth 
recalling that the sustainability principle originates from two sources of inter-
national law: from treaties and from customary international law. The latter is 
independent from the nations’ acceptance; the nations are unable to avoid the 
consequences, sanctions ensuing from the breach of such norms. But treaties 
are contracts – nations are free to refuse participating in them.
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, the sustainability principle is an 
extremely open term comprising several (in some cases, conflicting) unclear 
elements. It is, at best, a very soft law term – even if there is recent jurispru-
dence clarifying some of its elements. The fifth subchapter deals with the prob-
lems of vagueness: why do the parties incorporate very vague standards into the 
treaties instead of employing clear rules?
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 1 First Party Enforcement
The first subchapter concentrates on the case of first party 
enforcement. Prior to embarking upon the analysis however, it is worth stress-
ing that the three forms of enforcement presented by Ellickson are ideal types. 
In reality, hybrid systems exist; the different controllers can work together in 
countless ways. The models presented in this subchapter (the subchapter con-
sists of four main theories of obedience: Franck’s legitimacy theory; Chayes and 
Chayes’ managerial theory; Koh’s transnational legal process theory; and the so-
called liberal theory – see for example Moravcsik, Slaughter) share the view that 
international law influences the behaviour of the nations through modifying 
their preferences, i.e. their view about their national interests. As mentioned in 
the first paragraphs of the chapter, this is the typical case of first party control: 
the rule changes the benefit drawn from an action. Nations comply because an 
action provides more benefit, even if external enforcement is very weak. The 
subchapter will not provide a full description of the models – this is available 
in the relevant literature. The main goal is much rather to present a law and 
economics view of these models. As will be presented, the models identify many 
factors behind the preference change that are consistent with the economic 
models: change in expectations, change in available information, cost-effective-
ness of obedience (ethical internalisation of the rules).
 1.1 Legitimacy Theory
Thomas Franck explicitly adapts7 the theory and terminology 
of Immanuel Kant, Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls to find the theoretical basis 
of the compliance effect of the international law: ‘in a community organized 
around rules, compliance is secured – to whatever degree it is – at least in part 
by the perception of a rule as legitimate by those to whom it is addressed’.8 One 
of his main questions is why a country with great economic and military power 
(i.e. without any real threat of punishment) should choose to ‘play by the rules’ 
even if it is detrimental to its short-term or strategic interests.
Franck recognises that rules exert more or less a compliance pull. Such a pull 
does not mean that the rule will be always followed – other pulls also have effect 
on the nations’ conduct. However, compliance pull results in discomfort in case 
of noncompliance. Compliance pulls appear when the nations attempt to argue 
that their conduct is not against the rules, or when they try to find a morally 
acceptable reasoning for their noncompliance.
Franck identifies the basis of this compliance pull in the rule-making 
processes, the quality of the rules. In short: compliance pull results not from 
7  See for example: FRANCk, Thomas M.: Legitimacy in the International System, American Journal of 
International Law, 82 (1988) 705-59. FRANCK, Thomas M.: The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
8  FRANK op. cit. (1988) 706.
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rational calculation over the cost and benefits of compliance, as presented in the 
introduction to the chapter, however, as regards the legitimacy of the rules, legiti-
macy exerts a pull to compliance which is powered by the quality of the rule.9
This legitimacy stems from four elements – these elements strengthen the 
legitimacy of the rules (either in the international or the domestic context): 
(i) determinacy – which relates to the clarity of the rule or norm; (ii) symbolic 
validation – which is based on procedural practices or rituals; (iii) coherence 
– which refers to the possibility of the ‘generalisation’ of the main principles 
underlying the rule; and (iv) adherence – which refers to the connection between 
the particular primary rule and the secondary rules about the enactment and 
interpretation of such primary rules.
 1.2 Managerial Theory
Similarly to Henkin and the optimistic view, Abram Chayes 
and Antonia Handler Chayes10 start with the statement that the sense of obliga-
tion is empirically self-evident in state behaviour. Their main thesis is that this 
compliance is not the result of an explicit calculation of costs and benefits in 
case of every decision. Nations avoid explicit calculations because rational cal-
culation is in itself costly. In law and economics literature, it is well-known that 
in complicated situations, when cost-benefit calculations are impossible or too 
costly, the players use simple ‘heuristic’. According to the Chayeses, the main 
heuristic move in international relations is the compliance pull.
From the law and economics point of view, they provide two main reasons 
why compliance and not another rule of heuristic will be used. First of all, 
treaties are consensual. If the parties join a treaty, they demonstrate that it 
serves their interests. As law and economics would argue, because of this calcu-
lation at the time of joining, the recalculation is relatively unlikely to lead to an 
opposite conclusion, to the net benefit of noncompliance.
Secondly, the ratification of a treaty generally creates a domestic bureaucracy 
with a vested interest in compliance – they are against any form of question-
ing the rationality of compliance. Naturally, the bureaucracy is not monolithic, 
containing not only supporters of the treaties but opponents of compliance as 
well – when the mechanical compliance to a treaty requires the violation of other 
domestic or international rules unquestionably supported by other members 
of the same bureaucracy. Because of this conflict, even if rational calculation is 
missing from the decision about compliance, incomplete compliance is a general 
phenomena in international law.
9  FRANK op. cit. (1990) 49.
10  See for example: CHAYES, Abram and CHAYES, Antonia Handler: ‚On Compliance’, International 
Organization, 47 (1993), pp. 175-205. CHAYES, Abram and CHAYES, Antonia Handler: The New Sove-
reignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 1995.
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The lack of rational calculation is a very strong assumption in their theory. 
In consequence, they suggest that the instances of non-compliance are generally 
inadvertent. They offer a ‘management’ model, where they suggest that nations’ 
compliance should be promoted not through coercion but, rather, through a 
cooperative model of compliance, which seeks to induce compliance through 
interactive processes of justification, discourse and persuasion.
In light of the following models on second- and third party control, it is 
worth recalling Koh’s critique: the main force for compliance in Chayes and 
Chayes’ model is external. Koh stresses that this is the fear of the loss of reputa-
tion. While Chayes and Chayes start their model from the viewpoint of negat-
ing economic calculation behind compliance decisions and try focusing on the 
shift in national interest – they finally arrive at an external, third party control 
system.
 1.3 Transnational Legal Process Theory
In Koh’s transnational process theory,11 compliance equals 
‘bringing international law home’, in other words, it is the incorporation of 
international obligations into domestic legal processes. The core of this theory is 
the method of the internalisation of transnational legal norms into national law 
by domestic institutions. The model assumes that the nations comply with inter-
national rules because these are integrated into domestic law. Koh distinguishes 
between three types of internalization: social, political and legal internalization. 
In his view, legal internalization is the key issue.
In his view the transnational legal process has three sequential components 
facilitating incorporation: (i) interaction among the transnational actors, (ii) 
their interpretation of international law, and (iii) internalization. The transna-
tional legal process is a mechanism whereby an international law rule is inter-
preted through the interaction of transnational actors, and then internalized 
into a nation’s domestic law. In his view the repeated transactions among the 
nations generate novel interpretations of legal rules. When an international rule 
is incorporated into the domestic system, the concomitant new interpretation 
will also become part of the domestic system. Consequently, participation in 
this transnational legal process is highly important. However, participation also 
enhances the pressure of incorporating the new international rules into domes-
tic law, due to the interactions among the participants. While many critics of 
this model focus on the domestic pressure (the criticism most often formulated 
against this approach is that it focuses only on Western liberal countries), Koh 
argues that internalization basically depends not on the domestic system, but on 
the participation in the transnational process. Turning towards environmental 
issues, his model suggests that the most effective method for increasing the 
11  KOH, Harold H: Transnational Legal Process, Nebraska Law Review, 75 (1996), pp. 181-207. KOH, 
Harold H: Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, Yale Law Journal (1997), pp. 2598-2659. KOH, 
Harold H: Bringing International Law Home, Houston Law Review, 35 (1998), pp. 623-82.
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level of environmental regulation by far is to empower more environmentalist 
groups to participate in transnational legal processes. If they can participate in 
this process they can affect the interpretation of international law and increase 
the pressure for incorporating international environmental law into domestic 
legal systems.
The most important feature of this transnational legal process approach 
is the shift in focus. The former two approaches, particularly the legitimacy 
theory (but also Henkin’s optimistic theory and the realist school) personify 
the nations. They treat nations as unitary actors with their own preferences and 
interests (national interests). In this model, nations as unique decision-makers 
disappear (temporally), and several other players enter the process: govern-
ments, multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, interna-
tional organizations, private individuals. They participate in the transnational 
legal process and exert pressure on the legal system to incorporate international 
norms. But at this point the model stops. Incorporation is the end of the road. If 
the rule is incorporated into the domestic legal system, the rule is presumed to 
reflect the preference of the nations.
 1.4 Liberal Theory
While subnational actors appear in the managerial and the 
transnational legal process theory, these actors are the very focus of liberal 
theory. Protagonist is typically the judiciary, but the role of the legislatures and 
the administrative agencies are also under scrutiny. The leading theorists of this 
approach, Andrew Moravcsik and Anne-Marie Slaughter, argue that the nations’ 
compliance depends mostly on the domestic structure.12
12  MORAVCSIK, Andrew: Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. 
International Organization, 51 (1997), pp. 513-53. MORAVCSIK, Andrew: The Origins of Human Rights 
Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, International Organization, 54 (2000), pp. 217-52. 
MORAVCSIK, Andrew: In Defense of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European 
Union, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2002), pp. 603-24. Andrew Moravcsik: Is There a 
‘Democratic Deficit’ in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis, Government and Opposition, 39 
(2004), pp. 336-63. MORAVCSIK, Andrew: Liberal Theories of International Law. in: Jeffrey L. Dunoff, 
Mark A. Pollack (eds.): Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 83-118. RAUSTIALA, Kal: The Architecture of 
International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, Virginia 
Journal of International Law, 43 (2002), pp. 1-92. RAUSTIALA, Kal: and SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie: 
International Law, International Relations and Compliance,’ in CARLSNAES, Walter, RISSE, Thomas 
and SIMMONS, Beth A. (eds.), Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage Publications, Ltd., 
2002, pp. 538-57. SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie:: Judicial Globalization,’ Virginia Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 40, (2000), pp. 1103-1124. SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie:: A New World Order. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2004. SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie:, and BURKE-WHITE, William: The 
Future of International Law Is Domestic (or, The European Way of Law), Harvard International Law 
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The key assumption is that national interest is not given – it results from 
preferences of different groups in society. For example, the model stresses that 
policy makers usually attempt to design domestic institutions so as to change 
future social pressure on policy-makers in a direction consistent with their 
favoured views. Moravcsik argues that national politicians use legalized agree-
ments to tie the hands of their successors and to tie their own hands in dealing 
with domestic interest groups (asserting that international law restricts them 
from fulfilling certain demands) (Moravcsik, 1997: 225-9).
According to this view, international law is not ‘state-bidding’ but much 
rather ‘other-bidding’. The most important rules do not concentrate on the 
signatory states, instead, international regimes seek to alter the performance 
and the relative influence of non-state actors. At the same time they attempt 
to strengthen the actors, creating new domestic and international coalitions 
supporting compliance. Their aim is to create a lock-in situation where compli-
ance is the best choice for decision-makers.
Moravcsik stresses three mechanisms of this vertical pressure. The simplest 
mechanism of vertical enforcement is a change to domestic and transnational 
representative institutions through which the supporters receive more mandates. 
The second mechanism is to transform the interests of domestic and transnational 
social groups. This means some form of shift in pressure groups preferences – 
i.e. internalization of norms. The third mechanism is to encourage enforcement 
by embedding new collective objectives.13 The most important mechanism is the 
independent judiciary – for example through modifying the rules the court 
must apply (this is similar to the view of transnational legal process approach) 
and ensuring the independence of the judiciary, empowering the courts to use, 
and allowing the litigants to refer to international law as relevant law in lawsuits.
As a conclusion of the first subchapter, it is worth stressing that while the 
above-mentioned models (for example the legitimacy and the managerial theory) 
typically reject the realistic view and attempt to identify preference-generating 
effects (i.e. compliance pull) of international norms, they implicitly assume 
that the external forces of international law (peer pressure in legitimacy theory, 
compliance mechanism in managerial approach) are of significance. Koh and 
the liberal theories seem more successful in building compliance theories 
because they discard the realistic ‘national interest’ view which treats nations 
as single players with externally determined national interests (changing as 
a result of legitimate rules or compliance mechanisms under international 
law), concentrating on interactions among subnational or supranational actors. 
However, they are unable to provide a complex account of the changes in 
national interests as a result of interactions among these actors. The next chap-
ter will make an attempt to provide a more complex view of the political process 
determining the actual policy of the nations.
Journal, 47 (2006), pp. 327-352. SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie:: New Directions in Legal Research on the 
European Community, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31, (1993), pp. 391-400.
13  MORAVCSIK op. cit. (2012), 99.
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 2 Second Party Enforcement
As demonstrated in the beginning of the chapter, according 
to the law and economics theory of enforcement the effect of the law depends 
on three elements: the cost of compliance (benefit stemming from non-compli-
ance), the probability of punishment in case the actor violates the rule and the 
extent of such punishment. The first subchapter presented the models focus-
ing on the cost of compliance – the first party enforcement models attempt to 
demonstrate the effect of international law on the preferences of the nations. By 
contrast, the present and the following subchapters will assume that the nations’ 
preferences (nations’ interests) are given, therefore, the only way to modify the 
nations’ conduct is to refine the expected punishment in case of violation. This 
is the so-called rationalist school of international law theory: involving a unitary 
rational actor optimizing utilities distributed along its preferences.14
Such models do not assume that international law always enforces changes 
in the behaviour of the nations. They merely assume that the law always 
enforces changes in the cost of non-compliance. The most important form of 
sanctions are the three Rs of Compliance in Guzman’s words: reciprocity, retali-
ation, and reputation.15 The focus of the subchapter is on reciprocity and retali-
ation. The reputation and other forms of third party enforcement (international 
courts and compliance mechanisms in international regimes) will be the subject 
of the next subchapter.
 2.1 Retaliation and Reciprocity
Historically, the most commonly used forms of direct second 
party self-help sanctions were the hostage and bond systems: the offended 
nation would nationalise (part of) the assets of the violating nations located 
within their territory, or they would keep the citizens or officials of the other 
state hostage unless the violating activities were ceased or sufficient damages 
were paid. More recently, reciprocity and retaliation play a similar role. In case of 
reciprocity the offended nation stops performing his duties toward the offender. 
By contrast, retaliation includes other sanctions besides non-performance. This 
form of self-help is a very important method when the partners have several 
interactions with each other.
According to the law and economics theory,16 reciprocity and retaliation have 
a similar incentive effect: they impose a relevant cost on the offender. Reci-
procity is effective in case performance is valuable to the (potential) offender. 
However, in some cases, this incentive is not enough. Assume a contract 
14  It is worth stressing that according to this realistic view, the preferences affecting the decisions are not 
always in the public interest – such preferences may be those of the political leaders.
15  GUZMAN, Andrew T.: How International Law Works. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. pp. 33-49.
16  For detailed (but short) account see: GUZMAN, Andrew T.: A Compliance-Based Theory of Interna-
tional Law. California Law Review 90 (2002), pp. 1823-87.
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between two neighbouring countries about cleaning a shared lake or prevent-
ing over-consumption, exploitation of some transboundary natural resources (a 
forest for example). Both parties commit themselves to participate in the project. 
But after some time, Nation A recognises that the project costs for them exceed 
their benefit with 100. If Nation A breaches the contract, Nation B suffers 150 
loss – for example its costs increase with 150. However, if in the name of reci-
procity Nation B ceases its own part it results in 80 loss (or extra cost) for Nation 
A. In this case the reciprocity is obviously not enough to prevent Nation A from 
offending.
At this point it is worth recalling that the law and economics theory does not 
say that all offenses must be prevented. Efficient breach also exists: an offense 
is efficient if the compliance cost of the offending nation exceeds the losses 
the offense causes to others. For this reason (i.e. the basic rationale behind the 
requirement of proportionality between the sanction and the harms caused), 
in the example Nation A should face a sanction with 150 loss in case of offence. 
Such an effective (and efficient) sanction would require an additional sanction 
which is worth 70 besides the reciprocity.17
But these self-help methods are not unflawed. First of all, it is difficult to 
set appropriate sanctions. If the sanction is inappropriately gentle, too much 
damage will be caused. However, if the sanction is too harsh then efficient 
actions will not be undertaken. Secondly, the sanction (especially the retalia-
tion) imposes costs on the sanctioning nations as well. This cost may render the 
threat of such sanctions implausible. Assume that the service of Nation B in the 
mentioned contract is its own part of the same environment project. If it does 
not perform it causes losses not only for Nation A, but for Nation B, too.
In order to set efficient sanctions, the first necessary condition of sanc-
tioning the breach is observability. It is a general view that some activities are 
non-observable. For example the offended nations are unlikely to detect an 
environmental damage with long-term consequences.18 Secondly, even if the loss 
is observable, the offender and offending nations must disagree about whether 
the actions leading to the damage are consistent with the law. All in all, the 
self-help responses are typically triggered by activities which the offended nation 
considers an offense. The partner will rarely concede its non-compliance. In 
case of retaliation or reciprocity, Nation A will argue the non-compliance of the 
sanctioning nation. For example in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Case, both parties 
argued that they only took unavoidable mitigating actions – i.e. self-help actions.
17  Naturally, this example could be resolved through renegotiation: Nation B can offer more than 20 extra 
service (payment). The sum of this extra (minimum) 20 and the agreement service worth 80 is enough 
to induce compliance. But this renegotiation is not always possible; according to law and economics 
theory the transaction cost may be too high.
18  See for example KLEIN, Natalie: Settlement of International environmental law disputes. in: FITZMAU-
RICE, Malgosia – ONG, David M. –MERKOURIS, Panos (eds.): Research Handbook on International 
Environmental Law. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010. p. 381.
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Besides observability, the other main requirement for efficient retaliation or 
the threat of reciprocity is credibility. Assume a one-shot game: Nation A caused 
(or will certainly cause) losses to Nation B. Nation B must bear additional costs if 
it sanctions Nation A, but it must cover only its losses in case it fails to intro-
duce sanctions. Nation B is not interested in increasing its own costs through 
imposing sanctions against Nation A. The threat of Nation B is not credible – 
therefore, this threat will not affect the compliance of Nation A ex ante. Nation A 
could calculate that sanctions will not be applied in case of losses incurred.
In order to be credible, the sanction must yield some benefit in the future. 
For example, if nations repeatedly interact over time, it may be worthwhile for 
states to sanction the breach immediately. It thereby develops its reputation as 
a hard nation which sanctions offenders. This is the so-called repeated game 
model. Naturally, two neighbouring nations play such repeated games, since 
they must interact in the future. According to game theory, this threat of sanc-
tions will be more credible if (i) the cost of the sanction is lower; (ii) the future 
benefit of Nation B from the compliance of Nation A is higher, and (iii) Nation B 
has relatively low discount rates. The discount rate measures the relative impor-
tance of the future cost and benefit compared to the current cost and benefit.19 
Naturally these conditions, especially the condition of great future benefit from 
cooperation are met primarily in relations of countries conducting many interac-
tions, this is in particular the case with neighbouring countries. It is also worth 
recalling that several famous environmental pollution disputes in international 
law (for example Trail Smelter and the Gut Dam Arbitration between Canada 
and the US, Lac Lanoux Arbitration between France and Spain, Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros case between Hungary and Slovakia, Iron Rhine Railway Arbitration 
between Belgium and the Netherlands, Pulp Mill case between Argentina and 
Uruguay) originate from conflicts between neighbours.
However, it should be pointed out that in case of the repeated game an oppo-
site effect also occurs. Self-help imposes higher costs on the sanctioning nation. 
In these repeated games, amicable relations among the nations bear great value. 
Retaliation, especially if the sanctioning nation errs – for the offense does not 
result from intentional breach but from an accident (which cannot be avoided 
with due care) – imposes very high future costs on the sanctioning nation in a 
repeated or continuous relationship.
19  The discount rate is the extent to which a player values benefits today over benefits accruing a year later. 
Let it be represented by r. If someone receives 10 in the next year, its present value is 10/(1+r). If someone 
receives 10 each year, its present value is 10 + 10/(1+r) + 10(1+r)2 + …. = 10(1+r)/r.
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 2.2  Problems of Second Party-Enforcement: Multilateral 
Issues
The above mentioned model of credibility is built on the 
assumption that there is an offending and an offended nation. However, in case 
of global environmental issues there is no one single offended nation.20
The problem of multilaterality appers in the context of self-help as free 
riding. If self-help imposes costs on the sanctioning nations, then all nations 
will have an incentive to leave the sanctions to others. If a single nation retali-
ates, all nations will benefit from the reduction of the damage caused, but they 
will not bear cost of the sanction. This so-called collective action (or public 
goods) problem is typically assumed to result in general free-riding: no or only 
a suboptimal sanction will be imposed against the offending nations. (The next 
chapter will present some solutions for this problem: fortunately, universal 
free-riding is not always the consequence of collective actions or public goods 
problems.)
 3 Third Party Enforcement
It is worth distinguishing between two main forms of third 
party enforcement: the informal and formal control. The informal method 
concerns reputation: the sanction results in the loss of ‘reputational capital’. 
Reputation capital is indispensable if a nation wishes to cooperate with others, as 
such, reputational loss reduces the chance of beneficial cooperation. Naturally, 
reputational theory is closely linked to the ‘international community or club of 
nations’ view which is the key factor inducing compliance both in the legitimacy 
and the managerial theory of compliance. Franck claims that ‘obligation derives 
not from consent to the treaty, or its text, but from membership in a community 
that endows the parties to the agreement with status, including the capacity to 
enter into treaties.’21 Chayes and Chayes suggest that the ultimate impulse for 
compliance is not the fear of direct sanctions, but of loss of reputation.22
The most important formal enforcement mechanisms are the (international 
or domestic) courts and international organisations. They play similar roles, they 
employ similar mechanisms: (direct) enforcement and (indirect) compliance. 
Enforcement mechanisms use sanctions against offenders. Compliance mecha-
nisms typically offer help (in many cases financial assistance) in reaching the 
required level of compliance or remunerate the achievement of goals.
20  FRANCK op. cit. (1998) 756.
21  FRANCK op. cit. (1998) 756.
22  CHAYES and CHAYES op. cit. (1995) 120.
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 3.1 Reputation
For the sake of simplicity, let us analyse reputational effects 
in a very simple model. Assume that (i) the nation loses its reputation entirely 
if it violates any rules of international environmental law, and (ii) a nation with 
zero reputation is unable to cooperate (contract, start joint project, etc.) with any 
other nation in the future. Suppose that the nation’s net payoff from cooperation 
is ß – C in each year; where ß is the benefit from the cooperation and C is the 
compliance cost. This payoff is assumed to be certain in case of compliance. In 
case of offense, the payoff is ß in the first year because it saves the cost of com-
pliance; but 0 in the consecutive years because it lost any chance for cooperation. 
Thus, ß is lost.
The nation will compare the payoffs for the scenarios of compliance (ß – 
C in every year) and that of non-compliance (B in the first year and 0 in the 
subsequent years.) As seen, in case of retaliation, the future benefits must be 
discounted in order to compare them with the present ones. It can be substanti-
ated23 that compliance is more likely if (i) the cooperative benefit, ß is greater 
and/or (ii) the cost of compliance, C is lower and/or (iii) the discount rate is 
lower.
Law and economics models are often criticised because the exact values of 
these parameters are unknown. This is true, but the main goal of such models 
is not to determine whether a given nation will follow a given set of rules – the 
model much rather attempts to determine the factors affecting the likelihood of 
compliance. Firstly, the nations’ reputational incentives depend on its involve-
ment in international cooperation – this is likely to increase the benefit, ß. For 
example, in case of neighbouring countries this benefit is greater, so contractual 
and informal rules between them are less likely to be violated. Secondly, rules 
requiring higher compliance costs are less likely to be followed. Thirdly, nations 
with high discount rates are less likely to comply. As Goldsmith and Posner 
claim, ‘rogue states’, controlled by irrational or impulsive leaders, or ‘unstable 
states’ with shorter time horizons and, consequently, higher discount rates, are 
more likely to deviate than others.24
As already mentioned, this model is oversimplified. First of all, the assump-
tion of the immediate and total loss of reputation is unrealistic: reputational 
effect occurs only if other nations, potential future partners know about the 
offense. Even if the offended nations disclose such information, the offend-
ing parties can deny the accusations, and fabricate evidence to prove that they 
observed the rules. The problem is similar to the problem presented in the case 
of self-help. Albeit similar, it is not the same. While in the case of second party 
23  If the nation complies, its payoff (in present value) is (ß – C)(1+r)/r. If the nation does not comply, its 
payoff (in present value) is ß. Consequently, compliance is the better alternative if (ß – C)(1+r)/r > ß. 
After some rearrangement: ß > C(1+r).
24  GOLDSMITH, Jack L. and POSNER, Eric A.: A Theory of Customary International Law. The University 
of Chicago Law Review, 66 (1999), p. 1127.
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control the problem resulted from the observability of the offense, in this case, 
verifiability is the key. Verifiability requires not only that the partners recognise 
the deviation (i.e. observability), but that they are able to convince third-parties 
about the offense – when the offender tries to defend itself.
The second implicit assumption of the model is the inevitably negative effect 
of the offense. But reputational capital can be reconstructed even after a serious 
violation of an international rule. For example a change in leadership typically 
rehabilitates nations, rebuilds the trust. An opportunistic nation can exploit 
with this option – for example, before an almost certain change in government 
they will be less careful and more prone to violate (intentionally or simply negli-
gently) international rules.
Thirdly, it is worth recalling that reputation loss will not be the same in case 
of all breaches, unlike the model assumes. For example, reputational loss can 
depend on the severity of the violation, the extent of the damage caused, etc.
 3.2 Direct Enforcement
The traditional law and economics model of enforcement 
focuses on direct enforcement. The key parameters, as seen in the first para-
graphs of the chapter, are the magnitude and the probability of sanctions in 
case of offense. International law differs in both parameters from national legal 
systems.
International law is typically criticised for its too ‘soft’ sanctions. The 
tribunals in many cases refrain from issuing special orders, instead they call 
upon the parties to continue the negotiations and the verdict only sets some 
cornerstones of this negotiation. For example this was the final decision of the 
tribunal in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Case. In Pheobe Okowa’s opinion this 
cautiousness is a consequence of the lack of enforceability behind the courts’ 
verdict. The tribunals recognise the weakness of the international community in 
enforcing the decisions, and they defend their own authority by avoiding ‘hard’ 
but unenforceable decisions.25 As the case of European Court of Justice demon-
strates, if the court is supported by a strong administration, the decisions tend 
to have teeth.
On the other hand, this traditional view of international enforcement mecha-
nisms must be modified in the light of widespread internalisation of interna-
tional rules into domestic law, or in the light of the European legal order where 
acquis communautaire (or, more recently: union acquis) automatically forms part 
of national law. These changes introduce new players, new types of courts into 
the system: domestic courts which are less reluctant to take tough sanctions 
against offenders. Naturally, if the defendant is their own government, this 
cautiousness sneaks back but to a lower extent.
25  OKOWA, Phoebe: Responsibility for environmental damage. in: FITZMAURICE, Malgosia – ONG, 
David M. –MERKOURIS, Panos (eds.): Research Handbook on International Environmental Law. Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar, 2010. p. 311.
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The second relevant feature of the international legal process concerns both 
the magnitude and the probability of direct sanctions: according to the classi-
cal rule, only states can be parties to this process. The individual victims and 
offenders are ‘represented’ by their states. Such representation could result in 
conflict of interests. For example according to one of the classical analysis of 
Trail Smelter case (in which industry in British Columbia polluted and caused 
losses to the farmers in the US near the border) this conflict appears in the 
too soft strategy of the United States. The US government is assumed to fight 
less fiercely than the individual victims would do, because it must consider the 
interests of similar companies near the borders of the US. The government 
must calculate not only the uncompensated loss suffered by the farmers in a 
given case, but the potential future damages payable by the polluters in case 
Canada prevails and the case will be referred to as precedent in other cases.26
However, the exclusive right of states to litigate seems to be diminishing, as 
of late. While there are some courts which accept actions only from states (for 
example the ICJ, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body), others have made it possi-
ble for individuals to litigate. The most important supranational tribunal where 
the enforcement of private rights is possible is the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ). Moreover, as international law and acquis communautaire (union acquis) 
are incorporated directly into national law or if the environmental rights appear 
as human rights, this movement toward private enforcement of international 
law is expected to accelerate.
However, the private enforcement of law also has a weakness: the private 
interests of the litigants almost always differ from the public interest. This diffe-
rence can result in either sub- or supraoptimal litigations. It is well-documented 
in law and economics literature that private enforcement is suboptimal if the 
litigants cannot capture a significant portion of the social surplus or if the cost 
of litigation is too high compared to their assets.27 Public enforcement is typi-
cally assumed to be a better alternative if the government has an advantage in 
collecting evidence, or if the verdict can be used as an argument in other cases – 
which is a benefit not considered by the private actor – or if the litigation cost is 
so high that it makes private litigation unaffordable for individuals. On the other 
hand private enforcement could result in supra-optimal litigation as well, when 
the social benefit from the case is minimal while the personal stake (the amount 
of damages) is large.28
Besides these general issues concerning the direct enforcement in interna-
tional law, environmental regimes have two additional characteristics which 
reduce the likelihood of sanctions: (i) scientific debates on the magnitude of the 
losses or on the issue of causation and (ii) the global context of many environ-
mental damage. The necessary condition of a verdict against a polluter state 
26  OKOWA op. cit. 307.
27  For a detailed account, see: BEBCHUK, Lucian A. and KLEMENT, Alon: Negative-expected-value suits. 
in: SANCHIRICO, Chris W. (ed): Procedural Law and Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, p. 2012.
28  See STEPHAN, Paul B.: Privatizing International Law. Virginia Law Review 97 (2011), pp. 1606-1617.
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is that the claimants demonstrate a casual link between the offense and their 
material losses. For example even Australia, the claimant in the French Nuclear 
Test Cases admitted that the claimant ‘has no cause of complaint unless it suffers 
more than nominal harm or loss.’29 And France argued against New Zealand in 
1995 in the Second French Nuclear Test Case similarly: claimants should base 
their case on solid grounds, ‘something other than worst-case scenarios’.30 The 
tribunals are typically very conservative in accepting evidence or in measuring 
the damage.
Hitherto, all cases in which international tribunals referred to sustain-
ability were bilateral cases. In the current structure of international litigation, 
the procedure for dealing with multiple claimant states is missing. In national 
systems these problems are mitigated with class actions, collective litigations 
or actio popularis. But the international process has no similar method. Even if 
there seems to be erga omnes rights and obligations involved under in interna-
tional environmental law, or in cases related to other aspects of the sustainability 
the basic procedure of international tribunals is that all claimants can sue only 
for their own scientifically proved losses.31 As the crucial environmental prob-
lems are global ones, the direct enforcement mechanism is unable to deal with 
the most important issues. It is worth recalling that this weakness of private 
enforcement appears not only in international but in domestic context as well: 
the plaintiff of a tort law case must prove his or her own damage and casual link 
between the activity of the defendant and this loss. The environmental loss is 
rarely the personal loss of somebody – nobody will have standing to bring suit 
for damages. In most environmental cases injunction can be achieved in private 
enforcement mechanism.
International environmental regimes cope with this failure of the tribunal 
systems through own enforcement mechanisms. Several treaties and environ-
mental regimes formed international organisations to help the compliance. 
But these organisations only exceptionally received rights to sanction non-
compliance. The most important exception is the Kyoto protocol establishing 
the Enforcement Branch. This branch can deduct the nations’ assigned amount 
for the next period and suspend their eligibility to make transfers if the nation 
exceeds the emission limit.32 But very few examples of direct sanctioning (for 
example the withdrawal of some rights or privileges from the nations) can be 
found in international environmental regimes – perhaps because sanctioning 
would conflict with the main objectives of these organisations: partnership and 
assistance in compliance.
29  OKOWA op. cit. 311.
30  The Franch counsel, M. Perrin Brichambaut – cited by: Okowa op. cit. 312.
31  See for example: KLEIN op. cit. 388. OKOWA op. cit. 307 (claiming that in case of damage to biodiver-
sity and greenhouse emissions, a direct casual nexus of the kind present in Trail Smelter is impossible 
to establish), 309 (for an analysis of Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case).
32  Kyoto Procedure: Art XV, paragraph 5.
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 3.3 Compliance Mechanism
Compliance mechanisms can be defined as procedures with 
the main goal of encouraging ‘a non-complying state to return to compliance 
without accusing it of wrongdoing, or holding it accountable for the conse-
quences that entail from wrongdoing.33
Article 8 of Montreal Protocol is one of the first occurrences of the non-
compliance procedure. According to this mechanism, if parties fail to provide 
the required data to the Secretariat
‘The Parties, at their first meeting, shall consider and approve procedures and 
institutional mechanisms for determining non-compliance with the provisions of 
this Protocol and for treatment of Parties found to be in non-compliance.’
The Montreal Protocol was also the first treaty under which some parties, i.e. the 
developing countries can receive significant financial assistance to mitigate their 
compliance costs.34 Since then several international environmental regimes have 
created compliance mechanisms. The consequences of non-compliance in these 
systems typically consist of advice, technical assistance from the international 
organisations.35
It is apparent that these compliance mechanisms are closely related to 
Chayes and Chayes’ managerial theory of obedience. One of the general 
elements of the compliance mechanism in these regimes is the phenomenon of 
implementation and compliance review institutions. Their non-confrontational and 
forward-looking approaches are typically presumed to facilitate the performance 
of countries through the processes of continuous cooperation.
Some regime use aid conditionality as well. As seen, Chayes and Chayes 
assume that non-compliance results primarily from capacity problems not from 
intentional, opportunistic deviation. According to this optimistic view, even 
such capacity problems can be mitigated if nations are compensated for their 
compliance cost. However, as for example Chang (1995) demonstrates with 
respect to global environmental issues, this method is highly inefficient and 
dangerous if international organisations are imperfectly informed about the 
potential recipients’ optima in the absence of assistance. If this assistance is 
available, the nations will be interested in sending false signals about their low 
33  FITZMAURICE, Malgosia and ELIAS, Okufemi A.: Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties. Utrecht: 
Eleven International Publishing, 2005, p. 291.
34  Chayes and Chayes also refer to the Montreal Protocol as a typical method of the international regime to 
cope with the lack of capacity. CHAYES and CHAYES op. cit. (1993) 194.
35  For a detailed analysis of compliance procedures in international environmental law, see: LOIBL, 
Gerhard: Copliance rocedures and mechanisms in: FITZMAURICE, Malgosia – ONG, David M. –
MERKOURIS, Panos (eds.): Research Handbook on International Environmental Law. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2010.
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capacity, because if they are able to mislead the funding organisation, they can 
draw additional financial assistance.36
 4 Why do Nations Contract?
The realist view rejects any compliance effect of international 
law. According to this view the nations behave lawfully simply because their 
interests coincide with the law: the actions required by law are ideal for the 
nations. In this case, the compliance cost is negative, lawful actions do not 
generate costs but maximise the benefits of the nation even without any interna-
tional legal sanction or reward.
Even if realists also admit that some effectiveness of the international law 
(i.e. international rules sometimes modify the nations’ behaviours) but they 
calls the attention to another open question: why nations contract. It is clear that 
they do not terminate international contracts or exit those treaties that are no 
longer in their interest because of reciprocity, retaliation, reputational or other 
cost. But why do they tie their own hands, why do they take upon themselves the 
threat of these sanctions for case of following their pure national interests? The 
answer is similar to the logic of private contracting: they want to ensure coopera-
tion and coordination. The main difference between the two problems is that 
while the cooperation problem occurs when – in lack of a contract – the parties 
fail to create joint benefits, the coordination problem can typically be solved 
without sanction (communication between the parties is enough). However, the 
nations must face a new difficulty in case of coordination problem: the distribu-
tional issue.
 4.1 Cooperation
Goldsmith and Posner note that ‘[s]tates refrain from violating 
treaties (when they do) because they fear retaliation from the treaty partner(s), or 
because they fear a failure of coordination.’37 Failure of cooperation results in a 
joint loss of cooperative benefit due to the common free-riding strategy.
A simple example helps explain this problem. Table 2 presents a simple 
choice of two parties. Both parties have two alternatives: to comply or to deviate. 
Four scenarios are possible: when both parties comply, when both deviate, when 
only Nation A complies and when only Nation B complies. The table indicates 
the payoffs of the parties in each case. In each cell, the first payoffs (X, Y, Z, 
W) belongs to nation A, while the second set (x, z, y, w) to Nation B. In order 
to exclude irrelevant cases when the cooperation is not worthwhile, the model 
36  CHANG, Howard F.: An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 
Georgetown Law Journal 83 (1995), pp. 2131-2213.
37  GOLDSMITH and POSNER op. cit. 1171.
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presumes that the payoffs of both nations in case of mutual compliance (in case 
of cooperation) exceed those resulting from mutual deviation: X > W, and x > w.
First, for the sake of comparison consider the case when international law 
is irrelevant, because compliance is the best choice for both nations even in the 
absence of sanctions. This is the case when X > Z, Y > W, x > z and y > w. This 
corresponds to the aforementioned case of environmental treaty: even if the 
partner violates and, for example, pollutes the shared lake, exploited some trans-
boundary natural resources, the best choice remains to avoid additional pollu-
tion. And in case of no pollution from the side of the other nation, the national 
interest will be compliance.
Nation B
Comply Deviate
Nation A Comply X,x Y,z
Deviate Z,y W,w
Table 2: Basic structure of cooperation and coordination games
Compare this optimistic case with the Prisoners’ dilemma which is the classical 
presentation of the cooperation problem. Suppose the exactly opposite case: inde-
pendently of the action of the partner the nation’s best choice is to deviate. This 
is if Z > X, W > Y, z > x, and w > y. Imagine a case where one of the two nations 
suffices to solve a problem – for example to monitor the illegal hunting in the 
border zone. But the cost of this project exceeds a nation’s benefits. Neither of 
them will fight against the hunters alone, it is better for them to tolerate the 
illegal hunting (W > Y and w > y). Naturally, the elimination of illegal hunting 
yields benefits for both countries (Z > W and z > w). Finally, if both nations 
participate, they should bear only half of the total cost, and this amount shall 
be less than their own benefits: a joint project, cooperation provides net benefit 
compared to mutual deviation (X > W and x > w). It can be demonstrated that 
in this case both parties will free-ride, free-riding will be the dominant strategy 
(deviation is always a better choice than compliance) – both will wait for the 
other, consequently, the parties will end up in mutual deviation.
How do international treaties solve this problem? Suppose that the treaty 
defines sanctions which reduce the payoffs in case of deviation (reducing Z, 
z, W, and w). If these reductions are high enough (i.e. it reverses the relations 
among the payoffs of deviations and compliance: Z < X, W < Y, z < x, and w < y) 
then the parties will cooperate with each other, and they will join the program.
Naturally this method of sanctioning, of adopting treaties has its own 
problems. As seen in the previous subchapters the observability and verifiability 
problems can hinder the effectiveness of these sanctions. And, the magnitude of 
the efficient sanctions should be calculated as well. Moreover, the cost of nego-
tiation about the exact forms and extent of the sanctions must be covered.
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Fortunately, in some cases the problem can be solved without transactions 
between the parties. This is the already mentioned case of the repeated game. 
Two solutions are worth highlighting: the reputation and the tit-for-tat strategy. 
In case of the reputation strategy, the parties comply in the first period, keeping 
it up unless their partner deviates. But after the first instance of deviation they 
refuse to cooperate in any future time. The tit-for-tat strategy also commences 
with cooperation, and in each phase the players do what their partner did in the 
previous period; deviation results in deviation as response, cooperation induces 
cooperation. If the discount rate is not extremely low, both strategies result in 
cooperation. This tit-for-tat strategy is typically presumed to be the best strategy 
in a repeated game.38
Both strategies can ensure cooperation because the parties fear the conse-
quences of their deviation. But two problems must be solved: the problem of the 
last game and the case where there are more than two players. The mentioned 
strategies result in cooperation only if the game has no fixed ending. If the 
parties know which period will be the last one, deviation will become the domi-
nant strategy in the last period. But if it is certain that the parties will deviate in 
the last period then they will lose their incentive to cooperate in the former one: 
independently of their action the partners will deviate in the next (last) period; 
there is no reward for cooperating in the penultimate period. But if they deviate 
in that period, the incentives to cooperate disappear in the former period as well, 
and so on. Both strategies will result in cooperation if the parties do not know 
which period will be the last one; or more precisely: if the likelihood of termina-
tion (the probability that the game will terminate not in this or the next period) 
is sufficiently low.
The issue of multilaterality reappears. The strategies are clearly unworkable 
when there are several partners, because of the problem analysed in case of self-
help methods: the sanction causes collective action problem, and all nations will 
tend to wait for the others to take the sanctions (and to bear its costs). The para-
dox is: sanctioning the free-riding strategy causes the free-riding problem itself.
Notwithstanding these problems, Goldsmith and Posner’s argument is 
worth keeping in mind as a conclusion: ‘the value-maximizing equilibrium in 
the bilateral prisoner’s dilemma is not as robust as that in the coincidence of 
interest case. But it is not banal.’
 4.2 Coordination
Let us suppose a bilateral program which fails if only a single 
nation works on it. But if Nation A participates, it reduces the cost of Nation B to 
such an extent, that Nation B becomes interested in joining. This is a coordina-
tion problem. Contrary to the prisoner’s dilemma in this case, deviation is not 
38  The main flaw of the reputation strategy is that if the deviation is caused by any exogenous or random 
effect (or in case it is not a real deviation, but the other party makes a mistake in assessing the lawful-
ness of the action) the cooperation will never be resurrected.
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a dominant strategy. In case of the prisoner’s dilemma if one of the nations has 
committed itself to comply, its partner will continue to deviate. But in this case, 
such a commitment induces the partner to also comply. (In Table 2 X >Z, W > 
Y, x > z, and w > y.) Two equilibriums can occur: both nations comply or neither 
do.
Coordination comes into the picture because, as already mentioned, mutual 
compliance provides higher benefits for both nations than mutual deviation 
does. In this case if Nation A (or Nation B) commits itself to participate in the 
project, the other will participate as well. Once such commitments are made, 
neither nation has an incentive to deviate, because this brings higher payoffs 
than unilateral or mutual deviation.
At first sight, the threat of sanction seems unnecessary. But in a more real-
istic context, treaties are necessary because the coordination game needs some 
form of sanctions.
First, consider the case when nations do not know the other’s payoffs. For 
example Nation A mistakenly believes that the deviation is the dominant strat-
egy for Nations B. (Nation A believes that z > x, and w > y). In this case, Nation 
A will not comply. If Nation B has similar mistaken beliefs, it is certain that 
the game will lead to mutual deviation, similarly to the case of the prisoner’s 
dilemma. In this case, as in the case of the prisoner’s dilemma, the nations are 
interested in a treaty which incorporates some forms of sanctions. Similarly, the 
sanction will be necessary in case the parties’ knowledge is not false, since they 
are only uncertain about the other’s payoffs and consequently about its expected 
strategy. In this case the sanction against the deviation plays the role of insur-
ance.
The second complication occurs due to the fact that payoffs can change 
over time. Suppose that both parties know that the circumstances can change 
and they know that after such change, one of the nations will lose its incentive 
to participate. For example, it is possible that deviation will be the dominant 
strategy for Nation B (z > x, and w > y) after some time. If the circumstances 
change, Nation B will violate the treaty. If Nation B recognises this possibility it 
will refuse any sanctions – it will cooperate when this coincides with its national 
interest, but it will deviate when the changes occur. Why would Nation B accept 
a contract? The threat of deviation would be mutual. It can be demonstrated that 
if neither party knows which nation will be interested in deviation, ex ante both 
are better off with a sanction, i.e. with a credible commitment.
Up to this point, cooperation was mutually beneficial for the parties. But in 
the coordination game, distributional issues can also cause additional difficul-
ties. Let us suppose a special form of coordination game: the chicken game. In 
this case if one party commits to work on the project, the other is interested in 
deviation (Y > W, y > w), and both parties are better off if the partner complies 
and it can deviate (Z > Y z>y). In this case the core issue of coordination is not 
to reach the situation of mutual compliance instead of mutual deviation, but to 
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respond to the question which party must comply (and consequently bear the 
costs) and which can be the free-rider.
Finally, it is worth recalling that in contrast to the cooperation problem, in 
this case the equilibrium is not sensitive to the number (or end) of the game and 
multilaterality. Here, once a particular standard is established, none of the states 
gain anything from deviating from it.
 5 Puzzle of Soft Law
The previous subchapter explained the emergence of interna-
tional treaties with the help of the law and economics models of contracting. But 
international law, international environmental law in particular, differs from 
simple contracts. The treaties contain far less clear rules – as the previous chap-
ters demonstrated, the sustainability principle is perhaps the most prominent 
example for this indeterminacy.
Naturally, soft law is not peculiar to international environmental law; they 
occur in other areas of law as well. Institutions of non-binding soft law also 
appear in private law – for example companies often sign non-binding agree-
ments, so-called ‘letters of intent.’ Legislation often issues declarations – for 
example condemnation of the military activities or policies in other countries. 
According to the law and economics analysis of soft law39 these instruments are 
used to communicate the intent of the issuer(s). Soft law, as any other form of 
law can be considered as a form of information about the probabilistic outcomes 
in the future. While hard law conveys information about the expected sanctions 
or rewards,40 soft law conveys information about the expected changes in hard 
law in the future.
But there are significant differences between the case of companies, the case 
of declarations and the case of international environmental law. Firms rarely 
maintain the agreement in such soft form – they typically either prepare well-
designed contracts or terminate the bargain. Even if in politics, the next move, 
i.e. the formulation of hard law is often left out, this can be purposeful. If the 
addressees adjust their behaviour in anticipation of hard law, the enactment (and 
the cost of enactment) of hard law is rationally skipped. However, it is worth 
pointing out that for example the principle of sustainability in international 
39  See for example: GERSEN, Jacob and POSNER, Eric A.: Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 
Stanford Law Review 61 (2008), pp. 573-628 or GUZMAN, Andrew T. and MEYER, Timothy L. Interna-
tional Soft Law. Journal of Legal Analysis, 2 (2010), pp. 171-225. POSNER, Eric A., and SYKES, Alan O. : 
Economic Foundations of International Law. Harvard University Press. 2013, pp. 76-79.
40  Gersen and Posner argue that the consequences of hard law can be predicted only as a probabilistic 
expectation – there is no certainty because of the potential mistakes made by administration, those 
enforcing law or because of the intentional rejection of employing the rules (for example due to a real or 
perceived conflict between the specific rule and the constitutional rules). GERSEN and POSNER, op. cit. 
599-602.
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environmental law continues to retain its very soft form – it appears almost 
exclusively in preambles or in introductory articles defining the broad general 
aims of the treaties.41
The two most frequently mentioned features of the soft law are the vague-
ness and the lack of sanction. The next two points will discuss that the first one 
(vagueness) can be efficient strategy while the second argument (lack of sanc-
tions) is false.
 5.1 Vagueness
Clarity or determinacy is crucial in legitimacy theory, soft law 
and customary law are less defined. Franck who claims that textual determinacy 
(i.e. the clarity and transparency of the commitment defined by the rule) is a 
necessary condition of the legitimacy admits that absolutely clear rules does not 
exist, all rules have several plausible meanings. The violator is always able to 
manipulate the definitions in order to justify conduct.
The high level of indeterminacy in international environmental law can be 
justified with the help of three theories: reducing bargaining costs, reducing 
the risk of the unforeseen consequences of strict agreements (contracts), and 
delegating the right of amendment to third parties.
The role of high bargaining cost is obvious. International law is typically 
formed and can be amended in the course of a very complicated, multi-player 
bargaining process. This process and its cost can be cut if the parties enact a 
looser, more general engagement containing only the intents without clear defi-
nitions. Environmentalist particularly often criticised the treaties, international 
legal documents for the reason that they reflect a very low least-common-denom-
inator basis. The negotiators typically consider these low and vague standards as 
the greatest good compared to the option of the failure of negotiation.
Naturally, not all negotiations involve the same costs. The complexity of 
bargaining depends on the parties’ expectations. Wise drafters recognise that 
there will be a considerable time lag between the acceptance of the treaty and 
compliance. During this time many contingencies can change. If the own 
future, expected compliance cost and the reactions of the others is foreseeable, 
negotiating costs will be low. But nations have to ‘expect the unexpected’, they 
must consider the possibility that at some point in the future the conditions 
can alter in such a way that they will be interested in violating the rule. If they 
think that many unforeseen contingencies may materialize, increasing the high 
compliance cost enormously, they will be more reluctant to accept a very clear, 
binding agreement. If they think that the likelihood of unforeseen contingen-
cies occurring is very low and they can give rise to a very limited cost increase 
they will prefer continuing the negotiation in order to reach clear binding agree-
ments.42
41  FRENCH op. cit. 57.
42  It is worth emphasizing that this argument does not claim that the risk of cost increase could result in 
a vague standard. There is a very important difference between foreseeable but risky contingencies and 
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However, these low and vague standards have disadvantages as well. As it 
saves the countries from an increase in their own compliance cost, it increases 
the risk of noncompliance of others. Indeterminate standards make it harder 
to predict the others’ actions, because indeterminacy makes it easier to justify 
non-compliance.
The third reason for accepting indeterminate international rules comes 
from the so-called delegation theory. When a legal system – such as international 
environmental law – is dominated by standards rather than rules, it often entails 
that the drafters of such standards delegate the specification of the content and 
consequences of the legal norms to downstream decision-makers. In many 
cases, treaties including vague standards establish international organisations in 
order to monitor the compliance of the parties. But the same institutions often 
receive the right to interpret or amend the standard. The states preferring more 
stringent rules often accept vague and shallow standards in exchange for estab-
lishing organisations with jurisdiction for dispute resolution. Even if the deci-
sions of this body will not be binding, it will interpret the standards and reshape 
the expectation of the nations. In most cases, these interpretations gradually 
increase the level of regulation.43
This delegation has an additional advantage related to the previous argu-
ment about unforeseeable contingencies. These delegations will provide an 
additional option between the strict standards with unforeseeable consequences 
and the shallow standards coupled with the high risk of others’ non-compliance. 
This new option is ex post decision-making. If the unforeseen contingencies or 
non-compliance materializes, the dispute resolution system provides a solu-
tion. Naturally, such delegation is risky ex ante, because these decisions will not 
be controlled (or only indirectly controlled) by the nations. At the same time, 
the postponement of the decisions to the time when the circumstances will be 
known reduces the uncertainty. Delegation is efficient if this second risk-reduc-
ing effect dominates.44
unforeseeable ones. Albeit the foreseeable but risky changes result in risk, this increase in risk is irrel-
evant for risk-neutral decision makers. Even if many law and economics models argue that low levels 
and vague standards result from the risk-aversion of states (more exactly from their wish to limit the 
potential increase in compliance costs) this model assumes that the states are risk-neutral. As Guzman 
argues: ‘it is more appropriate to model states as risk-neutral with respect to international legal commit-
ments. At any given moment states have a large number of legal commitments – perhaps thousands 
– and these commitments are in a wide range of subject areas. In this sense they are ‘diversified’ in their 
legal commitments.’ GUZMAN, Andrew T.: How international law works: Introduction. International 
Theory, 1 (2009), p. 290. (Diversification in this context means that the risks from different treaties are 
not in close correlation.)
43  STEPHAN op. cit. 1593-1606.
44  With one meagre exception (Shrimp-Turtle I decision), no court or tribunal has ever made a serious 
attempt to clarify or define sustainability more closely. FRENCH op. cit. 64.
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 5.2 Lack of Sanctions: A False Argument
Soft law is often considered a law without an enforcement 
mechanism, but this is a clearly false accusation. It may be true that soft law has 
no direct third party enforcement. In other fields of international law, tribunals 
are also very reluctant to take harsh sanctions even in case of a violation of a 
well-defined, hard rule. On the other hand, second party and other third party 
sanctions (reputation and compliance mechanism) typically work.
Moreover, soft law seems to be the ideal solution for the aforementioned 
coordination problem, when clear sanctions are unnecessary. As demonstrated, 
if Nation A plausibly commits to participate in a project, this may induce others 
to join. Promises are self-enforcing. In this case, soft law, a pure declaration is 
far cheaper than enacting a new, fully binding treaty with sanctions.
 6 Conclusion
The chapter presented the classical law and economics analy-
sis of international law enforcement. Both the realistic and the optimistic view 
of international law accept that the traditional enforcement mechanisms, i.e. 
courts and sovereign power over the parties are weak in international law (or 
even in the European law) context. Even if some kind of authority exists, their 
main goal is to settle, to find a peaceful solution for international conflicts – not 
to enforce rules or to sanction the violator. Due to this weakness of traditional 
enforcement mechanisms, other aspects must ensure compliance. The chapter 
presented that the first and second party or non-traditional third party enforce-
ment methods (i.e. reputation, compliance mechanism) are able to ensure that 
international rules will be followed, because they are capable of sanctioning the 
breaching nations even if formal international law sanctions are missing.
These non-conventional enforcement mechanisms render the question of 
contracting highly interesting. If sanctions are missing absolutely, the contract-
ing would not mean any binding. But if the international community enforces 
the rules (even if through weaker mechanisms) the nations must consider 
joining a new treaty or signing a new international agreement, etc. As seen, the 
coordination and cooperation problem provide two different answers to the ques-
tion: why are the parties interested in creating binding international rules?
Therefore, the distinctive characteristic of sustainability law (or international 
environmental law) is not the lack of formal enforcement but the very vague 
definition of the principles. According to many legal scholars, the principle has 
not yet reached the ‘strictness or clarity’ of soft law principles – according to 
the view of many scholars’ it is only a political slogan. This vagueness increases 
the cost of enforcement, but it does not render it absolutely impossible – and 
in many cases (especially when the ex ante negotiation is very difficult) it can 
reduce the working (negotiation and enforcement) costs of international law.
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This chapter was based on the traditional assumption of international law 
and economics literature: it assumes that the decision makers are the states, 
the nations as such. As seen, almost all theories about first party enforcement 
(in particular, Koh’s transnational legal process model and the liberal theory) 
emphasize that states are not unitary decision-makers: their choices are influ-
enced by domestic political debates and domestic institutions. The next chapter 
will present some models to assess the effects of international law on these 
domestic circumstances – and through these channels on the policies of the 
given nation.
chapter 7
Why Do Governments Comply? 
Public Choice of Enforcement in International and European Law
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 1 Introductory Remarks 
The previous chapter made an attempt to answer the question 
of why nations modify their policies in response to such a vague standard such 
as the principle of sustainable development using the traditional enforcement 
model of law and economics literature. Now the focus shift from nations or 
states as unitary rational actors to the individual decision-maker, or the group 
of decision-makers. The basic assumptions of this model result from the public 
choice theory: the decision-maker is assumed to be the politician or the bureau-
crat who has the last word, or veto power over the policies. This analysis also 
supposes that the decision about compliance depends on the personal benefit 
and cost resulting from the projects.
As Andrew T. Guzman argues when criticizing the liberal theory and public 
choice approach: although the ‘advantage of a public-choice approach is its abil-
ity to provide a positive account of government activity that is difficult to explain 
through more traditional models of government behaviour’, the problems ensu-
ing from it are perhaps even more important: ‘the outcome of interest-group 
politics is very difficult to predict’.1 This chapter attempts to provide a model on 
interactions among domestic political actors which is able to generate predic-
tions about the change of national politics in response to the changes in interna-
tional or European sustainability law.
The model does not aim to predict the exact outcomes in the domestic politi-
cal market, since the model is unable to determine which environmental or 
other project will be implemented and which one will be rejected. In this sense, 
Guzman’s claim about the complexity of interest group politics remains valid. 
But this is not the main goal. The model demonstrates that comparative statics 
is able to predict some consequences of the changes occuring in international 
and European law. Comparative statics is an economic method comparing the 
outcomes before and after a change in some underlying exogenous parameter 
– in this case the results before and after a new international treaty referring to 
the sustainability principle is adopted.
The first (more lengthy) part of the chapter presents a very simple model 
of the political market: the basic characteristics of the actors (voters, politi-
cians, lobbies, bureaucrats) and the interactions among them. This subchap-
ter presents how the domestic policies are chosen and which are the effects 
influencing the decisions (and how). Table 1 summarizes these characteristics 
and interactions. The second subchapter examines how these effects change in 
response to international and European law. These external changes can modify 
the behaviour of domestic interest groups and constituents and their modified 
behaviour affects the actions of politicians even if the preferences of the politi-
cians remain unchanged.
1  GUZMAN, Andrew T: A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law. California Law Review 90 
(2002), p. 1841.
178
sustainability, law and public choice
 1 Equilibrium in the Political Market
The simple public choice model assumes that the politi-
cal arena can be analysed as a market where several actors interact with one 
another. The actors are politicians, voters, interest groups and bureaucrats – as 
it will be presented, the model treats the court as a special form of bureaucracy. 
The main forms of interaction among the actors are elections, lobbying, direct 
participation in policy-making and the implementation process.
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Table: 1 Political actors and their interactions in the political market
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 1.1 Actors in the Political Market
The simple public choice model assumes that each actor is a 
homo oeconomicus. They are expected to pursue their own goals. However, the 
model is not so ‘thick’ as to restrict the factors influencing the individual behav-
iour of legislators and other actors in the political market to material interests. It 
is capable of also incorporating ‘altruistic’ preferences, personal ethics, ideologi-
cal views which focus not on the personal well-being of the decision-maker, 
but are sensitive to the well-being of others. This broader view of preferences 
includes also the personal views about a good society, the public interest and the 
common good. But the basic assumption of individual rationality remains valid: 
the individual decision maker seeks the best choice to achieve his own goals, 
including his ethical, altruistic or political preferences as well.
In order to build a model which capable of saying more than the meaning-
less phrase: ‘everybody tries to maximise his or her own benefits’, the first step 
is to recognize some basic characteristics of the actors which will significantly 
influence their behaviour, i.e. their responses to the change in circumstances. 
The first part of the subchapter refers to these characteristics.
Politicians
The traditional public choice theory was built on the assumption that ‘parties 
formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order 
to formulate policies’.2 The main goal of parties and politicians is to maximise 
their winning chance. They make promises, take positions in political debates 
and make policies if they are on government according to which one maximises 
their wining chances. According to the simplest form of the model, politicians 
attempt to maximise the expected number of their votes.
This simple vote-maximisation view of politicians and parties must be 
extended for at least two reasons. First, not all politicians are concerned with the 
next election. Naturally, those who plan to retire are not interested in maxim-
ising expected votes, instead, they are interested in maximising their future 
benefit from other sources. They may attempt to increase their own personal 
human, social and financial capital. For example they may build close personal 
relationships with business or international organisations where they are likely 
to start a new career after leaving politics. Or they may try to increase the value 
of their own capital investments – accruing capital gains in the future.
Second, the simple vote-maximising view neglects the non-personal, non-
material interests of politicians. They may be unwilling to pass up on their own 
view about the public interest even if another political platform seems more 
popular and guarantees more votes. These public-interest-oriented politicians 
are willing to accept certain defeats in consecutive elections if they can express 
their own views about a better society or a better political system.
2  DOWNS, Anthony: An Economic Theory of Democracy New York: Harper, 1957, p. 28.
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Voters 
When voters make decisions on participation, gather information and select 
a party to vote for, they make rational decisions: they compare the expected 
benefits to be derived from the alternatives. But in case of elections the expected 
net benefit differs from the expected benefit from a simple consumption or 
investment decision. The vote provides no benefit if it has no impact, if the same 
party wins the elections independently both with and without the voters’ votes. 
The vote is decisive only if (i) other votes are evenly split between the candi-
dates, or (ii) the first best candidates lose only by one vote without the vote of the 
voters. Naturally, this chance will be immeasurably small if there is very large 
number of voters. Since Burrhus Skinner’s utopian novel,3 the probability of the 
decisiveness is typically is assumed to be similar or lower than the probability of 
a car accident going to or returning from the election office. If the consequence 
of the accident is worse than the loss of the preferred candidate then the rational 
voter will not vote. This is rational abstention. But a large portion of the popula-
tion votes – this is the voting paradox. The public choice theory presents several 
models to explain the actual turnouts: taste for voting,4 cat and mouse model,5 
minimax-regret strategy,6 expressive voter hypothesis,7 and ethical voter hypoth-
esis.8
Rational ignorance refers to decisions not on participation in elections but on 
gathering political information about the candidates. The benefit from gathering 
information is identical to the benefit from voting. It also depends (i) on the dif-
ference between the candidates’ positions and (ii) the probability that the voter’s 
vote will be decisive. His wrong choice because of the lack of information would 
3  SKINNER, Burrhus F.: Walden II. New York: Macmillan, 1948. Cited for example by: MUELLER, Denis 
C.: Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 305.
4  See TULLOCK, Gordon: Tward a Mathematics of Politics. Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 
1967, 110.], RIKER, William H. – ORDERSHOOK, Peter C.: A Theory of the Calculus of Voting. Ameri-
can Political Science Review 62 (1968), p. 25-42.
5  If each voter expects that all other voters are rational and as a consequence they (or most of them) will 
not vote then rational voter must vote becuase they seem to be the only decisive voters. See MUELLER 
op. cit. 306-307.
6  The voters calculate not the expected benefit and costs from voting, but compare the loss from voting 
if the vote has no impact and loss from non-voting if the vote was decisive. I.e. this model assumes that 
the voters fail to calculate the probabilities of the two state-of-worlds, they see them as equally probable. 
In this case, voting is rational if the benefit from the victory of the preferred candidate is higher than the 
double of the cost of voting. See FEREJOHN, John A. – FIORINA, Morris P.: The Paradox of Non-Voting 
American Political Science Review 68 (1974), pp. 525-536.
7  This is a non-instumental way of voting: the main reason for voting is not to increase the winning 
chance of the preferred candidate, but to express support: if a candidate promises a very appealing 
policy-mix, the voters express their support for this programme through voting for the respective 
candidate. See FIORINA, Morris P. The Voting Decision: Instrumental and Expressive Aspects. Journal 
of Politics 38 (1976), pp. 390-415, MUELLER op. cit. 320-322., CULLIS, John – JONES, Philip: Public 
Finance and Public Choice. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2nd edition 1998, pp. 73-74.
8  CULLIS – JONES op. cit. 75.
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cause the victory of the ‘wrong candidate’ only if the vote was decisive. The cost 
of information exceeds almost certainly the very low expected benefit from the 
‘right’ vote – even if the political system reduces the cost of information through 
information provision via the media or the parties.
It is worth stressing that the incentives to be informed in the market (private 
choice) and in political life (collective choice) differ. In his famous article, 
Buchanan discusses six main differences: (i) the degree of certainty, (ii) the 
degree of social participation, (iii) the degree of responsibility, (iv) the nature of 
the alternatives presented, (v) the degree of coercion, and (vi) the power relations 
among individuals.
?? The degree of certainty. While in the case of private choice, the individual is 
able to predict the result of his action with absolute certainty, he can never 
predict which alternatives will be chosen in the elections. This uncertainty 
exacerbates the effect of the above mentioned rational ignorance: while 
consumers will always seek the most desirable alternative in private choice, 
the voters will not ‘necessarily, or perhaps even probably’9 make the choice 
which seems to maximize their personal utility.
?? The degree of social participation. In the market, individuals typically assume 
that their choice will not affect the outcome of social interactions. Conse-
quently, they do not care about the social consequences of their actions; they 
concentrate solely on their own benefit. But in collective choice, they take 
the social effects of their actions into account. Buchanan assumes that they 
act according to different preferences in the two cases.
?? The degree of responsibility. While individuals must bear full responsibil-
ity for their private choices, responsibility in collective choice is shared. As 
Wolf argues, while the cost of private choice must be borne by the decision-
maker, in case of political choice, cost and benefit are separated. The cost-
bearer and the beneficiary groups are different: the costs are typically borne 
by other groups.10
?? The nature of the alternatives presented. Alternatives in private choice contra-
dict each other only from the aspect that in case we want to increase the 
amount of certain commodities or goods, the degree of consumption of 
another must be reduced. Private choice is a ‘more or less’ decision. By 
contrast, collective choice is an ‘either–or’ decision. In case of private choice, 
the individuals are able to divide their ‘votes’ between several options.
?? The degree of coercion. In private choice, all ‘votes’ cast by the individuals are 
effective: individuals receive the chosen commodities. Their choices are not 
overruled. In collective choice, voters may be compelled to accept an unde-
sired alternative. This kind of coercion also reduces the incentive to gather 
9  BUCHANAN, James M.: Individual Choice in Voting and the Market. The Journal of Political Economy 
62 (1954), pp. 334-343.
10  WOLF, Charles Jr.: A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for Implementation Analysis, Journal 
of Law and Economics, 22 (1979) 107-139. WOLF, Charles Jr.: Markets Or Governments: Choosing between 
Imperfect Alternatives, MIT Press, 2003, pp. 41-45.
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information about the alternatives – even if an individual spends much time 
gathering the full scope of information about the alternatives and becomes 
fully informed, other uninformed voters can force him or her to consume 
the worse alternative.
?? The power relations among individuals. The market choice is a one-dollar-one-
vote process. In case income is unequally distributed among the individuals, 
this inequality will affect the market outcome. At the same time, collec-
tive choice tends to create, ‘at least ideally’11 the conditions of equality. But 
the desirability of equality in collective choice may be debated. It can be 
demonstrated, that the one-man-one-vote rule can result in the tyranny of 
the majority: the majority has power over the minority even if the result is 
extremely undesired for the minority.
As the list indicates, the structure of collective choice typically weakens the 
impact of selfish material motivations, but at the same time, it also reduces the 
incentives to make judicious, informed decisions.
Interest groups
According to the simplest form of the public choice approach, all groups, 
all institutions (domestic or international) behave as an interest group. They 
all aspire to influence policies. Typically, they offer resources in exchange – 
resources that the decision-makers (politicians or bureaucrats) may use to 
achieve their own goals.
The public choice theory focuses primarily on the birth, i.e. the formation 
of these groups. Perhaps the most successful model of interest group politics is 
presented by Mancur Olson.12 According to this approach, the interest groups 
fighting for the adoption of policies provide public goods to their members and 
society, that is, they are available to all members (and to non-members as well) 
independently of their contribution.
At first sight, rational, self-interested individuals will free-ride: they attempt 
to avoid contributing because they know that the benefit from the public goods, 
if produced, will be available to them. But if this free-riding strategy is virtually 
all-encompassing, the interest group will not be formed, i.e. the shared interests 
or value will not be represented in the political market.
The main advantage of Olson’s model is the recognition that free-riding is 
not the dominant strategy in all cases, some groups are more likely to be formed, 
in consequence, some interests will easily appear in the political market. Olson 
identifies some conditions which increase the chance of establishing an interest 
group, increasing the chance that individuals engage in collective action.
First of all, some groups do not need this engagement to achieve their goals: 
if a single member of the group has enough at stake, he will fight for the policies 
individually, regardless of the others’ free-riding. Secondly, small groups with 
11  BUCHANAN op. cit. 340.
12  OLSON, Mancur: The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.
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more concentrated benefits are in a better position to induce collective actions 
than larger ones. In small groups, individuals must take into account that their 
decision influences other’s decisions: if someone communicates his conditional 
contribution (for example ‘if others join, I will participate’) the rest of the group 
should provide significantly less effort to achieve the common goal. Rational 
actors are more likely to take action (in this case: to join a collective action) if 
his or her personal cost is significantly lower – consequently, such conditional 
commitments increase the chance that others will join and the public goods will 
be produced, the desired policies will be received. In a large group this reduc-
tion caused by the commitment is very small, and it is very unlikely that it will 
change the others’ decisions regarding the participation in a collective action.
Olson does not claim that a large group is unable to act collectively. But in 
their case the production of public goods is not enough to induce collective 
action; such groups have to work out incentives for the potential members to 
join. These are the so-called ‘selective incentives’. The typical forms of such 
selective incentives are services, information, allowances, personal relations 
with like-minded people, etc. which are available only for members.
While Olson’s model is the most influential in public choice literature, other 
social scientists demonstrate that several other conditions also help in coping 
with the multi-person prisoners’ dilemma. For example, the 2009 economic 
sciences Nobel Prize laureate Elinor Ostrom lists conditions which raise the 
chance of cooperation among the potential beneficiaries13:
?? Accurate information about the nature of the public goods and expected 
flow of benefits and costs is available at low cost to the participants.
?? Participants share a common understanding about the potential benefits 
and risks associated with the status quo as compared to changes in norms 
and rules they could feasibly adopt.
?? Participants share generalized norms of reciprocity and trust that can be 
used as initial social capital.
?? The group using the resource is relatively stable.
?? Participants do not heavily discount the future.
?? Participants use group decision-making methods that fall between the 
extremes of unanimity or control by a few (or even bare majority) and, thus, 
avoid high transaction or high deprivation costs.
?? Participants can develop relatively accurate and low-cost monitoring and 
sanctioning arrangements.
13  Daniel H. COLE – OSTROM, Elinor: The Variety of Property Systems and Rights in Natural Resources. 
in: Daniel H. COLE – OSTROM, Elinor (ed.): Property in Land and Other Resources. Lincoln Institute, 
2012. Elinor OSTROM – HESS, Charlotte: Private and Common Property Rights. in: Boudewijn 
Bouckaert (ed), Property law and economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010. SCHLAGER, Edella 
– OSTROM, Elinor: Property Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A conceptual analysis, Land 
Economics 68 (1992), pp. 249-262.
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Similarly, Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis demonstrate that collective 
action problems, i.e. free-riding may be mitigated if the individuals have prefer-
ences going beyond their material interests. This finding is especially important 
in the case of environmentalist (and civil rights) groups: the feeling of solidarity 
among the group members and the so-called expressive benefit (i.e. the feeling 
of standing up for an important issue is similar to the expressive voter hypoth-
esis mentioned earlier) increase the chance of participation to a great extent.14
Besides the chance of formation, the other crucial issue of interest groups 
is the common goal to be pursued. According to public choice theory, the main 
goal of interest groups is to obtain transfer, economic rent15 from others; the 
interest groups are rent-seekers. They are on the demand side of policy-formula-
tion; they attempt to manipulate the policy-maker to attain the desired political 
decisions. Naturally, they publicly argue that the policy creates public wealth. 
The public choice approach does not neglect this effect, but instead it focuses 
on the personal (but, as demonstrated, not always material) benefits these actors 
draw from the policy.
It is worth recalling that the lobbies sensitive to sustainable development 
policies are not always large groups. Public choice theory, in particular, the 
so-called Chicago School16 since George Stigler, claims that the main demand 
for regulation comes from the regulated industry.17 For example, the incidence 
of environmental regulation, emission standards and quotas can be explained 
14  CIGLER, Allan J. – LOOMIS, Burdett A: Interest Group Politics. Washington: CQ Press. 2006. pp. 9-10. 
Mark Lubel stresses the role of trust towards the others and among the group members. Naturally, this 
is not new requirement: the necessary condition of collective action within a small group is that the 
promise of ‘I will contribute if others do the same’ must be credible. The members must trust each 
other. LUBELL, Mark: Environmental Activism as Collective Action, Environment and Behavior 80 
(2002), pp. 431-454.
15  In a narrow sense, economic rent is the income for an activity which exceeds the minimum income 
necessary to keep the inputs in that activity. This minimum income is the opportunity cost (i.e. the 
economic cost): the income that would be earned if the inputs were used for the second best activity. In a 
broader sense, all transfers from one social group to other are considered rent.
16  For example: STIGLER, George – FRIEDLAND, Claire: What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of 
Electricity. Journal of Law and Economics 5 (1962), pp. 1-16. DEMSETZ, Harold: Why Regulate Utilities? 
Journal of Law and Economics 8 (1968), pp. 55-65. STIGLER, George: The Theory of Economic Regula-
tion. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 (1971), pp. 3-21. STIGLER, George: Economic 
Competition and Political Competition. Public Choice 13 (1972), pp. 91-106. BARRO, Robert: The Control 
of Politicians: An Economic Model. Public Choice 14 (1973), pp. 19-42. STIGLER, George: Free Riders 
and Collective Action. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5 (1974), pp. 359-365. PELTZ-
MAN, Sam: Toward a More General Theory of Regulation. Journal of Law and Economics 19 (1976), pp. 
211-240. DEMSETZ, Harold: Economic, Legal, and Political Dimensions of Competition. Amsterdam: 
North-Holland, 1982, BECKER, Gary S.: A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political 
Influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98 (1983), pp. 371-399. BECKER, Gary S.: Public Policies, 
Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs. Journal of Public Economics, 28 (1985), pp. 330-347.
17  STIGLER op. cit. (1971).
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by the demand coming from the industry. The incumbent firms typically prefer 
direct regulation of emissions to taxes, because such regulations create barri-
ers to entry. (It would be irrational to limit the incumbents’ emission and then 
allow new firms enter, increasing the total amount of emission.) Because of the 
limited entry and the indirect quotas on production (if the technology is given, 
the emission quota indirectly limits production as well) the competition within 
the industry will become less fierce. The price will increase and the incumbent 
firms will turn more profit. Small, concentrated industries are interested in 
regulation if it leads to entry barriers.
The other well-known example when a small concentrated interest group is 
lobbying for environmental regulation is the case when a concentrated industry 
wants to shut down ‘polluting’ competitors. Zywicki (2002) demonstrates the 
key role of waste disposal firms in environmental regulation.18
Paul B. Stephan III19 explains the Tuna-Dolphin case in a similar way. This 
GATT dispute involved the USA prohibition on the import of tuna from coun-
tries that use purse seine fishing methods resulting in a high number of collat-
eral dolphin kills. The first case was brought by Mexico. In Stephan’s opinion 
the regulation was demanded by (i) the coalition of American fisheries industry 
the competitors of which were forced out of the US. market (or forced to employ 
a high-cost technique and, in consequence, to increase their prices) and (ii) the 
US-based producers of the mandated technology:
‘it seems plausible to believe that the United States fleet might find it less expen-
sive to purchase the new technologies necessary to produce a dolphin-safe catch 
than would some of their developing country competitors. The producers of these 
new technologies might be located in the United States, creating yet another obvi-
ous interest group favoring rules mandating the technologies’ use. By contrast, 
those consumers of tuna who might prefer lower prices to reassurance about the 
safety of dolphins are undoubtedly a diffuse and unorganized group, unable to 
discipline effectively lawmakers who might act against their preferences.’
Up to this point the models, both the collective action and the rent-seeking 
theories assume that interest groups attempt to achieve the common goal of 
the members, of the group. However, as politicians are not certain to follow 
the public interest, the decision-makers in the groups, the leaders may also 
have their own personal interests which contradict the interests of the group 
members. This is a principal–agent problem.
The principal-agent problem occurs in many instances. But in the case of 
interest groups, this problem has an additional, special feature – many prin-
cipals are faced with a single agent (or small groups of agents). All potential 
18  ZYWICKI, Todd J.: Baptists? The Political Economy of Political Environmental Interest Groups, George 
Mason University Law & Economics Working Paper, No 02-23. (2002).
19  STEPHAN, Paul B ‘: Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and International Economic 
Law.’. American University International Law Review 10, no. 2 (1995), pp. 745-767.
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beneficiaries of the policy, all stakeholders or members of the groups may be 
considered principals. This results in a collective action problem: the effective 
monitoring and controlling of the agent is in itself a public good where free-
riding can be the dominant strategy of each principal. All in all, the interest 
group does not with all certainty act in the interest of the group, the leaders 
may be corrupted – they accept policies which are not in the best interest of the 
members if they receive personal gains in exchange.
Bureaucracy
The fourth key actor in the political market is the bureaucracy. As Table 1 
indicates the main characteristics of bureaucrats are very similar to the features 
of politicians. They pursue their own selfish material interests; they are moti-
vated by their personal values or their ideological of philosophical view about the 
public interest. The main difference between the motivations of the two groups 
comes from the fact that the office of politicians depends on the results of the 
elections, while the bureaucrats are appointed and not elected officials. Conse-
quently, while politicians in a democracy attempt to meet the voters’ demand, 
bureaucrats can be considered the agents of politicians.
The principal-agent relationship resurfaces: the self-interested decision-
makers (in this case: the bureaucrats) must make decisions which do not 
maximise the benefit of the principals (in this case: the politicians). This 
opportunity of deviation appears because the agent has an information advan-
tage over the principal. Even if the principals (politicians) may easily monitor 
the outcome, the success of the implementation of policies, they will not know 
how this outcome is influenced by the actions of the agents (bureaucrats) and by 
random, external effects. The outcome can be high even if the agents are lazy 
but the external effects are advantageous; and vice versa.
While the information asymmetry in the case of the bureaucracy is similar 
to the asymmetry within a corporation where the agents are the managers and 
the principals are the shareholders, the incentive systems are very different. 
While in corporations this incentive system is monetized (for example with 
bonuses linked to the profit or to the price of shares, direct profit-sharing mech-
anisms, stock options), the monetized incentive is very weak in public office. 
The lack of strong monetized incentives appreciates other forms of incentives 
and control mechanisms. For example, in public bureaus procedural rules play a 
more important role. Procedural rules are negative incentives: the principals, the 
politicians define very detailed rules, and deviating bureaucrats must bear some 
negative consequences – a reduction in their income, the stop or delay in their 
career, or even their dismissal.
An effective incentive system ensures that agents are more likely to achieve 
their own personal goals if they advance the principal’s benefit. Effective posi-
tive incentives can be employed only if the goals of the agent are known. If they 
are known, the incentive system should concentrate on these goals, and it must 
ensure that these goals are more likely to be achieved when the bureaucracy 
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works hard, focusing on maximising the principals’ benefits. But these goals 
are difficult to identify. Even within a corporation – for example, profit sharing 
or stock options are not strong enough incentives to induce profit-maximising 
decisions. The managers’ personal benefit does not originate solely from these 
monetized incentives; they have many other options to create personal advan-
tages in their position: on-the-job consumption, excess staff and capital of the 
office, tunnelling the income of the corporation to their own firm (for example 
through business with their own firms). As William Baumol points out, the 
non-pecuniary goals of the managers correlate with the size and growth of the 
corporation.20 This finding is widely accepted in the case of public bureaus, 
as well. Since William A. Niskanen’s bureaucracy model, the simplest form of 
public choice approach assumes that the most important goal of bureaucrats is 
to maximise the size and the budget of their office.21
An effective negative or positive incentive system can only work if the princi-
pals have room to motivate the agents. The relationship between politicians and 
bureaucrats is typically considered as an employment relationship – but with 
very rigid rules. Principals can only fire bureaucrats or reduce their salaries with 
great difficulty even if they violate procedural rules or if they are corrupted. But 
the bureaucracy is not homogenous. There are ministries, agencies with more 
or less independence. As independence increases, the staff’s security of employ-
ment also increases and punishment becomes more difficult. This security 
is related not only to the personal employment of bureaucrats, but also to the 
budget of the institution. While the classical ‘public interest approach’ within 
political and legal sciences argues for independence as a necessary condition for 
pursuing the public interest even against the pressure coming from politicians, 
public choice theory basically focuses on the consequences of independence on 
creating effective incentives.
Before finishing off the presentation of the basic characteristics of bureau-
cracy, the role of the judiciary within this simple public choice model must 
be defined. The judiciary may be considered a part of bureaucracy because 
20  BAUMOL, William J.: Business Behaviour, Value and Growth. New York: Macmillan, 1959.
21  In his frequently cited book, Niskanen lists some of their very likely goals: ‘salary, prerequisite of the 
office, public reputation, power, patronage, outputs of the bureau, ease of making changes, and ease in 
managing the bureau’. (NISKANEN, William A.: Bureaucracy and Representative Government Chicago 
– New York: Aldine- Atherton, 1971, p. 38.) As Denis Mueller puts it: ‘all but the last two are positively 
and monotonically related to the size of the budget.’ (MUELLER op. cit. 363.) However there are alterna-
tive explanations. For example, some models are built onto the assumption that the bureaucrats are 
interested not only in the size of the budget, but in the discretionary budget – if the budget increases, 
but the cost of required activities increases at a higher rate, this increase will reduce the benefit of the 
bureaucrats. They are interested in a budget increase with relatively small (or no) increase of activities. 
If the budget exceeds the minimal cost required by the activities, this X-inefficiency or ‘slack’ is the 
‘profit’ of the bureau. While monetary gain cannot be directly drawn by the public bureau, this extra 
revenue will be drawn by the office through similar ways as the managers tunnel the corporations’ 
income: on-the-job-consumption, self-dealing, etc.
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courts also implement policies and laws enacted by the legislature (the politi-
cians). Similarly to other forms of bureaucracy they apply the policies, the laws 
to particular cases. However, contrary to public bureaus, the judiciary plays a 
minimal role (or no role at all) in policy-making. Typically, public bureaus make 
proposals, assist in codification, etc. In most political systems the judiciary is 
unable to influence the legislation positively, however, it is able to cast a veto. 
The Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court – and in some instances the 
general courts as well – may annul laws or decrees if they find that a policy is 
inconsistent with the Constitution or with some higher level laws.
Democracy vs. dictatorship. The public choice model is frequently criticized 
because it is assumed to be relevant only in liberal democracies where the politi-
cians depend on the elections. Naturally, the main characteristics of the politi-
cians are different in a dictatorship, in a single-party system where the elections 
play a minimal role. In such systems, the main goal of the politicians is not to 
maximise their votes but (i) to maximise their support within the party (if there 
is competition for the office within the party) or (ii) to ensure the trust of the 
party leaders. The first motive is identical to the basic vote-maximising incen-
tive in democracy; the only difference being that the vote does not come from 
the population but from the party members. The effects of the second change 
can be analysed as a shift in the role of the individual – in such systems several 
‘politicians’ play the role of the appointed bureaucracy. Their characteristics 
resemble those of the bureaucracy; large groups of ‘politicians’ are basically 
‘bureaucrats’ in such systems.
But the politicians are not entirely independent from the actions of the voters 
even in a single-party system. In a dictatorship, the constituents express their 
views not through regular elections, but through occasional riots. The public 
choice theory claims that in a dictatorship the basic method of expressing the 
views of constituents is ‘voting with feet’ – the constituents may exit, emigrate.
 1.2 Interactions, Exchanges Among the Actors
After defining the main characteristics of the actors, let us now 
focus on the main interactions among them. First, elections will be analysed 
where voters cast their votes in exchange for the promises made by the politi-
cians. The politicians and parties compete for the votes – this competition and 
this exchange among politicians and voters determine the result of the elec-
tions. Then the interest groups’ interactions will be presented. They are involved 
in the exchange with the voters and the politicians. Just as politicians compete 
for votes, interest groups fight for access to, and influence on the policy-makers. 
Finally, the relationships of bureaucrats will be analysed: their principal-agent 
relationship with the politicians, as well as the so-called regulatory captures 
with lobby groups.
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Elections: interaction among voters and politicians
In order to predict the result of an election, the voters’ choice must be under-
stood. According to the simplest assumption in the public choice approach, the 
voter’s choice between the candidates is determined by proximity: they will vote 
for the closest party, i.e. the party whose position is more similar to their prefer-
ences.
The simplest models assume that the political differences among candidates 
can be represented in a one-dimensional left-right spectrum. Each voter and 
each party has its own position in this scale. The closer the party is to the posi-
tion of a single voter, the more desirable its victory is for said voter. The voter 
will vote for the closest party. It is easy to prove that in a two-party competition 
the winning party in this one-dimensional political space will be determined by 
the median voter rule: the party offering the policy preferred by the median voter 
will prevail.22
If the distribution of the preferences of voters is multidimensional – if a 
single left-right scale is unable to predict the votes – defining the winning strat-
egy is more difficult.23 In this case, instability (cyclical voting) appears. It is easy 
to demonstrate that there is no position that cannot be beaten: if a party takes 
a position, its opponent will always be able to find a policy mix which will be 
preferable for the majority of voters.24
Hereinafter only one model of the voters’ choice in a two-dimensional space 
shall be presented: probabilistic voting. The probabilistic voting model assumes 
22  If a party positions itself at the most preferred position of the median voter, then the other party is 
forced to be situated on either the right or the left side of the spectrum. The party in the median will 
get all votes from the ‘empty’ side of the spectrum. This secures 50%+1 of votes, i.e. the votes from 50% 
of the voters from the empty side and from the median voters. (And the party will receive all votes from 
the median to the halfway point between the positions of the parties.) This simple model of the median 
voter rule is built on two simple implicit assumptions: (i) there is no entry or exit in party competition 
and (ii) the important political issues can be represented in a single dimension. The simple models 
draw these predictions from some unrealistic assumptions: the preference distribution of the voters is 
unimodal and symmetric. All voters vote, even if the closest partey is far from their preferred position: 
the extreme right or the extreme left voter will vote for the party at the median if the other alternative is 
on the other side – they do not abstain if there is no candidate close to them. Mueller demonstrates that 
the parties’ winning strategy remains to move to the median even if not all individuals vote; or if the 
distribution is not symmetric (but unimodal, and full participation is expected); or if the distribution is 
multimodal (but symmetric, and all voters participate). See MUELLER op. cit. 232-233.
23  It is widely accepted in political science that the debated issues in elections can be summarized into 
maximum two or three dimensions. The preferences in different issues are correlated – e.g. the 
opinions on closing a nuclear power station and supporting aid programmes for the third world are 
correlated. The two issues (and others correlated significantly with them) may be integrated into a single 
factor. The two-factor space can predict the voters’ vote with relatively high explanatory power. See 
CULLIS – JONES op. cit. 79-80.
24  And if the first party can move after the second party took the position as an answer to the first party’s 
choice, it can change his policy to attract enough votes from the second party to achieve majority.
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that proximity does not determine political choice, however, it increases the 
probability that the voter will vote for a given candidate. Even the party posi-
tioned exactly at the preferred position of a voter cannot be certain that the 
voter will vote for them, for example because of the voter’s ignorance: the voter 
can mistakenly believe that the party is situated far from their own ideal posi-
tion. (This argument demonstrates that the probabilistic voting model is able 
to handle the consequences of the voters’ ignorance.) In this model, if a party 
wishes to maximize its expected votes, an optimal position must be determined 
in a two-, or multi-dimensional political space – i.e. the problem of cyclical votes 
disappears.
Representation and information: exchange between lobbies and voters
The important role of interest groups in the political market can only be 
understood in case the assumption of rational abstention and rational ignorance 
of voters is accepted. Voters are assumed not to participate in elections and not 
to gather information about politics. But they are assumed to know that policies 
significantly affect their well-being. In this case, the voters seek ‘representation’ 
in policy-making. They want to influence policy-makers; they want to convince 
politicians to implement policies that are most beneficial for them. But their 
vote is unlikely to be decisive. Interest groups are the obvious choice for this 
kind of representation.
Moreover, voters knowing about the significant effect of politics will have 
a demand for cheap information or watchdog institutions continuously moni-
toring the activities of politicians and public bureaus, sending the very simple 
message: ‘you should vote for Candidate X’. Interest groups offer the most 
obvious solution: they continuously monitor the politicians and the bureaucracy 
because they are able to influence policy-making only in case they are informed. 
Information, which is very valuable to the voters, emerges as the by-product of 
the normal activity of the interest groups.
In exchange for these services, the interest group will require that the voters 
join the group, support (financially and in some cases personally) the interest 
group. This is the aforementioned collective action problem: the interest group 
should ensure the participation of the voters in their activities. Moreover, in 
many cases, the most precious commodity in the possession of the interest 
groups is their influence on the votes of their members and stakeholders. 
However, interest groups must be credible when they offer this influence in 
exchange for the required policies – they must have real influence. They may 
bluff, but the politicians can easily test their real influence. For example, if the 
politicians inform the group about a (real or fabricated) proposal of a policy hurt-
ing the group, the interest group must be able to demonstrate its influence over 
those suffering the consequences of such a policy through organising strikes, 
boycotts or public actions.
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Regulatory capture: interactions of the interests groups with politicians and bureau-
crats
Regulatory capture is the clearest form of governmental failure: policy-
makers do not pursue the public interest, instead they adopt policies desired 
by the lobbies, the distributional coalition, as Mancur Olson calls them. The 
most frequently mentioned reason for regulatory capture is the direct material 
interest of the policy-makers: they are corrupted; they receive bribes from the 
lobby. For example, in their cross-sectional analysis on the ratification of Kyoto 
protocol, Per G. Fredriksson, Eric Neumayer and Gergely Ujhelyi claim that the 
influence of the lobbies on the probability of ratification is stronger if the degree 
of corruption increases.25
The distributional coalitions offer ‘campaign contribution, votes, implicit 
promises of future favors, and sometimes outright bribes’26 in exchange for the 
desired policies. One of the most important non-pecuniary resources politicians 
expect from these groups is information. Don’t forget, politicians do not have 
information about the preferences of the voters. In case of selfish politicians, 
they want to, but do not know how voters will react if they adopt a policy – they 
would like to know how the policies affect their winning chances. Public-inter-
est-motivated politicians should know how the policies are implemented, how 
they affect the well-being of the actual constituents and the opportunities of the 
next generations.
But there is no need for a bribe or corruption for such capture. The interests 
of the sectorial bureaucrats and the ministries must coincide with the interest 
of the regulated group. The already mentioned choice between the regulation of 
emission and the taxation provides a well-known example for both the material 
and immaterial motives. First, environmental standards can increase profit. 
If only a part of this extra-profit is used to finance legal or illegal services for 
decision-makers in exchange for this lucrative policy then the politicians and 
bureaucrats have a material interest in imposing regulation instead of taxation.27 
Bureaucrats (and leaders of the regulators, the ministries) also have other incen-
tives: direct regulation typically requires a larger administrative staff, a larger 
budget – involving new argument for increasing the size of their office.
In many cases the convergence of the interests of a regulated sector and of 
the regulator is manifest: all wish to increase the available resources for the 
industry. They are natural allies in the distributional contest. Environmental-
25  FREDRIKSSON, Per G. – NEUMAYER, Eric – UJHELYI, Gergely: Kyoto Protocol Cooperation: Does 
Government Corruption Facilitate Environmental Lobbying? Public Choice 133 (2007), pp. 231-251.
26  LANDES, William M. –POSNER, Richard A.: The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspec-
tive. Journal of Law and Economics 18 (1975), pp. 875-901.
27  According to the classical critique: the taxation is income for the budget which the government can 
distribute among the voters in order to increase the probability of voting for the incumbent parties. 
In consequence, the politicians should prefer taxation to regulation. But if the assumption of rational 
ignorance holds, this extra support for the individuals will influence their motivation only slightly. See 
CULLIS – JONES op. cit. 40-42.
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ist groups often join the coalition of the regulated industry, the politicians and 
the bureaucrats. They also prefer more resources. And they often prefer regula-
tion to taxes, too, because they are against taxation for philosophical or ethical 
reasons. Tax is considered an unacceptable precedent of the ‘license to pollute’ 
approach.
Finally, perhaps the most important, but less frequently mentioned source of 
regulatory capture is the information advantage of the regulated industry. The 
regulators typically have very few and very unreliable sources of external infor-
mation. The regulated industry itself seems to be the most plausible source. 
However, the regulated actors are interested in manipulating information. Even 
if the regulators recognise the opportunity of this manipulation they are unable 
to filter out the fabricated evidence. Regulation will be biased because of such 
false data.
Competition among lobbies
As demonstrated in the previous point, interest groups are assumed to fight 
for their own benefit, i.e. redistribution, transfer from other groups. This rent, 
this extra benefit is not always of material nature; the benefit of an environmen-
talist group comes from the good quality of the environment, from biodiversity, 
etc. However, all benefits of the ‘winning coalition’ will be produced from taxes 
borne by other groups. According to the simplest model, the political market 
tends to redistribute from the group which is less able to resist, channeling 
benefits towards the well-organised interest groups.
However, this competition is far removed from a contest between groups 
with equal opportunities: the chance of interest groups to be formed is not 
equal, as Mancur Olson claims. Smaller groups with more concentrated benefits 
are more likely to be organized. At the same time, they represent only a small 
fraction of society, and the cost of their preferred projects are spread among 
many other groups; such distributional coalitions bear only a minimal fraction 
of the cost. They are more likely to fight for inefficient and injust policies.
Olson and other public choice theorists28 argue that when larger interest 
groups are formed also fighting for rents and providing information to politi-
cians about the expected consequences of their actions, the one-sidedness of the 
information disappears. Each interest group must face those groups from which 
the transfer would come. The group lobbying for nuclear power must face the 
group which is against nuclear energy– both groups will attempt to convince the 
decision-makers.
There are two main theories about the expected results of this lobby contest: 
the ‘size’ and the ‘efficiency’ view. According to the ‘size theory’, even if all 
groups were formed, the difference between the small and the large groups 
remains. First of all, the principal-agent problem is more important in case of 
large groups, therefore, ceteris paribus these groups are less likely to achieve 
28  See MICHELL, William C. – MUNGER, Michael.: Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introduc-
tory Survey. American Journal of Political Science 35 (1991), pp. 512-546.
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their goals. Secondly, they typically offer different resources in their exchange 
with the politicians. Small groups tend to offer campaign contribution, career 
opportunities after leaving politics or direct bribes. The main currency of large 
groups is the vote.29 But because the promise of the vote is less reliable, small 
groups are typically expected to be more successful even if large groups are 
organised. But this is an oversimplification of the issue. As Arthur Denzau and 
Michael Munger demonstrate, if voters are informed, interest groups which can 
supply campaign resources but only a limited number of votes will not influ-
ence policy.30 James T. Hamilton stresses that small groups are more effective in 
influencing the less visible actions – for example determining the exact contents 
of a policy through modifying, amending the bills in Parliament. At the same 
time, large groups have a greater effect on the more visible actions of politicians, 
such as final voting for or against the bill.31
The most famous and most important proponent of the ‘efficiency view’ is 
Gary Becker.32 His model is built on the simple assumption that the pressures 
coming from the groups are approximately proportional to their benefit or cost 
resulting from the policy. If there are two groups, one for and one against the 
proposal the group with a larger stake will devote more resources to convince 
the policy-makers. If politicians make decisions according to the strength of 
the lobbying of the two groups then those policies will be implemented which 
produce more benefits than costs. Becker recognises the collective action prob-
lems presented by Mancur Olson, but he claims that if the organization cost is 
zero, only efficient policies will be implemented.
Both the size and efficient contest views are built on an implicit assumption: 
the groups compete with each other. A policy is assumed to be implemented if 
the supporting group prevails. The Virginian School33 of public choice theory 
29  If the politicians are only interested in maximising their votes then, as Peltzman indicated, the 
regulator will compare the change of the expected number of votes – increase in votes comes from the 
winning group or the vote can be ‘bought’ from the resources offered by that group and the decrease in 
votes on the other side.
30  DENZAU, Arthur – MUNGER, Michael: Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests 
Get Represented, American Political Science Review 80 (1986), pp. 89-106.
31  HAMILTON, James T.: Taxes, Torts and Toxics Release Inventory: Congressional Voting on Instruments 
to Control Pollution, Economic Inquiry 35 (1997), pp. 745-762.
32  BECKER op. cit. (1983, 1985).
33  For example: BUCHANAN, James M. – TOLLISON, Robert: The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbour: 
University of Michigan Press, 1962. TULLOCK, Gordon: The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, 
and Theft. Western Economic Journal 5 (1967), pp. 224-232. TULLOCK, Gordon: More on the Cost of 
Transfers. Kyklos 27 (1974), pp. 378-381. KRUEGER, Ann: The Political Economy of the Rent-seeking 
Society. American Economic Review 64 (1974), pp. 291-303. CRAIN, Mark – TOLLISON, Robert: 
Campaign Expenditures and Political Competition. Journal of Law and Economics 19 (1976), pp. 177-88. 
CRAIN, Mark: Cost and Output in the Legislative Firm. Journal of Legal Studies 8 (1979), pp. 607-621. 
BUCHANAN, James M – TOLLISON, Robert – TULLOCK, Gordon (ed.): Toward a Theory of the Rent-
seeking Society. College Station, Texas A&M Press, 1980. CRAIN, Mark – TOLLISON, Robert: The Sizes 
194
sustainability, law and public choice
fiercely criticized this assumption. First, this assumption of competition seems 
to forget the information problem: inefficient policies may be invisible even for 
well-organised interest groups. If the cost, the wasteful consequences of a policy 
cannot be observed, the opposition will not fight against it. Their second and 
more important argument is: the model explicitly supposes that the contest is 
a zero-sum game. The transfer to the winning group must come from another 
distributional coalition. In other words, the budget is balanced; deficit is not 
accepted. If deficit is a lawful option, it creates options to shift the burden of 
actual policies to the next generation. The rent of the winning coalition is 
financed by the next generation. In this case, the interest groups are not forced 
to fight each other; they must recognise that the easiest way to finish bargaining 
is a mix of (i) the policy required by the beneficiary group, and (ii) some kind of 
compensation (or over-compensation) for the opposing groups. Naturally, this 
agreement also creates a transfer, but now, the resources will be taken (gene-
rally through invisible channels) from a group which cannot participate in the 
bargaining process: from the future generations.
Monitoring bureaucracy: interaction between bureaucrats and politicians (and 
interest groups)
While corporations use monetary incentives (profit-sharing, stock options, 
bonuses), bureaucrats are typically motivated through a combination of proce-
dural rules and punishment threats. The typical procedural rules consist of a 
very detailed description of prescribed procedures. But this elaboration risks 
rigidity; the bureaucrats will be unable to change processes even if under 
changed circumstances the public interest would require modification.
Besides rigidity, the other shortcoming of this negative incentive method 
results from the difficulty of discovering the deviation. Because of the principal-
agent relationship, the bureaucrats are always capable of concealing their real 
costs, mask their real actions. The politicians typically react to this problem with 
the establishment of monitoring agencies. Such agencies can be public bureaus 
or political bodies – for example a committee of the legislation comprising 
politicians with a strong interest in the field. Politicians often make attempts to 
use watchdog organisations directly or indirectly. For example, if the procedural 
rules require that the offices hold public hearings regularly, or announce their 
proposals in advance, these requirements provide an opportunity for watchdog 
organisations to present their opinions about the office or their arguments for or 
of Majorities. Southern Economic Journal 46 (1980), pp. 726-734. McCORMICK, Robert E. – TOLLISON, 
Robert: Politicians, Legislators, and the Economy. Boston: Martinus-Nijhoff, 1981. TOLLISON, Robert 
– McCORMICK, Robert E.: Rent-Seeking: A Survey. Kyklos, 35 (1982), pp. 575-602. COLLANDER, 
David (ed.): Neoclassical Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent-seeking and DUP Activities. Cambridge: 
Ballinger.1984 SHUGHART, William F. – TOLLISON, Robert: On the Growth of Government and the 
Political Economy of Legislation. Journal of Law and Economics 19 (1986), pp. 111-127. ROWLEY, Charles 
– TOLLISON, Robert – TULLOCK, Gordon: The Political Economy of Rent-seeking. Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1988.
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against the proposals. However, as seen in the previous paragraphs, this oppor-
tunity of the interest groups also enhances the chance of regulatory capture 
– such methods provide options not only for interest groups focusing on the 
public interest, but for lobbies furthering their own self-interest. The latter will 
be able to adopt effective strategies against welfare-enhancing policies.
An alternative mechanism for monitoring is the competition between the 
bureaus through so-called direct or indirect benchmark competition. In case of 
direct competition, the sponsor is able to terminate funding the office because 
alternative solutions of the problem are available. In case of benchmark competi-
tion, the funding is not under threat, but the size of the budget or the required 
outcomes are determined after comparing the results of the bureau with the 
data of similar offices.
Policy-making: role of veto-groups (bureaucracy and politicians)
The interest groups are able to increase or reduce the chance of adopting a 
new policy or terminating an actual one. But the politicians and bureaucrats 
have veto rights in policy-making. If they do not accept the proposal, then the 
policy will not be implemented. This veto right is clear in the case of legislation, 
but similar rights are in the hands of the bureaucracy. Implementing a new 
policy typically requires active contribution from the side of the bureaucracy. 
Moreover, the bill typically cannot be prepared without their work, because 
they have absolute advantage in codification. The implementation of the policy 
depends almost entirely on the bureaucracy.
Let us commence with the issue of proposals. Suppose the bureaucracy 
prepares a proposal for a policy change. Typically, the proposals are presented 
in a take-it-or-leave-it form. The politicians have a very limited opportunity to 
modify the proposal – because of the complexity of a bill they often need the 
help of the bureaucracy for a modification. They almost always face an all or 
nothing choice: either they accept the proposal of the bureaucracy or the status 
quo remains. In this case the bureaucrats tend to make proposals which are only 
just acceptable for politicians, only just a little bit better for them as the status 
quo, but the best scenario for the bureaucracy of the options that the politicians 
will not veto.
Figure 1 presents a simple model for this ‘legislative game’ between the 
bureaucracy and the government. There is a two-dimensional political space. 
The optimal platform of the bureaucracy and of the governing parties is B 
and G. The status quo is S – this is the current policy; it will be followed if no 
changes are accepted. Bureaucrats know that legislation will not accept any 
policy that is farther from G than the status quo – U1 depicts this constraint, 
these are the policies that are just as preferable for the governing party politi-
cians as the status quo. The optimal choice for the bureaucrats is the proposal at 
point 1. This is the closest point of U1 to their optimal point, B.
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Figure 1: Change in the equilibrium of the veto policy following the change of the pref-
erences of bureaucracy
If the politicians rationally foresee that the proposal coming from the bureau-
cracy will provide no or only minimal extra benefit for them, they can extort 
better proposals as well. For example, they commit themselves to refuse any 
proposal if their surplus is insufficient. The commitment must be credible: the 
bureaucrats must believe that they will refuse an insufficient proposal even if it 
provides more benefit for the governing parties compared to the status quo.34 The 
dominant strategy of the bureaucrats remains the same: they have to elaborate 
the proposal which is the best for the bureaucracy from among the options what 
the politicians will not veto. But now, the constraint shifts: more politician-
friendly proposals will not be vetoed.
Suppose the legislature declares that it will not accept any policy above or the 
left of line SS in Figure 1. Now, the best proposal of the bureaucracy is point 2.
Implementation: the role of independence within the relationship of bureaucracy and 
politicians
When the bureaucracy implements a law, applies it for particular cases, 
there is a room for discretion. The problem is similar in the case of implementa-
tion: the bureaucracy will choose the option maximising its benefit within the 
options in its discretion. Now the ‘politicians’ participation constraint’ is not 
defined by the acceptable (for example better-than-status-quo) policy, but by the 
limits of discretion. In a very simple model this room, this constraint is set in 
the aforementioned procedural rules – if the protocol is violated, the bureaucrats 
will be punished.
The chance and the form of punishment depend significantly on the inde-
pendence of the bureau. Suppose the politicians want to sanction the bureau-
cracy because, in their opinion, the bureaucrats make decisions inconsistent 
34  The commitment is credible because politicians and bureaucrats repeatedly play a similar game within 
the framework of an election cycle.
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with this constraint. Stronger independence means that this punishment is 
more costly. The model assumes that independence does not prevent such sanc-
tions, for example firing, replacing the staff – independence dependent on the 
cost of sanctions. The option for sanctioning the most independent institutions, 
for example the judiciary, is always available, but its costs are extremely high: if 
a government starts a war against the judiciary, the politicians’ reputation, their 
chance of being re-elected will decrease. This high cost of sanctioning results in 
the high discretionary power of independent institutions.
This definition of independence plays a key role in public choice theory. 
Since William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner35 the theory explained the 
independence of the judiciary as a method to ensure that the actual laws will be 
implemented after the next election. The judiciary will make decisions accord-
ing to the law independently from the preference of the actual government.36 
This argument can be applied for the case of other independent institutions and 
for the general bureaucracy as well: even if the incumbent parties lose the next 
election, their policies will be implemented unless the law is modified. If the 
staff of the public office may be easily fired, the new government will replace 
it with new staff less committed to implement the former governments’ poli-
cies. The politicians do not have to change the law, they can (more) easily ignore 
them. The laws and independent institutions tie the hands of other bureaus and 
their successors: if they want to abandon the policy, they must bear a higher 
cost – they have to modify the law or must start a war against these individual 
institutions.
Figure 2: Implementation in case of conflict among the politicians and the administra-
tion
35  LANDES – POSNER op. cit.
36  This independence is beneficial also for governments, because it ensures that the law they enact will be 
implemented even after elections. This certainty increases the value of the policy both in their own eyes 
(e.g. the policy will serve the public interest for many years) and from the perspective of the lobbies – 
they will devote much effort to ’buy a policy’. Because of this higher demand, the independence can be 
profitable for politicians as well. See LANDES – POSNER op. cit.
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Figure 2 presents a simple example for this tied-hand effect. (The political 
space in Figure 2 is identical to the one presented in Figure 1. The policy plat-
form of the current government is B, the next government is expected to take 
position G.37 First, consider the case where there are no independent institutions 
– lack of independence in this model means that the bureau can be restructured 
or terminated, the staff can be replaced without any negative consequence. In 
this case the policy after the next election will be close to G.38
What changes if a law is enacted and this is enforced by an independent 
judiciary even against the will of the new government? What changes if a new 
independent agency or bureau with independent staff is established? For the 
sake of simplicity, assume that a ‘demarcation line’ can be clearly determined: if 
the position of the bureaucracy and the ensuing implementation of the policy is 
farther from the level of difference accepted by the government, the government 
shall wage a war against the independent institutions, or the law will be modi-
fied. In Figure 2, this acceptable difference is represented by U1. If the imple-
mented policies, the administrative decisions in the particular cases, the verdicts 
in lawsuits are inside the circle, the legislature tolerates the independence, but 
in case the decisions fall outside U1 (i.e. they are farther from G than the radius 
of the circle), the government start the war. If the bureaucracy is interested in 
avoiding the sanctions, the optimal choice of the bureaucracy is policy 1 – this is 
the no-war point closest to B. Independence shifts the implemented policy after 
the election from G to 1.
Within governments: relationship between (current and future) politicians and 
among the bureaus
The earliest public choice models were criticized because they often treated 
governments as monolithic rather than structurally complex entities. These 
were entirely demand-side models attempting to explain policy-making as a 
consequence of a fight between distributional coalitions, or a result of vote-
maximising political actions.
However, the government is not monolithic, it consists of several bureaus 
with different material or immaterial interest. Their preferences may be 
contradictory: if a bureau achieves its goal it would reduce another’s benefit. 
For example, if the ministry responsible for environmental issues achieves that 
the legislature issues a declaration against another country because of its high 
37  The model supposes that ‘government’, ‘bureaucracy’ and ‘judiciary’ may be modelled similar to an 
individual. For example the ’choice of the government represents the choice of the person who has influ-
ence over the majority of the legislature – the median voter of the legislation, the leader of the majority, 
etc.
38  It will be located close to, but not necessarily at G, because the policy position of a single government 
may also change. The result of the contest within the government is not stationary. From time to time, 
other groups prevail causing a slight shift of G. Because replacing the staff is never entirely without 
cost, the ideal position of the actual bureaucracy and the government will not always coincide. Small 
differences will be tolerated.
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level of pollution, this declaration can be harmful for the bureaus responsible 
for the good political and economic relationship with the given country. In other 
cases the conflict is less direct – for example if the same ministry succeeded in 
increasing its budget, then the residual budget available to others is reduced. 
This budgetary bargaining is identical to the aforementioned interest group 
contest.
 2 Comparative Statics
After the static analysis of the characteristics of the actors 
and the interactions among them, the expected results of international and 
European environmental law can be assessed. This chapter will focus on the 
expected effects of the change in international or European law, in particular, 
the codification of the vague sustainability principle: what happens if the prin-
ciple is incorporated into a new treaty, directive, recommendation, or if they add 
a new element to the list presented in the previous chapters (as it happens when 
the principles incorporates new elements besides intergenerational equity), or 
if they change some element39? These changes will modify the equilibrium of 
domestic politics and therefore, the policy of the government. For the sake of 
simplicity, the model will analyse only three main transmitting mechanisms: 
(i) change in the preferences of voters, (ii) shift in the personal interest of the 
politicians and bureaucrats, and (iii) increase in the power of environmentalists 
in the framework of the interest group contest. But before we embark upon the 
analysis of these changes, it must be recalled that one of the most important 
effects of these changes in international or European law was assessed formerly. 
The ratification of these documents (or automatic incorporation into domestic 
law) results in the tied-hand effect.
 2.1 Changes in Preferences of Voters
As demonstrated, even in the case of probabilistic voting, parties 
try to find the platform which maximises their expected votes. The appearance 
or change of the sustainability principle in the international or European law 
context affects the policy through changing the winning platform. Comparative 
statics analyzes how this point moves in response to an external change. Figure 
3 represents the change in the result of the elections (more exactly: the expected 
shift in the position of winning party).
39  For example Duncan French argues that when the New Delhi Declaration defined the states’ duty to 
manage their natural resources in a sustainable and safe way, it moved beyond Principle 2 of the Rio 
Declaration which is based on the traditional principle of the ‘sovereign right to exploit’. FRENCH, 
Duncan: Sustainable Development. in: FITZMAURICE, Malgosia – ONG, David M. –MERKOURIS, 
Panos (eds.): Research Handbook on International Environmental Law. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010, 
pp. 62-63.
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Figure 3: Effect of an environmentalist shift of single group of voters on the result of 
elections
The model supposes that the appearance of the principle, the public discus-
sion about related problems renders voters more sensitive to the issue. Figure 
3 presents the simplest (weakest) change: only group A alters its preferences 
and becomes more sensitive to sustainability (the other two groups’ preference 
remain unchanged). This change induces a shift of point A to A’. This single, 
small change causes a shift in the optimal platform of the parties. The winning 
strategy will most certainly move toward a more environmentalist position. The 
equilibrium moves from M to M’.40
It is worth recalling another important effect of the international and 
European environmental regimes on the domestic elections. As demonstrated, 
rational ignorance is assumed to be the main characteristic of voters, because 
of the relatively high cost of information (or relatively low expected benefit 
accrued from the informed vote). However, even if international and European 
law adopts a very vague definition of sustainability, it typically incorporates a 
compliance mechanism: institutions monitoring the nations’ policies. Such 
institutions will provide more accurate information about the consequences of 
the policy option. Let us analyze the simplest case: only one group accesses this 
new source of information; these voters will assess the parties’ positions with 
less bias. Ceteris paribus, the equilibrium of party competition will move towards 
the preferred position of this group. It seems plausible to suppose that this 
group is the greenest group, C – they are more interested in this issue. If group 
40  Mathematically, this effect can be presented as a change in eq. (N.1) and eq(N.2). If the ideal position of 
group A shifts from Ay to Ay + E where E >0, then the winning strategy of the parties will move towards 
a more environmentalist policy. The extent of this shift depends the sensitivity of the vote of voters in 
group A to the distance between their ideal position and the parties’ platform, and the number of voters 
in group A. The shift in ideal position as a consequence of the appearance of the sustainability principle 
in political debates does not change the factors in this model. If the principle affects the preferences of 
two or all groups of voters, then the expected shift in the winning party’s position will be greater.
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C becomes more important in the view of politicians, M will move to M’, the 
new equilibrium platform will be more sensitive to environmental challenges, 
will focus more on the opportunity of the next generations.
 2.2  Changes in the Personal Optimum of Politicians and 
Bureaucrats: External Sticks and Carrots
After analyzing the tied-hand effect in legislation and the estab-
lishment of new independent agencies, it is worth considering the effects of the 
shift in the preferences of these independent institutions. Subsequently, two 
main interactions will be analysed: the shifts in the preferences of the indepen-
dent agencies affect the equilibrium (i) in policy-making and (ii) in implementa-
tion.
Suppose that after a change in international and European environmental 
law the independent institutions or the government (the politicians) become 
more sensitive to sustainability problems. This extra sensitivity can be based on 
the same reasons why the voter’s preference can change: the new international 
regime or the media coverage of the international debate can draw their atten-
tion to the importance of the issues. They receive more information about the 
expected negative consequences of current policies, economic or social practices. 
Officials engaged in international negotiation start obeying the common values 
which their negotiating partners share, the rules elaborated as an outcome of 
the negotiation. In case the bureaucracy or some politicians in domestic political 
debates stand up for the specific values or rules, this can bring them interna-
tional reputation, international support. The reputation and support can be 
personal or institutional. Institutional reputation can be a very useful weapon 
in national politics – for example they can be used in the ‘war of independence’ 
of the bureaucracy or in the distributional contest, in budgetary processes when 
the politicians fight for a higher share for the given issue. Personal reputation, 
similarly to the support of the lobbies can be transformed into social capital 
(personal network), future career, social capital, etc. These can help if the 
employee exits the current office. A special form of this preference modification 
is the aforementioned shift in the optimal platforms of the parties because of 
the changes in voters’ preferences.
Because of the limited space, this point will only refer to the effects of 
the change in the position of the bureaucracy (judiciary). Readers will easily 
construe similar effects of the shift in the platform of the parties.
First, focus on the previous model of implementation with independent 
institutions. After the occurrence of a new, but vague category of sustainable 
development in the international regime, the platforms of the agencies and the 
judiciary are assumed to be more future-sensitive. Figure 4 shows that their 
optimal platform shifts from B to B’. Even if the optimal point of the govern-
ment remains G (i.e. the preference of the politicians remains unchanged), the 
expected result of implementation is also expected to be more sensitive to the 
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well-being of future generations. The equilibrium of the implementation is the 
shift from 1 to 1’. Furthermore, if the politicians foresee that the proposal of the 
bureaucracy will provide no or only minimal benefit for them over the status 
quo, and they make commitments41 to refuse any proposal without the required 
surplus (i.e. if they define SS’ as the constraint for accepting the proposal), 
the shift in the bureau’s preference caused by the international environmental 
regime results in a move of the equilibrium from 2 to 2’.
Figure 4: Change in equilibrium of the veto policy after the change in the preferences 
of the bureaucracy
 2.3 Interest Group: Domestic Dynamics
It is well documented, that if environmentalist lobbies are 
organised the domestic environmental policy is strengthened. For example, Seth 
Binder and Eric Neumayer demonstrate that the strength of environmentalist 
NGOs in the different countries have statistically significant impacts on the 
regulation regarding the emission of sulfur dioxide, smoke and heavy particu-
lates.42 James T. Hamilton and Kip W. Viscusi claim ‘that the likelihood that 
residents will engage in collective action does cause [that the senators in the US 
Senate tend] to adopt more stringent cleanup standards and spend more to avert 
cancer cases.’43 In their cross-sectional analysis on the ratification of Kyoto pro-
tocol, Per G. Fredriksson and Gergely Ujhelyi find that intensive environmental 
lobby group activity rendered ratification more probable.44 At the same time, the 
41  The commitment is credible becuase the politicians and the bureaucrats play the similar game repetedly 
within the framework of an election cycle.
42  BINDER, Seth –NEUMAYER, Eric: Eric Environmental pressure group strength and air pollution: an 
empirical analysis, Ecological Economics 55 (2005), pp. 527-538.
43  HAMILTON, James T. – VISCUSI, Kip W.: Calculating Risks? The Spatial and Political Dimensions of 
Hazardous Waste Policy, Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999, pp. 154.
44  FREDRIKSSON, Per G. –UJHELYI, Gergely: Political Institutions, Interest Groups, and the Ratification of 
International Environmental Agreements. mimeo, 2006.
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research presented above is very context-dependent, and consequently, does not 
provide a solid basis for generalisation.
As demonstrated above, the first problem of interest group policy results 
from the unequal opportunity to become organised. At the same time, inter-
national environmental regimes help in the formation of domestic and inter-
national environmental lobbies. In essence, these face the free-riding problem: 
except for small groups with concentrated benefits they need personal benefit, 
selective incentive: for example personal material benefits, useful informa-
tion or other personal services unavailable for non-members, relationship with 
others, reputation, etc.45 International organisations typically provide some of 
these private goods: members can participate in an international network (nexus 
with foreign people, information, and foreign stipends; trips abroad, etc.). The 
(potential) organisers also receive material assistance and information (know-
how) from this network – and this makes the organisation of the domestic lobby 
easier.
However, as the size theory of the interest group contest claims, the mere 
existence of an environmental group does not cause a shift in policy. Smaller 
groups will always have a higher influence on policy-making, especially in the 
less upfront issues – for example the details of a regulation. There are many 
anecdotes that industries interested in weakening the emission standards 
typically do not lobby against the regulation, they accept its necessity en masse 
(especially, if, as demonstrated, the regulation ensures extra-profit for them) 
but they focus on some less visible details which may cause a relevant increase 
or reduction to their profit. However, the international regime may help in the 
fight against these less visible pitfalls in case the domestic interest groups in 
the international network share the information about the practice the polluting 
industries typically employ.
Moreover, this network can help in coping with the principal-agent problem 
within the interest group as well. One of the most obvious methods for control-
ling the agents’ actions is comparison: the group members can compare their 
benefits with the results of other similar groups. But since information is costly, 
and the collective action problem occurs, on the personal level, ignorance may 
be rational – the information necessary for the comparison will be missing. 
However, if the international organisations gather and publicize information 
about the policies of the member countries, this problem can be mitigated. 
The members, the interested groups can easily (but not without cost) assess the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the group leaders; they can compare the domestic 
achievements with the results attained in other countries.
On the other hand, we saw that the role of small concentrated lobbies 
supporting some regulation inspired by sustainable development must not be 
underestimated. The green industry with very concentrated benefits is also a 
45  Naturally, similarly to the motivations of voters, the group members can also be motivated by the 
’expressive action’: the benefit from the feeling of integrity, expressed through standing up for some-
thing important.
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natural ally of the large environmentalist groups. And policy typically provides 
benefits as compared to the taxation, custom, or other payment. However, the 
producers of close substitute goods must draw benefits from the production 
constraints of the given industry – for example limiting the use of nuclear power 
plants or coal fired power plants creates great advantages for firms engaged in 
alternative energy production. For example, Urs Steiner Brandt and Gert Ting-
gaard Svendsen explain the EU’s commitment to Kyoto as a consequence of the 
wind energy lobby.46
Finally, the institutional circumstances of the interest group contest can 
significantly affect the equilibrium. As demonstrated, if the contest is left 
‘unregulated’ then the lobbies will tend to allocate the cost of the policies not to 
each other but to the next generation. If the political systems employ some rules 
(for example budgetary constraints on the annual budgetary debt or the overall 
public debt), they limit the opportunity to burden the current costs onto the next 
years. However, the weakness of these financial methods is that they concentrate 
only on the annual cash flow and financial assets (debt, asset). For example the 
depreciated value of physical capital (for example due to the delayed renovation 
of the roads or buildings) or human capital (ineffective education system or 
health care) is left unassessed by such measures. Similarly, the so-called implicit 
deficit (for example the obligation not burdening the explicit creditor but the 
next generation – primarily the future pensioners) is omitted from this calcula-
tion.
Because all forms of ‘leave the problem to the future’ policy cannot be 
defined in financial rules, several countries establish institutions with the 
explicit responsibility of fighting against programs decreasing the opportunities 
of future generations – for example ombudsmen or other similar institutions. 
However, the inherent weakness of these institutional mechanisms results from 
the fact that while interest groups have several forms of ‘currencies’ (informa-
tion, material and immaterial support, vote, etc.) in exchange for the desired 
policy, ombudsmen only have two limited possibilities. First of all, they may 
inform the public and they may call attention to an unsustainable policy. Addi-
tionally, in some countries, where the court may not be accessed by the public 
(for example they do not have standing to sue if they incurred no direct harm 
as a result of the policy), these offices can bring lawsuits in order to achieve the 
annulment of a certain unsustainable regulation. (In countries where the access 
to justice is less constrained, these offices possess a cost-advantage.) At the same 
time, these offices often misunderstand their role: for example they consider 
themselves ‘green ombudsmen’ and narrow their focus to environmental issues 
(in some cases they also focus on certain public finance issues). Briefly, they 
may neglect the other aspects of sustainability. In the terminology of weak 
sustainability, they concentrate solely on the environmental capital and forget 
46  BRANDT, Urs Steiner – SVENDSEN, Gert Tinggaard: Fighting Windmills: The Coalition of Industri-
alists and Environmentalists in the Climate Change Issue’, International Environmental Agreements: 
Politics, Law and Economics 4 (2004), pp. 327-337.
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other forms of capital (social and financial capital) and the potential substitution 
between them.47
 3 Conclusion
The principle of sustainable development is frequently criti-
cized because it is only a political slogan; it does not amount to soft law yet.48 
This chapter demonstrated that such a vague term is also capable of influenc-
ing policies – even without the second or third party sanctions presented in the 
previous chapter. This public choice model focused on the key decision-makers 
(veto groups): politicians and bureaucrats. Their sensitivity to sustainability 
issues can result from pressure or incentives coming from abroad (through their 
personal relationships with people in international or European institutions, or 
people working for foreign governments) or from the domestic political market. 
Changes in international or European law can modify the behaviour of voters, 
it can reinforce the position of domestic lobbies interested in the given field (or 
in our case, the lobbies sensitive to sustainability issues or interested in green 
economy), and these changes in domestic politics may render compliance with 
the vague standards of international and European law more rewarding.
47  This is the original terminology of weak sustainability (used in environmental economics). See SOLOW, 
Robert M.: On the intergenerational allocation of natural resources. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 
88 (1986), pp. 141-9. Solow Robert M.: An almost practical step towards sustainability’. Resources Policy 
16 (1993), pp. 162-72.
48  LOWE, Vaughan: Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments in BOYLE, Alan –FREE-
STONE, David (eds.): International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future 
Challanges. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999, pp. 19-37.
